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Abstract 
 
It is argued that the contemporary era is one proliferated with moral panics 
(Thompson, 1998). This is just as the concept of moral panic, which has enjoyed 
nearly forty years of analytical purchase, is being ‘rethought’ with an impetus to 
connect its processes with developments in social theory. Underpinning this 
rethink is a primary question: what are moral panics extreme examples of? It is 
evident in the literature, however, that there is a varying degree to which a more 
longstanding question – why moral panics occur – is addressed as part of this 
rethink.  
 
I propose in this thesis that these questions are intimate with each other; that only 
by understanding why real episodes occur can a supposition of what the concept 
of moral panic is in an abstract sense begin. Another – related – proposal is that 
while the conjectural question remains elusive the approach to empirical cases of 
moral panic be in real-type/ideal-type terms. That is, that at the same time as the 
concept is employed to understand phenomena occurring in tangible social 
situations, a reflection upon the concept (the ideal-type) is undertaken in relation 
to how the real-type case under investigation challenges and/or supports its 
interpretative parameters.  
 
To demonstrate these relationships and their study, I examine in this thesis the 
case of ‘killer kids’, which emerged in 2002 and spanned across the socio-
political landscape of Aotearoa/New Zealand for the next six years. At the heart 
of this case was a set of news images of a child, who at twelve years of age had 
been involved in a heinous crime resulting in the death of pizza delivery person 
Michael Choy. Seeking to understand how and why these images were 
fundamental to how this ‘real-type’ episode of moral panic unfolded in this space 
and time, I employ a two-component approach inspired by Norman Fairclough’s 
(1995a) Critical Discourse Analysis. The first component deconstructs the real-
type case via a three-tiered analytical framework: content, process, and context. 
The second component reflects upon these tiers (in parts and as a whole) in 
relation to Stanley Cohen’s (1972) application of a ‘cycle of deviance 
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amplification’ in addition to the stages of panic as described in his seminal work 
Folk Devils and Moral Panics.  
 
From the processual and contextual factors identified at play in the construction of 
‘killer kids’ I conclude with a suggestion that moral panic can be thought of as a 
set of appetites that come together in an explosive discharge of excess energy.  
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation is about the sociological concept of moral panic. Stanley Cohen 
(1972), who developed moral panic in relation to his analysis of the Mods and 
Rockers in 1960s Britain, defines the concept as follows:1 
 
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by 
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or 
(more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates 
and becomes more visible (Cohen, 1972: 1). 
 
Reflecting the intellectual and political turbulence out of which it was forged, 
underpinning moral panic is the assumption of disproportionality; the idea that the 
social reaction it describes is all out of proportion to an empirical – or any rational 
sense of – reality. It is this that determines a reaction as a ‘panic’ and 
distinguishes it from other episodes of social concern. The facility to reveal the 
inconsistencies and injustices in how things become seen as troubling has since 
proved “deliciously alluring” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, forthcoming) and the past 
four decades has seen moral panic applied to everything from paedophile priests 
to Ecstasy, and from single mothers to terrorism (see Klocke & Muschert, 2010; 
Miller & Kitzinger, 1998). Indeed, the concept’s academic success over this time 
has been described as “whopping” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, forthcoming; see also 
Innes, 2005; Garland, 2008). Ironically, this success has become something of a 
problem. Scholars sensitive to the complexities of these acute and volatile social 
reactions no longer agree upon its analytical parameters, while others have been 
accused of adopting casual analytical standards (Best, forthcoming). At the same 
time, the terminology has been adopted by media professionals and other laymen 
who are often quick to label all sorts of different forms and magnitudes of social 
reaction as ‘just another moral panic’ with which “thinking types ought not to 
                                                
1 Cohen’s (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics is often cited as the founding work on the 
phenomena. However, it was Jock Young (1971) who first used the term in The Drugtakers. 
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bother” (Conway, 2010; see also Cohen, 2002; Hier, 2002a; Hunt, 1997; Jewkes, 
2004; Thompson, 1998). Adding to this are two quite significant shifts upon the 
intellectual scene. Sociology has become preoccupied with Ulrick Beck’s (1992) 
‘risk society’, while the ‘cultural turn’ privileges the postmodern concern with 
representations alongside an appreciation of audiences as active critics able to see 
past the masquerades of sensationalist journalism. Moral panic, it is said, with its 
personified ‘evildoers’ and its notion of propaganda against a reference to a 
‘truth’, has simply fallen out of fashion (Critcher, 2003). Yet the need to have at 
hand a concept that can deal with volatile social conflict has never been more 
essential. It is argued that with increased social plurality, the development of the 
public sphere and civil society and the decline of class alignments, the means and 
the space for contests over moral questions to flourish is unprecedented (Critcher, 
2003, 2006; Thompson, 1998). Indeed, it is claimed that the contemporary era is 
“the age of moral panic” (Thompson, 1998: 1).  
 
Anyone familiar with – or becoming familiar with – the panic literature will 
observe that most scholars will begin their work just as I have here, with Cohen’s 
(1972) opening paragraph. The most recent accounts will follow this – again, as I 
have – with a brief discussion about the concept’s phenomenal success and 
consequent loss of academic capital. There is often then a statement about how 
the author intends to contribute to the literature as either a panic defender or a 
critic. This thesis is about an episode of moral panic, and it is about the concept of 
panic and a way by which it can regain its former status as an interpretative idea. 
It is, thus, a defensive account. Finding myself captured by a case that demanded 
interpretation, and evaluating that moral panic remained the most appropriate way 
by which this interpretation could be got, the argument developed here is very 
much a product of an excursion through the vast terrain of panic literature, trying 
to work out how the concept could get the best out of my case study and vice 
versa; how my case could shed light on directions in which the concept might 
regain some authority. I anticipated that my study could also add some much-
needed girth to the small body of panic literature that is Aotearoa/New Zealand 
focused. There are few published studies of moral panic as they occur in the 
Aotearoa/New Zealand context despite the concept’s popularity with graduate 
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students as well as a plethora of episodes that fit the candidature for panic 
research (boy ‘racers’, problem dogs, teen drinkers, and ‘tagging’ to name a 
few).2 Additionally (and fortunately), my treks through the literature were 
happening at the same time as a project of ‘rethinking moral panic’ was gaining 
ground. Concerned, as I was, with salvaging the concept, this project offered me 
some footing in terms of how to organize the approach to my case study. It is this 
approach that forms the basis of my contribution to the study of moral panic.  
 
Underpinning my approach are two proposals. These proposals are dependent 
upon imagining the study of moral panic simultaneously as two separate but 
interrelated studies: as a study of a real-type situated reaction and the study of an 
ideal-type transferable concept. It is my first proposal that the ways by which the 
internal processes of a real-type reaction of moral panic develop must be seen in 
relation to the context in which it is meaningful. To offer an example, it is a 
proposal that a panic about Ecstasy will develop differently to a panic about single 
mothers simply because the threat each poses to societal values and interests, the 
ways by which the moral boundaries are manned (together with the identities of 
the ‘right-thinking people’), and the diagnoses and solutions pronounced will be 
fundamentally different. Of course, they may not be fundamentally different 
which would suggest much about the context/s they belonged to. It might also 
imply that the concept has an extraordinary authority insofar as its ideal-type 
formula captures absolutely how real-type cases unfold. Building upon this first 
proposal, my second proposal is that the relationship between the real-type panic 
and the conceptual model (the ideal-type) – and by extension a collation of 
relationships between real-types and the ideal-type – needs to be considered in 
detail. While both proposals acknowledge that the processes described in Folk 
Devils were intimate with their subject matter – the Mods and Rockers – this 
                                                
2 The published works include (in chronological order) Young and Kelsey’s (1982) The Gangs: 
moral panic as social control, Shuker, Openshaw, and Soler’s (1990) Youth, Media and Moral 
Panics in New Zealand: from hooligans to video nasties, Hill’s (1998) Satan's Excellent Adventure 
in the Antipodes, and the less academically orientated but nevertheless sophisticated study of the 
localized version of the satanic ritual abuse scare A City Possessed by Lynley Hood (2001). 
Graduate student works include Griffiths (2005) Darkness, death and distortion: a sociological 
examination of moral panic theory and the Gothic subculture, Matthews (2001) Home Invasion: 
the role of the New Zealand media in a moral panic case study, and Wallace (2006) Menace or 
Moral Panic? Methamphetamine and the New Zealand press.   
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second one also preserves Cohen’s (1972) conjecture of the concept as 
transferable and not necessarily particular. However, it also extends the concept 
insofar as it asks how the context/s of real-types can inform an explanation of the 
ideal-type. It hypothesizes that moral panic might be something more than a 
descriptive sociological tool.  
 
These proposals developed in relation to three variables; the case that captured my 
attention, the directions in which the project of rethinking moral panic were 
heading, and the methodological framework employed for making sense of this 
case in relation to those directions. The next section introduces the case as I 
encountered it. As my objective is to flesh out why the case demanded 
explanation, it will include only brief synopses for why the project of rethinking 
moral panic and the methodological framework would become important for how 
this study would move forward. These variables will be given due attention in 
chapters to follow.  
 
A Case of Moral Panic 
 
On August 25, 2002, a photograph of 13 year old Bailey Junior Kurariki, 
convicted of manslaughter for his part in a group incident which resulted in the 
death of pizza delivery man Michael Choy in September, 2001, graced two thirds 
of front page space of major national newspaper the Sunday Star Times. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to reproduce this image in this thesis, beyond 
examination.3 The Sunday Star Times, which shares copyright with the 
photographer, informed me that because it was taken inside a courtroom, they 
were unable to give me permission to use it.4 Taking a lead from Jones and 
Wardle (2008), who came across an identical embargo, I opted to have the image 
                                                
3 It is important to note that the Copyright Act (1994) allows such images and other like material 
to be used without permission for purposes of examination. Thus, the examiners of this thesis were 
able to view the photograph as it appeared, as I used the original for those copies. It can be seen, 
however, in the original article (see Wellwood, 2002) and others (see for example: “Welfare 
Blamed Over Young,” 2002; “Teenage Criminal’s Terrible Message,” 2002). It also appears in 
another article that can be viewed online (“Kurariki’s Release Puts Fear,” 2008).  
4 I encountered a similar issue when sourcing film footage of the case from TVNZ, which I note in 
Chapter Three. Both the Sunday Star Times and TVNZ were unable to give me a firm explanation 
as to why. Nevertheless, it is significant that the media are able to continue using these images, 
which they have done repeatedly across the sample that I employ and beyond.  
 5 
digitally traced, and to supplement it with description, in order to demonstrate 
why the image was significant. In Figure 1.1. Bailey is the figure shown sitting at 
a table with his left arm resting on its corner edge.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The front page of the Sunday Star Times, August 25, 2002.  
 
Bailey is wearing a baby blue t-shirt and his hair is styled to the latest trend for 
young men. The table that he sits behind was plainly not made for someone his 
size as its edges reach his mid-chest area. Behind him is the figure of another 
person who is out of focus, but it is clear that his/her shoulders exceed the length 
of Bailey’s. The shot, taken from his left, is at a 40-degree angle. Something has 
caught his attention ahead of him and he is smiling, either completely unaware of 
the photographer or not concerned to present himself to the camera in any 
particular manner. He is a beautiful child, with even features and smooth skin, and 
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seems to be alertly curious, even just for that instance, at whatever it is that he is 
looking at.  
 
As can be seen, situated within the image, adjacent to and parallel in size to 
Bailey’s face, and in bold font, is the headline “Our youngest killer”. The sub-
headline reads “At 9 he was shoplifting, by 10 he was banned from school, at 12 
he helped kill a pizza delivery man”, and beneath, the accompanying text 
continues “Youngest … At 13 … could barely see over the court bench … one of 
six teenagers … murderous plan … he was the worst … was out of control … 
convicted killer … was Kurariki who gave the command” (Wellwood, 2002).  
 
This was the first print article after the trial, which convicted six teenagers in 
relation to Michael Choy’s murder, and the first time this image appeared. For the 
most part, reports at the time of the incident and during the trial were intermittent 
and confined to facts in terms of how the event unfolded, what charges were laid, 
who was in attendance in court, and so on. However, already a feature of interest 
were the ages of the group involved, as this was often mentioned in opening 
paragraphs, particularly that of the as yet to be named Bailey Kurariki who was, at 
12 years-old, the youngest person in Aotearoa/New Zealand to ever be accused of 
murder.   
 
On appearance of Bailey’s image in that first article however, coverage of the trial 
saturated the press. Moreover, attention emphasized Bailey’s involvement despite 
that he had been one of six, and had played a relatively minor role. This marked a 
definitive shift in focus from pre/during trial reports in which it was clear a group 
were involved. Significantly, reports were repeatedly accompanied with images of 
Bailey, all of which accentuated, as did the above photograph, his childlike 
appearance. 
 
Another prolific factor in post trial reports was an array of statements from 
significant public figures assigning those who could be held responsible, 
evaluating whether this was a result of nature or nurture, with many also offering 
dire predictions if something was not done now. Then Commissioner for Children 
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Roger McClay called for an immediate inquiry into ‘killer kids’ claiming a 
definitive trend towards violent acts by young people, while both governmental 
and opposition politicians urged for investigations into the inadequacy of welfare 
organizations (particularly those under whose care Bailey was at the time of the 
event).5 Lobby groups such as the Sensible Sentencing Trust and other ‘expert’ 
individuals argued Aotearoa/New Zealand’s rehabilitative approach to young 
offenders was a failed experiment and that this case only exemplified their 
previous claims for tougher sentencing. Editorials spoke of Kurariki’s “angelic 
face” and how it was “an emblem of youth corrupted…(disguising a) terrible 
reality” (“Young and Bad,” 2002), while claiming the country’s mood as 
retributive in asking why it (the crime) happened. These agents were also 
prescriptive for how the ‘problem’ should be addressed (“Children Who kill: 
Don’t Be Surprised,” 2002).  
 
The six responsible for Michael Choy’s death were sentenced on September 16, 
2002, each receiving what was later identified as ‘adult sized’ custodial terms. 
The two convicted for murder, for example, received ‘life’ terms whereas the 
youngest of the group, Bailey Kurariki – convicted of manslaughter – got seven 
years. At this point the initial furor towards the construction of a problem of 
murderous youth can be seen to wane, only to re-gather momentum and shift its 
focus towards the management of and prevention of the risky behaviours 
particular youths were susceptible to. Debates unto this would persist, 
intermittently, over the next four years, culminating with the development of the 
Young Offenders (serious crimes) Bill (which sought to reduce the age of 
criminal responsibility from 14 years to 12) put forth by New Zealand First 
Member of Parliament Ron Mark. This Bill would be debated periodically for the 
next two years but would be rejected by parliament as a law in May, 2008, just 
weeks after Bailey Kurariki was released from prison.   
 
These paragraphs describe what I initially observed of the matter of ‘killer kids’. 
As one development gave way to another I began to consider that there appeared 
                                                
5 It is from this call for an inquiry that I adopted the term ‘killer kids’ as a name for the case as a 
whole.  
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to be a ‘problem’ emerging whose trajectory fulfilled the criteria for a moral 
panic. However, taking into account that the first point of departure for any moral 
panic analysis is the claim that this particular reaction is one that has been blown 
all out of proportion to an objective reality, I needed to first determine that such a 
decree could be made. This was not difficult, as the details of the murder case 
demonstrate.  
 
On Wednesday, September 12, 2001, a group of youths at an address in Papakura, 
Auckland, ordered a pizza with the intention to rob the delivery person. When 40-
year-old Michael Choy arrived, he was greeted by two of the group pretending to 
be customers. One of these was the youngest of the group who reportedly 
indicated to one of the elder ones that the assault could commence. This elder boy 
with a baseball bat then hit Michael Choy on the head and the group stole the food 
and drinks and ran off. Although mortally wounded, Michael Choy was still able 
to walk. Another of the group walked him down the road towards his car and took 
from him his belt-bag containing money. Mr Choy, now alone, then appealed for 
help from one of the neighbouring properties, but was refused aid by the 
occupants. He then walked towards his home where he was found collapsed a 
short time later. He died in hospital at 6.25 pm on the following day. 
 
Over the next week, 15-year-old Alexander Peihopa, 17-year-old Whatarangi 
Rawiri, 15-year-old Riki Rapira, 16-year-old Phillip Kaukasi, 14-year-old Joe 
Kaukasi, and 12-year-old Bailey Kurariki were arrested, charged with murder, and 
remanded in custody until the trial the following July. Given the grave nature of 
what these youths had been accused of, this action can be fairly assumed as 
proportionate. However, attention to the case would be suspended until trial 
proceedings got under way in July, 2002. This was due to some remarkable timing 
on behalf of the events of the crime themselves. Taking account for world time 
zones, these events occurred on the same day as the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre in New York – September 11, 2001. Therefore, where ordinarily the 
significance of a murder by a group of youths would warrant a fair degree of local 
print and air space, our media were for the following weeks preoccupied, as were 
media globally, with events unfolding on the world stage. This would become 
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significant for how the case would be subsequently interpreted. In particular, 
attention would be stirred toward the notion that ‘killer kids’ were on the rise by a 
bevy of such cases that would materialize during 2002, many of which were 
especially visible during the period July – September.6  
 
The trial for the murder of Michael Choy concluded with the convictions of 
murder for Peihopa and Rawiri, and manslaughter for the others, on August 24, 
2002. Three days later, 14-year-old Renee Kara O’Brien was sentenced for having 
struck 60-year-old Kenneth Pigott eight times with a hammer while he was 
sleeping in his car on March 10, 2002, killing him. She received ‘life’ (a 
minimum 10 year custodial sentence). The two friends that had been with her 
during the attack both pleaded guilty to manslaughter and were sentenced on 
August 26, and September 11, 2002 respectively. On May 8, 2002, 18 year-old 
Ese Junior Falealii set out to rob a Pakuranga pizza bar and shot attendant Marcus 
Doig in the back, ending his life. A week later on May 15, Falealii robbed the 
Mangere ASB bank and shot and killed a second victim – teller John Vaughan. 
Falealii pled guilty and was sentenced on July 19, 2002 to 17 years and 9 months; 
incidentally, the second longest non-parole period for murder handed down in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand to that date. On July 5, 2002, 17-year-old Daniel Luff 
detained his ex-girlfriend and her family in their home at gunpoint, which resulted 
in a shootout with police. Luff was sentenced to a minimum non-parole period of 
17 years for the murder of Detective Constable Duncan Taylor, and the attempted 
murder of Detective Constable Jeanette Page on September 18, 2002, just two 
days after the sentencing for the Choy case. However, it would not end there. One 
day prior to the Choy case sentencing, 21 year-old Tanya Burr was stabbed to 
death by 16 year-old John Wharekura, who later pled guilty and was sentenced to 
14 years.  
 
Considering the nature of these cases; that is, as violent, often premeditated 
murders by young people, in addition to their relation to each other in terms of 
timing, it is not difficult to imagine that the Choy case would be understood as 
                                                
6 Chapter Five explores the ways in which the media construction of the events of the trial was 
significantly affected by such timing.  
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part of a sharp escalation in youth crime. Indeed, one editor argued not long after 
the trial for the murder of Michael Choy that 2002 would be seen in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand’s history as “the year of the child killer” (“Children Who 
Turn,” 2002). It is also not hard to envisage why the youngest of these youths 
(both in the Choy murder itself and among the other crimes) would incite 
attention. Therefore, the reaction in this sense can also be evaluated as reasonably 
proportionate. However, that the identification of a social problem to which there 
would be a bevy of explanations and prescriptions materialized only after the 
appearance of the imagery of Bailey Kurariki and that the attention to the case 
itself would concentrate predominantly upon Bailey’s involvement over and 
above that of his co-offenders, brought to light that the focus upon Bailey was 
becoming extreme. Later, as will be confirmed in this dissertation, as the 
predicted ‘battalion’ of murderous youths failed to appear, it could be argued that 
the reaction and its repercussions would also be out of order. Nevertheless, a 
perception that society was ‘under siege’ prevailed for another six years as the 
following passage reveals:  
 
Armed with weapons and a devil-may-care attitude, rogue youths have terrified the 
public with a series of deadly attacks … seven years on since the brutal murder of 
Michael Choy, New Zealand remains in the grip of teenage attackers (McDonald, 
2008). 
 
With Bailey, by this time, having earned himself an exaggerated sense of infamy:  
 
Six others were involved … Their names are largely forgotten but the baby-faced 
Kurariki became notorious (Cummings, 2008).  
 
People have become convinced he was the murderer (Workman cited in Cummings, 
2008).  
 
My claim is that this episode demanded interpretation simply because this child 
was depicted as a killer in terms that went beyond what was appropriate for a 
measure of retribution. Moreover, he stood unwarrantedly alone in the ways by 
which the murder case was represented, and by which a social problem was 
constructed. Moreover still, this segregation had been initiated and was sustained 
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with the use of a set of media images. My initial questions, therefore, related to 
the nature of this imagery and what role it served in the unfolding of a social 
problem. Not only did this appear a pertinent point of analysis for this case study 
(indeed it was an almost natural selection of what to focus on, given the shift of 
focus to Bailey upon the imagery’s appearance), but there is an increased 
emphasis among scholars across the spectrum of social and cultural analysis upon 
the significance of images in the construction of social life (for some excellent 
examples, see Biber, 2007; Holland, 2004; Jones & Wardle, 2008; Wardle, 2007; 
Young, 1996). Moreover, it seems that nowhere is this more essential than in the 
analysis of media images of crime: 
 
… today the visual constitutes perhaps the central medium through which the 
meanings and emotions of crime are captured and conveyed to audiences. Indeed, 
we would suggest that it is the visual that increasingly shapes our engagement with 
and understanding of, key issues of crime, control, and social order (Greer, Ferrell & 
Jewkes, 2007: 5).  
 
However, there was no simple means by which I could ‘add in’ the analysis of the 
image given the expanding body of work that sought to deal with what 
Featherstone (1991) terms the aestheticization of everyday life (see also Debord, 
1977; Evans & Hall, 1999; Lister & Wells, 2001; Matheison, 1997; Poster, 2002, 
Young, 1996). In addition, our ‘readings’ have become more complex as we 
incorporate the insights of cultural studies and psychoanalysis, feminism and post 
colonialism; all of which place emphasis on the ‘gaze’ in the social practices of 
observation, surveillance, and visual pleasure. Yet, as Walter Mitchell (1994: 13) 
argues, “we still do not know exactly what pictures are, what their relationship to 
language is, how they operate on observers and the world, how their history is to 
be understood, and what is to be done with or about them.”  
 
Nevertheless, my observation that pictures had sparked a moral panic required 
explanation. To begin with there were some central questions to be asked of this 
initiation. How and why could the imagery of Bailey Kurariki prove so 
commanding? Was the unit of the imagery important: the photograph? Or was it 
what it depicted: a criminal child, a brown child? Would the imagery continue to 
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be commanding throughout the panic sequence? How would its role in the 
sequence bear upon the processes of the ideal-type as described by Cohen (1972)? 
What was happening in the socio-political environment at this time that could 
shed light on these questions?  
 
A review of the contemporary moral panic literature brought new requirements; 
how could these initial questions inform, and be informed by, the ways in which 
the project of ‘rethinking moral panic’ was developing? It became clear that moral 
panic was undergoing review to see how it might be connected to developments 
within social theory. This was an imperative exercise insofar as the analytical 
concept appeared to have had lost authority at the very same time that real-type 
cases were on the rise. At the heart of this project of rethinking moral panic was 
(and is) an impetus to find the answer to a ‘bigger question’ that has to date 
eluded panic analyses. That question, as Critcher (2008: 1139) aptly puts it, is 
“what, if anything, are moral panics extreme examples of?” It is a question 
concerned with contextualizing the processes of the ideal-type concept in order to 
provide an explanation for moral panics as they are witnessed in real social 
situations. The ultimate aim, it seems, is to theorize the concept. However, I 
contend that this exercise is premature insofar as understandings often focus upon 
the operation of the internal processes of panic in their approaches for why a said 
panic emerges, in addition to varying degrees of acknowledgment of the bearing 
of real-type episodes upon these processes. My objective was to demonstrate how 
context matters, and how the interpretative processes of panic must be relevant to 
empirical realities. I propose that these are the first crucial steps toward a 
theoretical understanding of the analytical concept.  
 
The next task was methodological; in what way could I address the questions 
developed so far? Taking heed of the concerns of contemporary moral panic 
scholars to incorporate discourse analysis within the research agenda, I drew upon 
the three-tiered model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) formulated by 
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Norman Fairclough (1995b).7 For Fairclough (1995b), any communicative or 
discursive event is made up of three parts that are interconnected but analytically 
separable. A discursive event is first written or spoken text. It is second an 
instance of discourse practice – the production and interpretation of text. Third, it 
is a piece of social practice. What this means is that any discursive event can be 
seen as both socially shaped and as socially shaping. Correspondingly, for 
Fairclough (1995b) there is a three-part approach for analysis – description, 
interpretation, and explanation. Further, importantly, Fairclough (1995b) contends 
that the analysis of a discursive event be examined alongside an analysis of its 
relation to its ‘order of discourse’. This is an abstract way of describing particular 
configurations of discourses that can be identified as belonging to a particular 
social space or subject to a particular organizational logic (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 1999). An order of discourse can be affected by the discursive event, 
and the discursive event can affect its order.  
 
I imagined the case study of ‘killer kids’ (my real-type panic) as a discursive 
event (as an instance of text, discourse practice, and socio-cultural practice). I 
then imagined the concept of moral panic, in its ideal-type form, as an ‘order of 
discourse’. In this way I could examine how the context of the episode was 
important to how it materialized and examine the relationship between this real-
type case of moral panic and the ideal-type concept. I could also address each 
component concurrently by working my analysis across the three aspects of the 
communicative event in a revised framework that encompasses the study of the 
‘order of discourse’: content (to explore the material features of a panic), process 
(to look at the practices that gave rise to these material features in relation to the 
practices of the conceptual model), and context (to examine the environmental 
factors upon which this relationship between material features and practices rely 
and the conjectural space in which we might locate the concept).8  
 
                                                
7 My choice here is not accidental. The critical element of CDA addressed my concern to retain the 
deconstructive – normative – element of moral panic. The debate about the role of normativity in 
contemporary panic analyses is discussed in Chapter One.  
8 This framework and the methods it informed are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 14 
This approach to moral panic allowed for some interesting findings. This was a 
material episode that spanned three discourses and two phases. Its drama was as 
dependent upon a sequence of judicial decisions specific to the trial as it was upon 
routine media story making. It exposed that active in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s 
socio-political environment across the period of 2002-2008 was an operation 
against particular children, an expanding punitive agenda, and a spectacle in 
which the ‘other’ was subject to a racialised regime of representation. Moreover, 
despite my anticipation that the material features would impose themselves upon 
the conceptual model, obliging modification, the challenge by this real-type moral 
panic to the processes of the ideal-type would be subtle. More significant was 
how removed from any impending content these processes were revealed to be; 
how descriptive they remain. Nevertheless, my proposal that panics need to be 
situated and that context matters in thinking about how the ideal-type can be 
explained would be validated. Through locating ‘killer kids’ within its context I 
was able to conjecture that what moral panic might be an extreme example of is 
something far more existentially confronting than the project of rethinking panic 
has thus far imagined.  
 
Chapter Outline  
 
The thesis is comprised of seven chapters, designed to be read in clusters. Chapter 
One conducts a close examination of the concept of moral panic as it was 
developed through the foundational works of Cohen (1972, 2002), Hall, Critcher, 
Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts (1978), and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a, b). 
The second part of this chapter seeks to understand some of the ways by which 
the concept has been marginalized through exploring in detail some of the 
substantial (and a few less developed) critiques. In the main, the objective of this 
first chapter is to get to know moral panic and to construct the platform upon 
which the contemporary scholarly project of ‘rethinking moral panic’ would grasp 
a foothold. Chapter Two examines the development of this project of ‘rethinking 
moral panic’. The aim is to position the proposals of this study in relation to the 
work of four scholars; Sheldon Ungar (2001), Chas Critcher (2003, 2008, 2009), 
Sean Hier (2002a, 2003, 2008), and Amanda Rohloff (2008, 2010). At this point I 
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also introduce an idea emerging from recent scholarship in the sociology of 
punishment, reflecting upon how this idea has come about through consideration 
of the context of late-modernity and thereupon how it might be useful for 
reimagining the study of panic. Chapter Three spells out the methodology for the 
study. It revises the proposals forged in Chapters One and Two and introduces a 
framework inspired by CDA with which to address these. It examines how this 
framework informed the methods with which the study was carried out. It also 
gives the details of, and justification for, the sample used and the sources 
employed.  
 
The next three chapters cover the empirical part of this dissertation. In these 
chapters the phenomenon of ‘killer kids’ is imagined as a ‘discursive event’ 
within the critical discourse analysis paradigm. As I proceed, I show how this 
‘event’ can be considered in relation to the ideal-type processes of the concept of 
moral panic; how, despite its unique beginning and its inimitable trajectory, it 
offered very little of a challenge to the concept’s interpretative parameters. 
Chapter Four examines the content of the episode; the ways in which the 
narratives of ‘killer kids’ developed in relation to the trial for the murder of 
Michael Choy and its interpretations in the media across the sample period. 
Chapter Five moves behind this picture to examine the practices and identities 
involved in the episode’s construction. First, it interprets the case against an 
examination of the criteria by which media professionals choose events for news 
and the practices by which they subsequently transform these events into stories. 
Second, it examines what was and who were at work in energizing the momentum 
required to build the media story into a sense of social crisis that would extend 
from an acute reactive phase into a lengthy period of constancy. Chapter Six is 
concerned with the social context in which the narratives, practices, and identities 
of ‘killer kids’ belonged. Working with a set of cues from the previous chapter, 
three social phenomena are identified to have particular bearing upon why this 
episode materialized in the way in which it did. The chapter concludes with some 
disclosures about the ways by which Bailey Kurariki continues to be demonized 
beyond the boundaries of an observable moral panic and questions what this 
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might mean for understanding the ideal-type concept as an ‘extreme example’ of 
something.   
 
Chapter Seven concludes the study with a review of the empirical findings, a 
suggestion of what moral panic might be an acute example of, and a reflection 
upon why the approach employed for this study was significant.  
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Chapter One 
 
Moral Panic 
 
… moral panics are condensed political struggles to control the means of cultural 
reproduction. Studying them is easy and a lot of fun. It also allows us to identify and 
conceptualise the lines of power in any society, the ways in which we are 
manipulated into taking some things too seriously and other things not enough 
(Cohen, 2002: xxxv). 
 
This chapter will explore the development and evolution of the sociological 
concept of moral panic though the foundational works of Cohen (1972), Hall et al. 
(1978), and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994). It will be seen how the concept was 
initiated as an unintentional ‘interactionist’ episode, interpreted as a strategy 
employed to orchestrate hegemony and divert attention from a capitalist crisis, 
and subsequently moved into a collective behaviour framework whereupon the 
focus moved to the role of claims-makers in defining, amplifying, and diffusing a 
social problem. The chapter will then discuss and evaluate an assortment of 
critiques that have been directed at the concept in the course of its movements 
over the intellectual terrain; namely, the notion that moral panic is a polemic 
rather than an analytical concept, that it lacks an appreciation for the plurality of 
reactions that can accompany moral assertions, and that it neither accounts 
appropriately for how the public respond nor how an engagement with that public 
can be achieved. At the end of the discussion, I explore how the idea of moral 
panic rests upon an assumption that it functions to alleviate social uncertainty by 
marking the moral boundaries of the particular society in which it materialises and 
why this has become problematic.  
 
In the introduction for this dissertation I argued that my proposals for the study of 
killer kids developed in relation to three variables: the case under analysis, the 
directions in which the project of ‘rethinking panic’ were heading, and the 
methodology employed for making sense of this case in relation to those 
directions. The objective of this chapter is to become acquainted with the moral 
panic concept and appreciate its relevancy for the study of ‘killer kids’ but also to 
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learn why and from what bedrock the contemporary project of ‘rethinking moral 
panic’ has developed.9 Concluding this chapter, I examine how the development 
of the concept, along with the critiques, has an initial bearing upon my approach 
to ‘killer kids’ and my proposals for panic study. A full ‘thesis statement’ is 
formulated at the end of Chapter Two, and stated again in Chapter Three as I 
explain how the Critical Discourse Analysis framework enables my proposals to 
be put into action.  
 
Folk Devils and Moral Panics 
 
A scuffle between a few groups of youths in Clacton at Easter in 1964 prompted 
spiralling over-heated concern about what came to be seen as a series of episodes 
of vandalism and mob violence by two adolescent factions identified as the Mods 
and the Rockers. The media sensationally over-reported these episodes, the police 
increased their vigilance and over-zealously employed crowd control tactics, and 
local people urged that something legislative be done, while it was rumoured that 
vigilante squads were formed by tradesmen seeking to protect their property. 
Further, local members of parliament issued statements of probable solutions, 
editors articulated their opinions, interest groups pushed for policy statements to 
be formalised, and the courts sought to ‘clamp down’ upon these volatile 
disturbances.  
 
For PhD student Stanley Cohen (1972), this episode demanded interpretation and 
it would become the subject of his dissertation; later to be developed into his 
seminal text Folk Devils and Moral Panics. Informed by the ‘transactional’ or 
‘interactionist’ approach to deviant behaviour (see Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1951), 
his analysis developed in relation to an emphasis on the set of reactions to the 
Mods and Rockers; how were they identified, labelled, controlled? Why did the 
reaction take particular forms? What were the myths, stereotypes, and methods of 
control that erupted from the interaction between the deviants and society?  
 
                                                
9 This project is the focus of discussion in Chapter Two.  
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The structure of his explanatory framework is justified firstly, through 
understanding how information is received about the behaviour in question; 
second-hand, via the media. This link between the media and the creation of folk 
devils; how the nature of information increased both the scale of deviance and the 
degree of societal reaction toward it was usefully made with Wilkins’ (1964) 
‘deviance amplification cycle’. Still, the ‘panic’ became more than an ordinary 
case of deviance amplification (initial event, societal reaction, increase in 
deviance, increase in reaction and so on), particularly as the key processes of the 
media (exaggeration, distortion, prediction, symbolization) tended to have an 
amplification effect independent of actual events.  
 
Cohen (1972) visualised the process as a flow of initial deviance (the event in 
Clacton) that led to an inventory phase of interpretation whereupon the 
seriousness of the event and subsequent episodes were exaggerated. Thereupon, 
the public, the police, and the press were sensitised to reinterpret neutral or 
ambiguous stimuli as potentially or actually deviant. As these latter features fed 
back on each other there was an over-estimation of the deviance, which then led 
to an escalation of control towards it, in turn heightening awareness of the 
potential threat. In other words, a moral panic could be conceptualised as a 
reaction to a condition, person or group of persons that is or who are defined as a 
threat that is out of proportion to any actual threat it or they may pose.  
 
While Cohen (1972) identified that there were many actors in the drama he was at 
particular pains to emphasise the role of the media and much of his analysis is 
devoted to understanding this role. From the beginning, Cohen (1972) contends 
the media reinforced the sense of expectancy and gave shape to the rumours and 
ambiguous situations; it served to frame the picture of what was happening and 
what was to happen. But it went beyond publicity per se; by reporting such events 
and rumours the media triggered off events of a similar order through lowering 
the threshold of ‘readiness’ for the potential Mod or Rocker, and offering him/her 
the symbols and stage directions with which and upon which he/she was to 
perform. It is this mobilisation of action (either as the deviant or as the reactor to 
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the deviant) that Cohen (1972) argues cannot do without an adequate means of 
communication such as the mass media.  
 
Folk Devils is often called to account for its emphasis upon the ‘what’ and the 
‘how’ of moral panic at the expense of addressing the ‘why’ (see Jefferson, 2008; 
Shuker et al., 1990), something that Cohen (2002) himself acknowledges. But the 
‘why’ was attended to in the study, albeit briefly. Cohen (1972) interpreted the 
clashes on the beaches as a response to an emerging consumption culture 
characterised by high wages, a commercial youth movement, and an elevation of 
wild pop heroes (such as the Rolling Stones and The Who) into national idols. 
The newly affluent teenagers (the Mods) could revel in this emerging scene, but 
for working class teens (the Rockers) there were still structural barriers to 
participation. These teens would rebel against their situation and create their own 
excitement on the beaches, where their rivals would join them. Cohen (1972) 
located the response to these clashes (the ensuing moral panic) as a retort to the 
permissive post-war society that had allowed for this consumer culture (and its 
differential access) to develop.  
 
While Cohen’s (1972) moral panic is understood largely as an unintended and 
unanticipated construction, Hall et al. (1978) argue that moral panic can be a 
strategy employed by elites to orchestrate hegemony and divert attention from a 
systemic (capitalist) crisis. It is this analysis that I consider now. 
 
Policing the Crisis  
 
A brutal robbery of an Irishman by a group of black youths in Handsworth, 
England in 1972, initiated a resounding press, judicial and public response about a 
‘frightening new strain’ of crime known only to date in America – mugging. This 
was despite that the event, though horrific, was neither new in its character nor 
particularly unusual. Nevertheless, the response would evolve into a notion that 
the British ‘way of life’ was at threat and install a perception that the weak 
liberalist position that Britain had taken on law and order issues in the post-war 
period was to blame. In turn, this would justify a series of severe control measures 
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that were directed at black inner city youth who were seen to be responsible for 
the wholesale denigration of the moral fabric.   
 
Sceptical about the speed in which the idea of mugging took hold, and about the 
rearticulation of old forms of street crime under this new and imported label, Hall 
et al. (1978) interrogated first the relationships between the media and the ‘control 
culture’.10  They found that the media turn to ‘accredited experts’ in order to 
maintain the news values of ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity’ and these experts, in 
turn, become primary definers whose framing of events becomes the most 
significant in terms of how they are subsequently understood. Hall et al. (1978) 
also saw that the media became secondary definers as they transformed these 
primary definitions into everyday language. Part of this transformation involved 
adopting the public voice; claiming to speak for the public. This would then 
justify further assertions on behalf of primary definers who would call upon this 
voice as evidence that such assertions were required (or desired), and these 
assertions would then be used to support additional secondary interpretations. In 
other words, the amplification cycle that would create an ideological closure 
around the issue of mugging would be set in motion by virtue of routine news 
practices and the structural reciprocal relations between the media and their 
institutional sources (see Jefferson, 2008).  
 
Second, in order to understand the role the folk devil (the mugger) would play in 
the panic, Hall et al. (1978) examined what was happening in the wider socio-
political environment at that time. Drawing from Gramsci, they conjectured that 
the early 1970s was a time where hegemony – consent to authority – was in crisis. 
This was due, in large, to economic recession. They concluded that the specific 
concern about mugging would operate to re-direct social anxieties away from the 
real issue to one about ‘law and order’. Put another way, in order for dominant 
interests to remain dominant, the periodic failure in capitalism needed to be 
shielded from popular view, and this was achieved by ‘whipping up’ an issue as a 
problem that could be held responsible for the deprecation of a respectable work 
                                                
10 ‘Control culture’ is a term borrowed by Cohen (1972) from Lemert (1951) and it refers to the 
police, the courts, welfare organizations and the like; those institutional bodies responsible for the 
regulation and control of deviant behaviour.  
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ethic (which was related to a decline in jobs) at the same time as it would unite the 
lower and middle classes. This issue would be race.  
 
Effectively, Policing the Crisis reworked the understanding of power in a moral 
panic insofar as official reaction was seen as not just ‘reactive’; it was “part of the 
circle out of which ‘moral panics’ develop” (Hall et al., 1978: 52). Accordingly, 
Hall et al. (1978) defined (or redefined) moral panic as an ideological event in 
which a specific and historical crisis is developed and managed. This has had 
some implications for how Policing the Crisis has been received which I will 
consider in a moment. For now, I want to turn my attention to moral panic as it 
has been conceived in the American context through the scholarship of Eric 
Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994).  
 
The Social Construction of Deviance 
 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a, b) situated the trajectory of moral panic within a 
collective behaviour framework, defining it as irrational or “a kind of 
fever…characterised by heightened emotion, fear, dread, anxiety, hostility and a 
strong sense of righteousness” (1994a: 31), and therefore a particular form of 
constructed issue. Like Cohen (1972) there is a concern for the processes of 
definition, but there is astutely more of a focus on organised interests and the role 
of claims-makers, their alliances, and the ways in which they seek to gain public 
attention (and support). In part this shift in emphasis was a response to a 
perceived lack of clarification on Cohen’s (1972) behalf and especially for 
application in the United States. Here, the media in particular are seen to be less 
centralized and tend to rely less on sensationalist journalism than does the British 
counterpart (Critcher, 2003: Victor, 1998) and so the processes whereby a local 
event transforms into a general problem depends more upon the rhetorical 
activities of interested parties and their access to the appropriate channels. For 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a, b) what distinguishes a panic from general social 
problems and specific moral crusades can be determined through the 
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identification of five ‘criteria’.11 First, there must be a heightened concern over 
behaviour of a group and the consequences this behaviour poses for wider society. 
We can measure the manifestation of this concern through opinion polls, proposed 
legislation, interest group calls for action to be taken, social movement activity, 
and by public commentary by way of media attention (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 
1994b: 156-157). Second, a dichotomisation occurs between ‘them’, the folk 
devils, and ‘us’, the responsible and law-abiding citizens. Their behaviour are 
seen to be threatening to the values, interests, and possibly the very existence of 
society as ‘we’ know it, and so there is hostility towards this designated enemy. 
Often this involves identifying the deviant in terms of a stereotype (the Mod or 
the Rocker and his style of dress and demeanour; the ‘mugger’ and his ethnicity 
and/or class position). Third, there must be a consensus within society, or at least 
considerable segments of it, that the threat proposed is very real and serious. 
Further, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994b: 158) are explicit about the implicit 
assumption in the term ’moral panic’ of disproportionality. That is, that the threat, 
costs, and figures proposed by claims-makers are wildly exaggerated and do not 
coincide with an objective reality. Finally, moral panics are volatile. They 
typically explode, reach a pitch, and then subside just as suddenly. Some panics 
leave no impact on the legal, moral, and social fabric, while others become 
institutionalised as organisations are established to deal with the ‘problem’. Even 
so, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994b: 169) argue that all panics leave informal 
normative traces which in effect prepare us for later panics and that this 
connectivity may be seen early on in that it was the Mods and Rockers who paved 
the way for the later scare over youth delinquency; mugging.  
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a, b) further recognised that panics could be 
usefully categorised in terms of three distinct models that are differentiated by 
dimensions of motive and responsibility. The first model; the grassroots panic, 
suggests that while concern may manifest within other sectors such as the media 
                                                
11 Social problems are void of the folk devils upon whom the anxiety of the public is projected and 
lack the characteristic ‘fever’ of a panic. Moral crusades, on the other hand, are mobilised by 
specific moral entrepreneurs who adopt an issue to further their own interests. A panic may result 
from a crusade, but in the main, a panic will have a variety of interested parties, and either 
advertently or inadvertently will appeal to a wider and more diverse constituency (see Goode & 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Critcher, 2003).   
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or among political bodies, it is the deeply felt attitudes and sentiments of a broad 
area of lay society that appear threatened. The second model; the interest group 
panic, asks whether the cause is ideological or moral or to do with advancing a 
material or status position of a group, although invariably there is a “happy 
coincidence” (Thompson, 1998: 9) of both principle and interest. The latter 
model; the elite engineered panic, is employed most often to avoid a genuine 
solution to a real problem whose presentation would undermine elite interests.12 
Although we might position Cohen’s (1972) case study as an interest group panic 
and Hall et al.’s (1978) analysis of mugging as a classic example of an elite 
engineered one, all three are to be seen as ‘ideal types’ that when applied will 
illustrate different aspects of a panic. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) suggest 
further that no panic is explicable by means of a single model; the grassroots 
model in particular is a naïve one in isolation in that it cannot take account of how 
raw concerns are intensified and mobilised. 
 
Reflections upon the foundations which these three works have constructed view 
that within the ‘one’ original project of moral panic there are two broad 
formulations, each with different strengths and weaknesses. Thompson (1998) 
argues that what we may call the American tradition (Best, 1990, 2001; Goode & 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994a, b; Jenkins, 1992, 1998, 1999), because it favours analysis 
through the interest group model, tends to lose the ‘cutting edge’ as it rejects the 
more radical concern to disclose social control processes and ideological conflict 
in favour of a focus on the work of claims-makers. There is at the same time a 
lack of recognition of the media both as a powerful and independent claims-
maker, and as the primary institutional vehicle for the dispersing of claims 
(Jenkins, 1992 for example, makes an outright denial that the media can create a 
panic), although this oversight may be dependent, as Critcher (2003) suggests, on 
the differences in the structure and nature of the press between the two countries. 
The British tradition (Cohen, 1972; Hall et al., 1978) on the other hand, insists on 
                                                
12 Alternatively, those in positions of power may ‘wag the dog’ or seize the opportunity to direct 
anxieties. Burns and Crawford (1999) argue the Columbine shootings allowed Bill Clinton to 
divert attention from the Whitewater investigation and his own sexual misconducts, whereas in 
response to the Bulger murder Tony Blair is said to have “employed a dead toddler to shift Labour 
to a hard line on law and order” (Cohen, cited in Jewkes, 2004: 72). 
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the divide between what is real and what is mediated at the expense of analysis of 
representations in their own right. Thompson (1998) would call for a fusion of the 
two into one explanatory framework; one that would sever the hold of theoretical 
ethnocentrism in centralising the common ground but also employ crucial insights 
of both. Critcher (2003) however, remains firm that they are distinct; one argues 
of processes at work (the British tradition) while the other argues for attributes 
that can be identified. Correspondingly, he argues that we extend the employment 
of ‘ideal types’ and term the first a processual model of moral panic, and the 
second an attributional model of moral panic.  
 
In the next sections I consider the ways by which the concept (in both its 
processual and attributional formulations) has been subject to a range of criticisms 
since its initiation; from the criterion of disproportionality as reliant on normative 
assessments to questions regarding the applicability of the ‘original project’ 
within the political, cultural, and social environment as it stands differentiated in 
relation to the analyses of 1960s and 1970s. I turn the discussion to these critiques 
now.  
 
A Normative Concept?   
 
People may panic in a fire, but this does not imply that the building is not burning 
nor that there is no threat (Waddington, 1986: 258). 
 
The notion that moral panic is a polemic rather than an analytical concept has 
become something of an Achilles heel for panic research (see Rohloff & Wright, 
2010). The critique is most fervently directed at Hall et al.’s (1978) consideration 
of moral panic as an envoy for dominant ideology, as it is seen as far more an 
exercise of neo-Marxist scholarship than it is a contribution to the sociology of 
deviance (see Jones, 1997; McRobbie & Thornton, 1995).13 However, panic 
studies across the board are similarly assessed. Hunt (forthcoming) for example, 
contends that the panic analyst is suggesting that the claims made by panic 
participants are irrational; that the claimants are at best ‘misguided’ and at worst 
                                                
13 Jefferson (2008) suggests this is an unfair assessment insofar as the mugging account worked 
with a commitment to grounded theorizing and was critical of a reductive Marxism.  
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‘crazy’ (see also Garland, 2008). Indeed there may be overtones of this in 
research dealing with more extreme panics (the satanic ritual abuse one is a case 
in point) or where claims are made on behalf of moral entrepreneurs or other 
parties who exploit an issue for their own political or economic advancement (see 
Best, 2008; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994b). However, Critcher (2006: 3), a panic 
defender, also claims:  
 
The moral panic classification does not imply rational appraisal, considered reaction 
or appropriate remedies. As the words connote, what we are contemplating is a state 
of panic where emotion rules over reason.  
 
My own reading of the irrationality of panic is that it is the overall reaction (the 
claims and responses inflamed and augmented via a cycle of amplification) that is 
assessed as ‘out of order’ rather than the individual actions of people based upon 
what they know or feel (see Best, forthcoming; de Young, 2004). The issue then 
becomes about the measure of proportionality against which the reaction in 
question is argued to be in excess of. As Cohen (2002) argues, it is difficult to 
measure emotion, symbolism, and representation in quantitative terms. Indeed, it 
is only with a prior commitment to externally erected goals of social justice, 
human rights, or equality can we expect to make a evaluation that R (the reaction) 
is an inappropriate response to A (the action) (Cohen, 2002). However, for Cohen 
(2002) this does not mean that we need dismiss the idea and enter an arena where 
our claims are not accorded privilege; questions of proportion can be made 
empirically even when the evaluation is of, say, the rhetorical means of problem 
construction (see also Best, 2008).  
 
However, furthering the reception of moral panic as polemic was Cohen’s (1972) 
intention to expose reactions that were not just out of proportion by a qualitative 
measure but tendentious (slanted in a particular ideological direction) and 
misplaced (aimed at something which was not the ‘real’ problem). This has lent to 
the empirical task a tradition of exposing the (irrational) moral outrage as 
something on behalf of ‘the right’ end of the political spectrum which in turn 
positions the analyst firmly on the ‘left-bank’. Garland (2008: 22) observes: “one 
reads of very few instances of ‘moral panic’ analysis being applied to episodes 
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where the underlying moral concern appears to be shared by the sociologists who 
invoked the term”. Yet, as McRobbie (1994b) points out, whipping up a moral 
panic is an effective way by which conservatives secure support; it is their chief 
‘campaigning arm’. Critcher (2006) too, identifies that issues over the moral state 
enable the ‘right’ to distinguish itself, particularly if the left can be seem to have 
adopted similar policies (economic policies especially).  
 
Other critics argue that often an issue’s candidacy for a moral panic can be 
regarded as trivial, especially when more significant and damaging events that 
could and perhaps should command social apprehension exist (see Jenkins, 2009; 
Jewkes, 2004). Cohen (2002: xxii) responds that this is exactly why 
interpretations of deviance need to be studied; how it is we are apathetic and 
indifferent to torture, political massacres, and social suffering in distant places 
while exuding relative hysteria over such things as video ‘nasties’ and alcopops. 
Perhaps instead of exposing these ‘bad’ panics, Cohen (2002) argues, we might 
encourage the same inflammatory processes towards ‘good’ panics whereby we 
can then “overcome the barriers of denial, passivity and indifference that prevent 
a full acknowledgment of human suffering” (Cohen, 2002: xxxiii). However, it is 
clear that in such cases the terminology of ‘panic’ would need to be abandoned. 
As Garland (2008) notes, the reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 clearly 
fit all the criteria for a moral panic (at least in the attributional sense). Yet there 
appears to be a marked reluctance to identify this reaction as a panic. Jenkins 
(2009: 2) puts it well: “whoever heard of a legitimate panic, or of well founded 
hysteria”? (original emphasis). Constructing a social problem that should be a 
social problem would also negate the disproportional element of ‘panic’, and a 
‘good’ panic would dissolve the function of deviancy in terms of reconstructing 
moral boundaries (see Durkheim, 1984; Cohen, 1972; Erikson, 1966).  
 
It does seem inevitable that in employing ‘moral panic’ to understand a social 
reaction one will be accused of undertaking positioned research, and, if not 
dismissed for labelling reactors as ‘delusional’, then certainly scrutinised for the 
appraisal of proportionality. Best (1993), with sympathy for the panic analyst, 
suggests that the accusation (and scrutiny) is better directed at the enterprise of 
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sociology itself and its promise to ‘improve’ the world once we have 
deconstructed and understood it. Cohen (2002) suggests that though panic’s ‘folk 
meaning’ subscribes to a concept designed to expose dominant interests, there 
may be a continuum along which we view the relationship between moral panics 
and political ideology; from the abstract analytical to the invested critical (see also 
Rohloff & Wright, 2010). In Chapter Two I explore how studies involved in the 
project of ‘rethinking moral panic’ tend to focus on the analytic end of such a 
spectrum and later, how my own approach to the case of ‘killer kids’ may offer a 
way by which panic research can be received as both a political endeavour and an 
analytical study. I want to now turn the discussion to an argument that normativity 
aside, the concept of moral panic as it was developed in the 1960s and 1970s has 
limited value for research in a contemporary context. 
  
Folk Devils ‘Fight Back’  
 
Moral panics are totalitarian products of democratic systems (Critcher, 2006: 14). 
 
One of the more astute criticisms of each of the proposed ideal-type models of the 
moral panic concept is that they lack an appreciation for the plurality of reactions 
that can accompany moral assertions. McRobbie (1994a, 1994b), in particular, 
contends that the expansion of ‘new moral minorities’; pressure groups, 
associations, voluntary organisations, and other grassroots political bodies serves 
to give folk devils both the vehicles and the support networks through which they 
can ‘fight back’. She notes the panicking that took place at the heart of the 
conservative government in Britain following the murder of toddler James Bulger 
by two ten year-olds in Britain in 1993 which saw a launch of a vicious attack 
upon single mothers.14 However, this never gained ground as a full panic; 
contestation from single parents, their supporters, and indeed women from across 
the political spectrum worked in unison to redefine the agenda to one that 
recognised the strengths and capabilities of mothers who raise children both 
                                                
14 In Chapter Six it will be shown how the ‘mother factor’ would come into play in the episode of 
‘killer kids’.  
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single-handedly and in dire poverty (McRobbie, 1994a).15 De Young (2004) is 
another who emphasises the ways by which folk devils can challenge their 
demonisation. In her assessment of the satanic ritual abuse phenomenon, she 
attributes the social capital retained by the child care providers (as nurturers) 
together with their ability to use effective oppositional language (in stating ‘this is 
a media witch-hunt’ as opposed to ‘I didn’t do it’) as one of the reasons the 
alleged (and satanic) nature of abuse was exposed as a purely constructed 
phenomenon (de Young, 2004). In addition, McRobbie and Thornton (1995) 
argue that the pessimism of moral panic (particularly Hall et al.’s version) cannot 
imagine that the victims (the folk devils) might celebrate this status as a right of 
generational passage, nor that panic could be employed by various marketing 
outlets as “priceless PR campaigns” (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995: 565).16 17  
Another problem for the materialisation of the ‘ideal’ models is the ways by 
which the media environment has both expanded and diversified. McRobbie 
(1994b: 201) argues that this ‘new’ media are far more politically savvy than the 
‘original’ project allows for, while at the same time are competitively conscious. 
One way to gain an edge on the market is to routinely sensationalise the ordinary 
and/or to cast oneself in the role of moral guardian (McRobbie, 1994b). Either of 
these developments could independently create the prerequisites for moral 
debates, and upon that stimulate the conditions for panic (see also Aldridge, 
2003).18 On the other hand, political strategies today are seen to materialise as 
media strategies (see Hier, 2002b) as the past distinction between the media, 
politicians, and social control agencies becomes less clear, and as social ‘reality’ 
                                                
15 This is not to imply that there was no panic at all. The Bulger panic was one of Britain’s most 
explosive, with resounding effects. The most significant of these was the way in which the idea of 
childhood was disturbed (see Green, 2008a; Hay, 1995; Young, 1996).  
16 To some degree this recognises the oft overlooked aspect of Cohen’s (1972) work; that the roles 
of the Mods and Rockers were self-consciously played out in that youths appropriately posed for 
photographs and wore the expected attire as they turned up to watch the anticipated (predicted) 
event. What drew the crowds that then became the event was chiefly the entertainment feature!  
17 Some critical ideas developed from these observations in relation to the Aotearoa/New Zealand 
context can be found in Griffiths (2005).  
18 Hunt (1997) furthers this point in his contention that we may be experiencing a crisis of moral 
language itself; that the media have whole heartedly adopted the lingo of moral panic simply 
because the notion offers this back; it has become the primary means through which to articulate 
that which is moral.    
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is increasingly tied up with representation (see McRobbie & Thornton, 1995; 
Silverstone, 2007).  
This would suggest that the task of deconstruction has become both thornier and 
more urgent than has previously been considered. Indeed, not all panic scholars 
are persuaded that these cultural developments lend themselves to more active and 
open confrontation nor that that confrontation will necessarily be heeded. As 
Hier’s (2002a) example of resistance from ‘ravers’ to the problemisation of 
‘raves’ as drug spaces demonstrates, the socio-political position of the potential 
folk devil remains a crucial variable in their ability to resist the deviant label.19 
Ideally, as Cohen (1972: 167-168) argues, the folk devil will occupy a position of 
high visibility but with little social status; they will be outsiders that is, in the 
sense they are structurally and politically weak.20 
 
A quite different but just as pertinent issue as the challenges posed by the changes 
across the social and cultural landscape thus far described is the appearance of 
‘risk’ problems. Ungar (2001) for example, argues that Urlich Beck’s (1992) 
thesis that we are now in a ‘risk society’ suggests that our ‘sites’ of anxiety are 
changing and therefore models for analysis are required. For other commentators 
the challenge is to see where risk and moral issues meet; how risk problems are 
politicised and how then the identification of an impurity or threat to ‘the care of 
the self’ is articulated in moral terms (see Critcher, 2003; Garland, 2001; 
Thompson, 1998). Conversely, Cohen (2002) contends that problems of risk and 
problems of the moral order remain analytically distinct if we take into account 
how stylised screams of tabloid headlines work to create fear and hostility and 
where vigilante action is premised upon emotive anger, outrage, and resentment 
(see also Scott, Jackson, & Backett-Milburn, 1998). These arguments and their 
implications for moral panic research are considered in more detail in Chapter 
Two.  
 
                                                
19 How Facebook, Twitter, and other social network sites might shift the balance of power is yet to 
be assessed in the literature.  
20 In later chapters it will be seen how Bailey’s inability to speak in his defense became a markedly 
important feature in the extent to which he was labelled deviant, and indeed remains so. 
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Despite the changed media environment, the enhanced ability for folk devils to 
contest their status, and the appearance of ‘risk’ problems, it is generally agreed 
that the cornerstone of any panic is the outcome; the ‘way of coping’. In other 
words, the process is complete where there appears an imposition of one way of 
thinking about something; a singular definition or discourse unto the ‘problem’ at 
hand, which, more often than not, manifests through legislative change (Critcher, 
2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994b; see also Best, 1990). Invariably how this 
singular definition attains legitimacy depends on the idea that there is concern on 
behalf of the public. This is the focus of discussion in the next section.  
 
An Absent Public   
 
… to take constructions of public opinion as evidence of consent is both 
intellectually and politically dangerous (Stabile, 2001: 263). 
  
Interestingly, Cohen’s (1972) study documented that the reaction on behalf of the 
public was not necessarily congruent with the reaction of the media and social 
control agents, and that it was the actions of only particular publics (some moral 
action groups, some commercial interests, some individuals) and their varied 
interpretations of the ‘problem’ that came to the attention of the legislators. 
Nevertheless, most panic analyses have a working assumption that the public (as a 
whole, or at least a significant segment of it) is involved and that the role of active 
and imaginative audiences are to comprise a significant part of the research 
agenda (de Young, 1998; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994a; Miller & Kitzinger, 
1998). In practice, however, public concern has proved difficult to establish and 
as a result tends to be inferred directly from sensationalist media coverage (see 
Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Burns & Crawford, 1999; Welch, Price, & Yankey, 
2002 in particular). This is problematic. It not only assumes the media as an 
objective and non-commercial space for civil debate and that ‘the media’ is one 
unified entity, but it also, paradoxically, presents ‘the people’ as an ignorant 
monolithic mass; subject to, and agent-less in relation to media propaganda. Yet 
the media as an objective medium is questioned by philosophers such as 
Habermas (1989) and civil society theorists such as Alexander and Jacobs (1998). 
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Moreover, the idea that what the media says is what the public thinks leans 
towards the hypodermic model of the media effects debate; a debate that has 
polarised thinking between the media as having a sustained influence and 
audiences as active consumers. Most contemporary theorists working with the 
media recognise and develop their methodologies from both sides of the debate; 
that texts affect, but that also audiences can resist (see Surette, 1988; Kitzinger, 
2004).  
 
Then again, Hall et al.’s (1978) analysis of how the media work with a ‘public 
idiom’ in a panic accounts for how the press both speak in terms the readership 
will relate to at the same time as they assume themselves as the ‘voice’ of the 
people. Because this ‘voice’ is then fed back to the elite bodies as public opinion 
(the ‘people’ are spoken for) there is somewhat of a ‘magical circle’ at work 
whereby the actual public are surpassed.21 In this way, the variable of public 
opinion “functions rather like the trope of the silent majority; it signifies only 
insofar as politicians and journalists want it to signify within the context of a 
given argument” (Stabile, 2001: 265).22  
 
More recent panic assessments have undertaken that panic narratives must be seen 
as capable of engaging a relation with audiences in order for the ‘magic’ to 
unfold, and in view of that have sought to ignite how an engagement with the 
public may be achieved. Drawing upon Althusser’s (1971) conception of how 
ideology moves from something abstract or external and into ‘being’, moral 
panics are conceived in these assessments as ideologico-discursive formations that 
interpellate through points of resonance with lived subjectivities (Hay, 1995, 
1996; Hier, 2002a, 2002b; de Young, 2000, 2004).23 As Hier (2002a) describes, 
                                                
21 This ‘magical circle’ was conceptualized by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
(CCCS) (1975: 76), of which Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson of Policing the Crisis were a part.  
22 Stabile (2001) argues that it is notoriously difficult to capture ‘public opinion’ without large 
scale in-depth research tools. Using formal channels such as polls are problematic as they are often 
monopolized by elite interests which have no structural homology to informal channels of social 
communication. Stabile (2001) contends that it would defy the logic of the capitalist media to have 
opinion ‘trickle up’ in this way; that one of the functions of crime news (in particular) is to deny a 
diversity of opinion.  
23 Althusser (1971) conceptualized interpellation as the precise operation by which ideology acts 
to transform individuals as subjects. This can be imagined as a common-place everyday police 
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this is a critical interpretation of ideology that assumes that how a person 
perceives his/her world will have an immediate application to how they act within 
it. For the most part, however, these assessments seek to annul the critique of 
normativity by demonstrating that panic participants might behave rationally at 
ground level, however ‘irrational’ or disproportional their collective action can be 
assessed as. The actual public remains absent.  
 
Commentators who are less austere (and less committed to the notion of an 
ideological agenda) also question the degree to which public sentiment is required 
(or symbolically called upon) to move any legislation through (see Miller & 
Kitzinger, 1988; Schlesinger & Tumber, 1994). In the Aotearoa/New Zealand 
context a case in point is the vocal and hot-tempered opposition by large sections 
of the constituency to Member of Parliament Sue Bradford’s colloquially termed 
‘anti-smacking Bill’ in early 2007. The Bill made it to law despite this response, 
and remained in law despite that 87.6% of voters voted against it in a 2009 
citizens initiated referendum.24 Critcher (2003) adds that the media, politicians, 
and many pressure groups may be seen as permanently oriented towards the moral 
agenda and therefore research should concentrate upon what he denotes as the 
powerful ‘P’s’; the press, pressure groups, politicians, the police, and the public.25 
Recognition of this alliance may also solve the problem of how to account for 
panic eruption and subsequent decline. Critcher (2003) suggests that the intensity 
(volatility) of panic is a direct reflection of the media’s desire for novelty. In other 
words, the ‘news attention cycle’ determines that a problem will be seized upon, 
exploited, then dropped as a new problem takes its place.  
 
Removing the variable of public sentiment from the empirical equation still leaves 
the question of when a ‘problem’ assumes the greater momentum of a panic. As 
Thompson (1998: 20) argues, panic narratives and all their discursive tricks do not 
                                                
‘hailing’; “hey… you there” whereupon the individual recognizes it is he/she being spoken to and 
by turning to respond becomes a subject.  
24 Similarly, Jewkes (2004) points out that the public is often indifferent or even resistant to issues 
we might view as political crusades (anti-smoking and ‘safe sex’ campaigns are given as 
examples). 
25 Critcher (2006) is referring here to public opinion which is invoked. 
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“exist in a vacuum”. In the next section I discuss how this location of why panics 
happen is too often left aside in the interests of determining what they do.  
 
Outside the Machine 
 
The real Devil, whose shapes the early puritans were trying to establish, was the 
same devil that the Mods and Rockers represented (Cohen, 1972: 162). 
 
Moral panics are understood to ‘work’ much like other cultural events (royal 
weddings, coronations, state funerals) in that they stimulate the sense of an 
‘imagined community’ (see Anderson, 1983). Indeed, the practices of a panic 
fashion an enemy to mark the distinction between ‘us’ (the upstanding citizenship) 
and them (the wrong doers). It is through the identification of the outsider that 
social groups create and recreate themselves, and the sense of who ‘us’ is, is re-
constructed each time a new enemy appears.26 Cohen (1972) compellingly linked 
the response to the Mods and Rockers as a declaration about moral boundaries, 
arguing the period “can be seen as constituting what Erikson terms a ‘boundary 
crisis’, a period in which a group’s uncertainty about itself is resolved in ritualistic 
confrontations between the deviant and the community’s official agents” (Cohen, 
1972: 162). This is not to say, however, that the Mods and the Rockers were 
consciously picked out to clarify normative contours, but rather, that both their 
behaviour (by nature of its visibility) and their position (as structurally weak) at 
that particular time provided a sufficient enough forum in which to dramatise and 
articulate issues previously blurred in ambiguity, more clearly. 
 
The problem is not that this ‘blurred in ambiguity’ variable is incorrect, but that in 
practice it is often correlated with the idea of a free-floating ‘anxiety’ which is 
notoriously difficult to deconstruct (see Hunt, 1999).27 Indeed, the success of a 
panic is often used as an indicator of social anxiety, without other evidence to 
suggest that anything is actually there (Critcher, 2003). In recent times, our ‘age 
of moral panic’ has been attributed to, congruously; the ‘age of anxiety’ that is 
                                                
26 This reflects the “elasticity of evil” (Cohen, 1974: 5); the idea that as societies change, so does 
the terms and conditions upon which inclusion and exclusion depends. 
27 The idea that a panic is caused by anxiety is intimate with the normativity factor, which, as 
argued, assumes that the ‘panic’ identified has erupted upon something more or other than a 
reasonable assessment of social facts (see also Hunt, 1999; Rock, 2007). 
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characteristic of the late-modern era (Critcher, 2003; Thompson, 1998). Giddens 
(1990, 1991) formidably describes this era as a state of a sense of change and 
instability across politics, economies, cultures, the collapse of traditional 
authorities and identities, the disembedding of time and space. Precisely, argues 
Jewkes (2004), it is these negative characteristics of modernity that stimulate our 
need for the sense of community (see also Greer, 2004). However, the notion that 
instability and anxiety are features unique to contemporary times is somewhat 
problematic. Considering that prior to the 1970’s (the era after which is 
commonly denoted as late-modern), the prevalence of war (both civil and 
international), numerous economic recessions, and profound leaps in 
technological advancement: from cars to computers to nuclear weapons, Tonry 
(2001: 523) contends: 
 
In every era, I suspect, people attribute much that they dislike or disapprove to the 
seemingly unprecedented changes of their times, and, with the benefit of imperfect 
memory and good-old-days nostalgia, believe that the changes in their lives are 
more consequential than those of other times. 
 
Nevertheless, the idea that moral panics erupt in communities and societies that 
are ‘anxious’ is often now a priori assumption of research, and so attention tends 
to direct itself to what effects the panic in question has in terms of restoring 
stability (see Critcher, 2003, 2006). This is important, as questions of effect, 
function, and impact are an essential part of panic research. As Goode and Ben-
Yehuda (1994b) argue, not only are successive panics built on earlier ones, but 
that in the interval period (panic free) the legacy of prior panics provide the means 
with which to regulate or condone the behaviour that was deemed harmful or 
deviant in the first place. In this way, “even seemingly transitory panics are not 
‘wasted’” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994b: 169). However, Cohen (1972) argued 
that more moral panics would be generated not because they have an inevitable 
logic, but because society (western, it is presumed) regularly makes problems for 
some of its members and then condemns the solutions such members find. Asking 
why they do this at particular spaces and times is crucial for understanding why 
the devil in question takes a particular form, where the lines of power reside and 
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how ‘we’ are subject to ‘manipulation’. Indeed, perceptive of where Folk Devils 
fell short, Cohen (1972: 150) writes:  
 
… the reaction itself … is often left unexplained. Models such as deviance 
amplification deal well enough with what happens in the machine (the feedback and 
snowballing effects during the reaction sequence) but inadequately with why the 
initial reaction takes place and even less adequately with why the sequence itself 
might come to an end. For these problems we have to look outside the machine and 
outside the theatre. 
 
Several studies since have looked ‘outside the machine’ in order to discover why 
this or that episode occurred. Three that are exceptional in this regard are Hall et 
al.’s (1978) analysis of mugging, Jenkin’s (2005) study of the construction of sex 
offenders across 20th century America, and de Young’s (2004) assessment of the 
satanic ritual abuse phenomenon. I want to briefly outline these works in order to 
identify how (and why) context matters. In Chapter Two I situate my emphasis 
upon context in relation to these studies. 
 
As discussed, Hall et al. (1978) argued that early 1970s Britain was on the verge 
of a political ‘crisis’ as an economic recession threatened to reveal the inequalities 
inherent in capitalism. The elite, whose interests were under threat, would employ 
and exploit the Handsworth ‘mugging’ as evidence to suggest that the ‘crisis’ felt 
at grassroots level was actually one of ‘law and order’. Thereupon, a key question 
for Hall et al. (1978) was how a spectrum of consent for the exercise of a coercive 
law and order campaign was achieved; why different classes who had become 
increasingly polarised both economically and politically would, at this injunction, 
share the same social and moral perspective on crime. They found that the call for 
tougher measures was articulated through an appeal for ‘common sense’ at the 
local level, and that at the basis of this appeal was the sense of Englishness. In 
other words, the ‘problem’ was to be found in working class immigrant labour, 
the absence of a respectable work ethic and the lack of appropriate discipline 
which posed to threaten the everyday person and his traditionalist, conservative, 
and very English values. In this way, power was exercised to re-construct an 
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imagined community in order for power to be exercised to restore stability in the 
interests of that power.  
 
De Young (2004), on the other hand, located the satanic ritual abuse (SRA) 
phenomenon within a union of three culturally significant ‘master symbols’ of the 
1980s: the menacing devil, the vulnerable child, and the psychological trauma 
model. Though each of these symbols could be seen to have its own cultural 
history and generate its own anxieties, they enjoyed something of an 
omnipresence as a trio in the 1980s as they operated as ‘proxies’ for the much 
deeper cultural strains inherent within religious fundamentalism and women’s 
increased involvement in the labour market, while at the forefront was a pseudo-
scientific profession eager to legitimate its practice. They would also come 
together several times in what might be seen as a set of pre-empting episodes to 
the SRA panic.28 Yet none of these would have quite the same impact as the SRA 
which was impelled with just the right meta-narrative to resonate with and act as 
an expression of these deeper tensions. This narrative wove together the ultimate 
threat to vulnerable children – traumatic sexual abuse within circumstances of 
satanic malevolence (de Young, 2008).  
 
Jenkins (1998, 2004), a historian, traces the shift in social responses to adult/child 
sexual relations in the American social, cultural, and political landscape from the 
late 19th century until today. He identifies three distinct periods of interest group 
activity (leading to moral panic) which constructed and reconstructed the problem 
which is now understood as child sexual abuse (CSA). The first panic erupted 
with a campaign to raise the age of consent with a coalition of feminists, moral 
crusaders, and religious reformers claiming widespread venereal disease and the 
trafficking of young girls. The second panic is described as the ‘age of the sex 
psychopath’. Central to this episode was the image of the crazed sex offender, 
propagated by sensational media stories of sex-related murders, developing 
psychological and psychiatric ‘expertise’, and a body of legislators keen to profit 
politically. The third manifestation – the most current – is denoted as the ‘child 
                                                
28 These include small-scale panics over heavy metal rock music, the strategy game ‘Dungeons 
and Dragons’, and devil-worshipping punk youth in Jamestown, New York.    
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abuse revolution’. Though largely due to a campaign on behalf of feminists 
calling attention to male oppression in familial settings, a familiar nexus of moral 
conservatives, the media, and legislators (all with their own agendas) created a 
sense of national urgency to the ‘unqualified evil’ of CSA (Jenkins, 1998). Like 
de Young (2004), Jenkins (1998, 2004) views each episode’s content as a direct 
reflection of spatial and temporal social, political and ideological ‘tensions’ which 
provide the bedrock for (and are crystalised by) the entrepreneurial efforts of 
campaigners.  
 
In Chapter Two I propose that the question of why a panic occurs is more 
imperative than ever, and examine the degrees to which this question is addressed 
as one of the ‘bigger questions’ of the project of ‘rethinking moral panic’. In the 
closing section of this chapter I want to consider the development of my approach 
to the case of ‘killer kids’ thus far.  
 
Formulating an Approach to Moral Panic 
  
Cohen’s (1972) notion of an ideal-type concept to be used as a heuristic, 
transferable tool across case studies appears consistently valuable. This is 
reflected both in the way moral panic has been perpetually used and by Goode 
and Ben-Yehuda’s (1994a, b) reworking of its formulae for the American context 
(see Critcher, 2003). I configured that part of my task would be to conserve moral 
panic as just this; an ideal-type concept. Nevertheless, the intimacy with which 
Cohen (1972) developed the concept in relation to the Mods and Rockers, and the 
way by which Hall et al. (1978) exposed the structural relationship between the 
state and the civil sphere; identifying in course how political processes can 
operate in the distortion of reality in their analysis of the mugging phenomenon 
demonstrate that this ideal-type is relative to material events, or real-type episodes 
of panic. Similarly, Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (1994a, b) identification of three 
models differentiated by the variables of motive and responsibility presupposes 
that some of the attributes will be achieved via different means and others would 
play out according to who was driving the respective campaign. Moreover, 
Critcher (2003) argues that no model can account for overhead narratives or 
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underlying themes between cases of moral panic. Therefore, I would need to be 
receptive to the events (and narratives and themes) of my real-type case and how 
they could be seen in relation to the ideal-type. Fortuitously, this corresponded to 
my anticipation that there would unfold a unique trajectory in the case of ‘killer 
kids’ (given that there had been a unique initiation) and my intention to observe 
this trajectory.  
 
Looking toward the analysis of my case, the next task was to assess which ideal-
type model would be appropriate to use; the processual or the attributional? 
Critcher (2003) argues that in practice, it is the former that has thus far grasped 
the common features between panics (an issue emerges as a threat, moral 
entrepreneurs support it, experts pronounce diagnoses, and the state institutes 
repressive measures) whereas some of the attributes of the latter have proved 
problematic (concern and consensus in particular are noted to be difficult to 
measure). Moreover, I needed to anticipate the relatedness of the contexts in 
which these models were developed with Aotearoa/New Zealand’s socio-political 
environment. Drawing from the small body of moral panic literature developed in 
this country, and from my own preliminary observations, I ascertained there are 
two notable particularities about the media sphere here; first, that similar to the 
British context Aotearoa/New Zealand has a centralised media; second, that the 
relationship between the press and the police is, in the main, symbiotic (see in 
particular Matthews, 2002; Wallace, 2006). Moreover, the local literature had, in 
the main, employed the British sense of the concept. These factors determined 
that I favour the processual model. Of the two most well known uses of this 
model – Cohen’s (1972) analysis of the Mods and the Rockers and Hall et al.’s 
(1978) account of mugging – I settled upon proceeding with Cohen’s (1972) 
interactive model as my ideal-type. There are two reasons for this. Though the 
mugging analysis assured a more accurate capture of the dependent relationships 
between the press and the police than Cohen’s (1972) blanket notion of a ‘control 
culture’ could, and it could relate intricately to my early suspicion that the 
variable of race played a key role in how the imagery of Bailey Kurariki was 
construed with connotations by the press, its political backcloth was at odds with 
my intention to preserve the idea of panic as a transferable, heuristic concept (see 
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Cohen, 1987). Moreover, Cohen’s (1972) model is the most employed (including 
by Hall et al.) and best understood within the panic literature; indeed, it is 
Cohen’s (1972) opening paragraph that Critcher (2003) determines as the 
processual prototype.  
 
In the second half of this chapter I discussed some concerns with the concept’s 
criteria of disproportionality, and of its political tradition. I argued that the notion 
of a panic as ‘irrational’ is not – as some critics argue – directed at the actions of 
panic participants but the overall reaction as it evolves from the interactions of 
those actions. I also discussed how panic’s ‘folk meaning’ as a concept designed 
to expose dominant interests was inherently sociological, and that there could be a 
continuum of investment according to each analyst’s persuasion. Critics also 
identified a more delicate balance of relations between the media, agents of social 
control, claims-makers, and folk devils than the original model could account for. 
Others questioned the engagement with a panicking constituency. These, I argued, 
only demanded that analyses are more vigourous in their assessments of the 
interlocking variables of representation, media strategies, and sensationalism, and 
the ways by which these can operate to initiate and sustain the construction of a 
‘problem’ without grassroots support. I then identified that on the whole, panic 
assessments have placed too heavy an emphasis on the function of a reaction 
while issues of cause remain vague. Following in the tradition of Hall et al. 
(1978), de Young (2004), and Jenkins (2005), I wanted to understand why the 
phenomenon of ‘killer kids’ had erupted in this space and time; why, specifically, 
it was the imagery of Bailey Kurariki – and not the murder of Michael Choy itself 
– that had set the reaction in motion. To do this, I would need to look beyond the 
boundaries of the conceptual model of moral panic – outside the machine.  
 
In Chapter Two I explore how recent efforts toward ‘rethinking moral panic’ also 
seek answers to why a panic occurs on route to the address of another ‘big’ 
question; what are moral panics extreme examples of? It is from the directions 
this project is heading that I argue my analysis of a real-type in relation to an 
ideal-type be extended to imagine how the contextual location of panic reactions 
can inform a theoretical location of the concept.  
 41 
Chapter Two 
 
Rethinking Moral Panic 
 
For MPs to be a robust concept, its operationalization needs to be clear and coherent 
(Klocke & Muschert, 2010: 299). 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I identified that the concept of moral panic had 
lost its former interpretative authority and how this was due, in the main, to its 
own success. In Chapter One I explored the evolution of the concept and 
examined the critiques and social developments that have been seen to further 
weaken its sway. In this chapter, Chapter Two, I explore the ways by which a new 
wave of thinkers seek to renew panic’s analytical authority. This task is 
underpinned by a primary question: ‘what are moral panics extreme examples of?’ 
(see Critcher, 2008, 2009a). It is a question which aims to locate the concept 
within developments in social theory with a view to explain its processes. It is 
evident, however, that there are varying degrees to which these thinkers also 
locate their empirical ‘real-type’ panics within the social, cultural, and political 
contexts in which they emerge.  
 
In Chapter One I argued that I would approach the study of moral panic as a real-
type empirical case that could be seen in relation to the ideal-type analytical 
concept. I intimated that the ideal-type required regular assessment as its 
interpretative parameters needed to be relevant for how real-type cases unfolded 
and I would be asking how the case at hand challenged the parameters of the 
original model. I also argued that the question of why panics happen was too often 
circumvented with a focus on who started them and what they (panics) did, and 
that a central objective of my research was to understand why the case of ‘killer 
kids’ had emerged in Aotearoa/New Zealand when it had. As Cohen (1972: 172) 
avows: 
 
It is not enough to say that witches should not have been burnt or that in some other 
society or in another century they might not have been called witches; one has to 
explain why and how certain people get to the stake now.  
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If indeed this is the ‘age of moral panic’, then a concern for why panics 
materialise and certain people get to the stake is surely more important than ever. 
Moreover, if the ideal-type is intimate with real-types then it follows that what 
moral panics are extreme examples of is fundamentally intimate with why they 
occur. This observation extends my proposals for a real-type/ideal-type 
relationship. Indeed, I contend that the study of moral panic be of a configuration 
of relationships between a real-type episode and the ideal-type concept. One is to 
examine how a real-type panic challenges and/or supports the ideal-type 
parameters of an accepted model. One is also to situate a real-type within its 
context. How one might situate the ideal-type theoretically is drawn from how 
these first two relationships are configured. My central objective for this chapter 
is to look at the ways the new ideas have addressed this configuration and where, 
thereupon, my proposals fit amongst them.  
 
The discussion to follow is structured by ‘thinkers’ and in the order by degree of 
departure each thinker places upon the real-type in relation to the ideal-type, as 
this has implications for each respective assessment’s ability to address the 
contextual/theoretical relationship. The first thinker under discussion is Sheldon 
Ungar (1992, 2001) who contends that conditions identified as specific to late-
modern industrial societies demand a new research agenda as they not only 
confound the sites of social anxiety but also indicate a shift in processes through 
which conviction is sought. The second is Chas Critcher (2003, 2008a, 2008b) 
and his proposal for how we might think ‘beyond’ moral panic through viewing it 
in terms of three dimensions: processes, discourses and moral expressions. Third, 
I look at the scholarship of Sean Hier (2002b, 2003, 2008) who argues that risk 
issues mean more moral panics, in addition to how we can view panics as short-
term volatile moments within the ongoing and more routine project of moral 
regulation. Fourth, I overview the work of Amanda Rohloff (2008, 2010) who 
locates moral panic within the sociology of Norbert Elias; viewing panics as 
short-term decivilising episodes that emerge from civilising campaigns. Last, I 
introduce a line of insight on behalf of Simon Hallsworth (2000) and Ian Loader 
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(2009) that has not yet been considered in the study of moral panic, but it is one in 
which my proposals for an approach to moral panic appear reflected. Moreover, 
as will be seen in later chapters, this literature offers a fruitful direction by which 
to develop a conjectural understanding of ‘killer kids’. Though in many ways this 
is a selective choice of thinkers given a plethora of emerging literature on the 
legacy of moral panic (see Altheide, 2009; Innes, 2005; Garland, 2008; Young, 
2009) and how to overcome its discontents (Klocke & Muschert, 2010; Jenkins, 
2009; Welch, 2006, 2007), it is also contingent upon how the debates between 
these scholars (for example, Hier in response to Ungar, Critcher in response to 
Hier) are making important headway for how moral panic can be imagined in 
terms that extend its understanding.  
 
For the first thinker in my consideration of the project of rethinking moral panic, 
Ungar (1992, 2001), the ‘anxiety’ of real-type social reactions can no longer be 
evaluated as inappropriate or disproportional as it is difficult to establish the 
objective realities of the problems of a risk society.   
 
Abandon Panic: the ‘Social Scare’  
 
Underlying Ungar’s (2001) assessment is that risk issues – which now command 
our attention over and above other types of issues – are not temporal and spatial 
threats to a particular social order, but to the life and biology of the planet and its 
inhabitants. What is more, these issues are unpredictable, uncalculable, and 
possibly irreversible. For Ungar (2001) this real-type development renders a 
number of methodological assumptions of the analytical concept of moral panic – 
the ideal-type – problematic. First, if a risk problem is scientifically uncertain 
(thus there is no objective measure), how can one establish that concern is 
disproportionate to the level of threat? Second, where a panic is seen to be the 
result (intended or not) of efforts of moral entrepreneurs and claims-makers, a risk 
society issue needs a ‘real world’ event to precipitate concern and direct interest 
group enthusiasm (Ungar 1992). Moreover, it is Ungar’s (2001) contention that 
the media are more likely to report the ‘facts’ of risk problems – given the 
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reservations of scientific claims – than they are with moral assertions where there 
is relatively more licence to be creative (and thus sensationalist). Finally, it tends 
not to be the vulnerable or ‘distinguishable social types’ that are designated as 
‘folk devils’ but the powerful (political authorities, commercial interests) who 
find themselves the target of risk focused campaigns. Succinctly Ungar’s (1992, 
2001) argument is:  
 
… claims-making on risk society issues is, in comparison with conventional moral 
panic issues, hedged in by more apparent and sticky trajectories, by a more equal 
balance of power on the part of rival claims-makers, and by a comparative absence 
of distinguishable types of folk devils that evoke deep-seated hostility and fear 
(Ungar, 2001: 287).   
 
Further, Ungar (2001) suggests that efforts towards containment are attempted 
through a ‘post market coping model’, and not the erection of ‘safety’ discourses 
in the reconstruction of normative boundaries that are typical of moral panics.  
 
Despite these observations Ungar (2001) is still keen about the idea of a 
conceptual tool with which to deconstruct a social reaction. Moreover, his 
proposal for an alternative concept draws intricately on Cohen’s (1972) panic 
model. But for Ungar (1992) the ‘social scare’ is less specific and is devoid of the 
normative measures that plague moral panic assessments and so therefore is better 
able to conceptualise anxieties of the risk society. He explains:  
 
Social scares entail acute episodes of collective fear that accelerate demands in the 
political (or related) arena. Accelerated demands urge extraordinary responses – 
solutions that tend to be costly, often simplify problems to the point of caricature, 
seek to leap-frog prevailing processes for evolving solutions, and can verge on the 
draconian…These demands may or may not be acted upon, depending on factors 
such as the scare intensity and whether it persists, is renewed, or simply disappears 
(Ungar, 1992: 485).  
 
Ungar’s (2001) emphasis upon real-type reactions and argument for why a panic 
model is no longer applicable is important insofar as it recognises that changing 
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environments require that conceptual tools be revisited (there is a relationship 
between real-types and ideal-types). It is interesting then that his model of the 
‘social scare’ has much in common with moral panic, which would suggest that 
the ideal-type (of moral panic) is not dramatically challenged by the shift to a risk 
society. He identifies, for example, that responses (to the fear of risk) are in 
simplified, ‘caricature’ and ‘draconian’ terms, which inadvertently suggests that 
there is some form of external measure to which the proposed solution (too far) 
extends to. This, in turn, implies that the criteria of disproportionality can be 
established. Ungar (2001) also overstates the role of claims-making in a panic. As 
argued in the last chapter, panics are distinct particularly in the alliance between 
political, institutional, and lay groups who are sensitised, and it is this which 
facilitates the over-estimation and escalation towards a perceived problem 
(Cohen, 1972; see also Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994a on the difference between 
panics and moral crusades). Moreover, moral panics often require precipitating 
events. In Hall et al.’s (1978) elite engineered, Cohen’s (1972) interest group 
panic, and Kitzinger’s (1999) assessment of the ‘paedophile in the community’ 
crisis as a grassroots panic, it can be seen that each was set in motion by a key 
‘real-world’ incident (the Handsworth mugging, the brawl in Clacton at Easter, 
and the murder of Sarah Payne respectively).  
 
This aside, what can be most astutely observed of Ungar’s (1992, 2001) work is 
that he draws upon a realist (or materialist) conception of the risk society theses. 
In other words, his view is that things such as global warming, nuclear weaponry, 
and bioterrorism – threats to the existence of human life – demand our attention 
simply because they are actual, factual risks. Consequently, the question of what 
the model of a social scare is an extreme example of or how the logic of its 
processes might be explained is not important. Hier (2003), however, takes issue 
with this materiality. Indeed, Hier (2003) goes so far as to challenge the ontology 
of external risk, observing that despite their departures the common thread in 
theories of late-modernity is ‘risk’ as a concept invoked to explain uncertainty and 
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deal with unawareness.29 In other words, social actors employ the idea of risk and 
are ‘risk conscious’ as it offers a sense of calculation and control in late-modern 
societies characterised by uncertainty (and where there is uncertainty of 
knowledge) (see also Furedi, 1997). In this way, its processes can be explained as 
a operation of governance. 
 
In a further section I examine Hier’s (2002a, 2008) location of risk talk within 
practices of moral regulation, alongside his identification that the risk society 
nevertheless has implications for how moral panics appear. Prior to examining 
these implications more closely, I want to turn to Critcher (2003, 2006, 2008, 
2009a, b) who argues that the capture of specificities of any ‘real type’ reaction 
(be that anxiety about a real-world risk, or hysteria about a phantom menace), is 
better got by firmly engaging with moral panic as a transferable, heuristic ‘ideal 
type’.  
 
Preserve Panic: Three Dimensions  
 
Indeed, of all the scholars involved in the project of ‘rethinking’ moral panic, it is 
Critcher (2003, 2006, 2008, 2009a, b) who places the most emphasis upon the 
concept as a heuristic conceptual tool, or ‘ideal type’. However, he is critical of 
the eclectic and sometimes slapdash application of both Cohen’s (1972) 
processual and Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (1994a, b) attributional models, at the 
same time as he is sympathetic to a range of the critiques directed at moral panic. 
To evaluate and propose how we might overcome the critics concerns, using 
secondary data Critcher (2003) applies both models across a range of ‘case 
studies’ – from ecstasy to video ‘nasties’ to paedophilia – with the view to find 
both ‘constancies’ and those aspects of each real-type case that moral panic 
cannot account for. He concludes that we cannot yet do without ‘moral panic’:   
 
                                                
29 Hunt (2003) also challenges the ontology of risk that has given the impetus behind Beck’s 
(1992) ‘risk society’. He argues that despite the greater potential impact of today’s risks, there 
appears no qualitative distinction to justify an epochal change (Hunt, 2003).  
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Where an issue, in whatever form, emerges as a symbolic threat; where the media as 
a whole accept a single definition of the problem; where there are organised groups 
supporting the panic and none disputing it; where expert opinion does – or can be 
presented to – support the diagnosis of the problem; where the state, however 
laggardly, does institute repressive measures, then we have the basic requirements of 
the ideal type fulfilled (Critcher, 2003: 154).  
 
It is those cases where there is variation from this ideal type that a full-fledged 
panic fails to materialise (see also Jenkins, 2009). On the other hand, all real-type 
cases that Critcher (2003) overviewed exceeded beyond the boundaries of the 
models; that is, each case had features which moral panic analysis alone was 
unable to reveal (see also Rocheron & Linne, 1989). In particular was the 
presence of discourses, often specific to each issue, that either informed by or 
were generated by the panic; sexuality to Aids for example, hedonism to 
rave/ecstasy, and innocent children to child sexual abuse. Critcher (2003) then 
examines what moral panics do – namely, the reaffirmation of the moral 
boundaries of society through the nomination of outsiders (see Erikson, 1966). He 
contends that moral panics can be understood in terms of three dimensions: as a 
set of identifiable processes (for which an ‘ideal type’ model is useful), as sets of 
discourses (pertaining to the real-type issue), and as expressions of moral values 
(their functionality).  
 
There is, however, little room for an examination of how a real-type panic may 
bear upon the ideal-type via Critcher’s structure. In part this is because he 
employs secondary data and so the subtleties of each reaction is lost. But it is also 
because the practice he prescribes can only capture differences between the 
variable episodes, conditions and/or persons or groups of persons through the 
interplay of processes and discourses as they materialise within an episode. At the 
same time it looks for excesses beyond the model. Further, with emphasis placed 
upon how the discourse that emerges as dominant works as an achievement of 
moral certainty, the emphasis is upon the function of the panic in lieu of the 
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question of ‘why’ it occurred in the first place.30 A later submission (Critcher, 
2009a); that one would ask what wider discourses inform and relate to the 
dominant discourse in the bounded reaction (explicated by either of the models), 
and who it is that defines who is ‘at risk’ is tentative about what this could mean 
for how the ideal-type concept can be rethought.  
 
Thus far then, for Ungar (1992, 2001) the challenge of real-type social reactions 
and real-type contexts both renders the concept of moral panic problematic and 
mitigates the need for further reflection, whereas for Critcher (2003, 2006, 2008, 
2009a, b) the ideal-type is abstract enough to explain many different reactions so 
long as the basic descriptive criteria is met. However, the question of why such 
reactions occur and where the concept might be located within theory remain 
elusive. In the next section my attention turns to the work of Sean Hier (2002a, 
2003, 2008) whose assessment of real-types intricately informs the ‘extreme 
example’ question (of the ideal-type) but that, paradoxically, his notion of how to 
explain the concept risks becoming too general to capture the exceptionality of 
‘panic’.  
 
Risk and Morality: the Converging Sites of ‘Anxiety’  
 
Hier’s (2002a, 2003, 2008) contribution to the project of ‘rethinking moral panic’ 
is both extensive and complex. As indicated, Hier (2003) agrees with many 
cultural theorists who view that moral ends are now achieved with the use of risk 
language. Mary Douglas, for example, argues that “risk provides the secular 
terms for rewriting scripture” (that is, of what constitutes sin) (Douglas, 1992: 26; 
see also Garland, 2008; Lupton, 1999; Moore & Valverde, 2000; Mythen, 2007; 
                                                
30 However, Critcher (2003, 2006) is aware of the complex beginnings of a problem unfolding, and 
that his template under-represents a full analysis of the inter-workings of the moral agenda. 
Moreover, in a more recent work (Critcher, 2009), the moral regulation literature is identified as a 
means to understand why some social objects and subjects become moral targets. What is 
interesting further, is that for most perspectives that undertake discourse analysis, and particularly 
those who analyse media text, discourse practice is seen as a means through which textual analysis 
can be linked to socio-cultural analysis; that is, the aim is to show the dialectical relationship 
between the materialisation of texts and the wider social practices in which they are embedded 
(see Fairclough, 1992, 1995a; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Matheson, 2005; Van Dijk, 1988a, 1988b, 
1991; Wetherell, 2001). 
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O’Malley & Mugford, 1991; Sparks, 2000). Indeed, Critcher (2003) identified in 
his assembly of panics that ‘risk talk’ was a predominant feature; who was at risk 
of Aids, the risk to party goers, risk inside and outside familial structures. Garland 
(2003: 64) takes a systematic view of this connection:  
 
… as chains of interdependence grow longer, and shared moral codes grow thinner, 
risk management has become a necessary moral technology, operationalizing 
liberalism’s twin concern to maximize freedom of action and to reduce that 
freedom’s harmful consequences (emphasis added). 
 
Ultimately, for Hier (2003: 19), if “post moral techniques and discourses of risk 
management have ended up doing old moral regulation work”, then this would 
suggest that it is not so much that sites of anxiety are shifting, but converging.   
 
Might this explain the ‘age of moral panic’? Somewhat, though here Hier (2003) 
adopts a functional explanation of panic. He suggests that in the context of 
existential (and ontological) insecurity, a sense of ‘community’ has an urgency to 
it as it operates to affirm belonging in a world of generalised strangers and 
confronts the individuation modernity initiates (see also Jewkes, 2004). This is 
why we are seeing more moral panics, as what panics ‘do’ is identify a threat to 
the group (which in turn becomes a group in the identification of a threat). 
However, the erection and re-erection of the borders of community are now done 
under the guise of ‘safety’ (i.e. the amelioration of risk). Hence we no longer have 
‘folk devils’ that may be cast aside, but dangerous others that we must be 
protected from (Hier, 2003).  
 
Hier’s (2003) work to this point emphasises that the character of real-type moral 
panics is changing. This, he contends, can be instructive for what causes moral 
panics, and thereupon what we might invisage what the concept can be seen as an 
extreme example of. Adopting a critical conception of ideology whereby the 
relation between the production of meaning and the function such meaning 
extends to is problematised, Hier (2002b, 2008) argues that an examination of 
how panic discourse works to recruit its members and demonise its target will 
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reveal the foundations from which it emerged (see also de Young, 2004, 2008). In 
an extension of his ‘rethink’ of moral panic, Hier (2002a, 2008) argues that the 
proxies of risk, harm, and personal responsibility that are characteristic of 
contemporary panics are also visible in more routine practices of moral regulation 
under neo-liberalism. In the next section I examine how he locates the volatility of 
moral panic within a context of wider practices of governance. I then consider 
how his ‘rethinking’ of moral panic addresses the relationship between real-types 
and the ideal-type.   
 
Volatile Episodes: Moral Panic and Moral Regulation  
 
Drawing on Valverde’s (1994) model of moral capital, Hier (2002b) envisages the 
‘moral’ as dispositions and habits that are constituted through and naturalised 
through a process of a ‘calling’ to engage in particular practices of ‘care for the 
self’. That is, we are now asked to take on responsible forms of personal risk 
management.31 But how is this assured? Hier (2008) argues the notion of the 
responsible individual sits against a collective subject position of ‘harmful 
other/s’. This/these are abstract subject/s that represent the potential threat that 
risky behaviours pose, and the potential harm that could entail from those threats. 
Hier (2008) offers the example of the discourses which call us (individually) to 
drink responsibly and how these sit in tension with (and yet rely on) the discourse 
which represents the collective harm of the drunk driver. In other words, I will (it 
is my moral calling to) manage my drinking so as not to become the ‘risky’ other 
(harmful to the wider group), and to manage my activities to avoid becoming 
subject to such harm. Yet I know of these duties only with the drunk driver’s 
ethereal presence.  
 
However, moral callings are not always heeded (or seen not to be heeded). At 
such conjunctions the abstract subject position is filled by identifiable person/s. 
The threat then becomes more specific and the harm less preventable via our own 
                                                
31 The ‘calling’ is on behalf of spatially and temporally situated bodies such as the church, 
professional organizations and interest groups. For Hier (2008) the state only comes into the 
equation by responding to limit the agency of those who do not heed ‘calls’.  
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actions of risk aversion. Thereupon, a collective discourse of risk management 
moves in against an immediate and personalised dimension of harm; the everyday 
dialectic (of individual risk management against the collective dimension of 
harm) is momentarily reversed. Put simply, when everyday practices of regulation 
in which the subject is asked to act responsibly fails, this subject is seen as a 
danger and limitations are then put upon his/her agency via defensive activity on 
behalf of the wider group. For Hier (2002b, 2008) these are moments of moral 
panic; or, moral panics are a volatile manifestation of routine processes of moral 
regulation.   
 
Hier (2003) recognises the relationship between real-types and the ideal-type in 
that he critically assesses real-type discourse to inform his idea of what the ideal-
type can be seen as an extreme example of. However, at the same time he puts 
paid to that relationship as, akin to Critcher’s (2003, 2006) fortification, he 
weakens the boundaries of the ideal-type by locating its volatility within wider 
social processes that are common, general, and less than fantastic. Indeed, in 
response to Hier’s work, Critcher (2008: 9) suggests that the relocation of moral 
panic into the field of moral regulation risks “encompassing potentially any topic 
within its remit” (emphasis added). This may be because Hier’s focus is also upon 
the discourse inside a panic, and while he acknowledges that contextual shifts 
have lent to changes in how panic discourse appears, he lacks attention to the 
ways by which such shifts may allow us to view why panics erupt in the first 
place or have altered the very foundations upon which modern panics emerge. 
This is reflected in his attribution of ‘insecurity’ as a causal variable in the ‘age of 
moral panic’ which I argued in Chapter One was problematic. Critcher (2008, 
2009b) goes on to argue that better specification of the scope of moral regulation 
is needed whereupon we might clarify the boundaries between those issues that 
are merely dissident of regulatory discourses and those that are more likely to 
erupt into panics. He suggests a dimensional categorisation (separate to his own 
three-dimensional framework for the study of individual cases of moral panic) 
based upon how an issue is discursively constructed; as a threat to basic values 
(the moral order dimension), the extent to which there is a proposed solution (the 
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social order dimension), and the regulation of others insofar as it requires the 
ethical formation of the self (the governmentality dimension) (Critcher, 2008, 
2009b). It is those issues that score high on the first two (child sexual abuse, 
violent crime, asylum seeking) that are potential panics; issues such as smoking, 
obesity, and sexually transmitted diseases score high only on the third, and as 
such, are not likely to generate the same language of ‘evil’; their perpetrators 
probably less subject to the same degree of social expulsion.32  
 
Critcher (2008) also questions whether the moral regulation literature shares the 
agenda of critical research, observing Hunt’s (1999) outright rejection of any 
potential relationship (between panic and moral regulation) in addition to a 
similar hesitancy on behalf of Moore and Valverde (2000).33 Hier (2008) is quite 
clear that his intentions for ‘rethinking panic’ in terms of regulatory processes are 
about moving beyond what he terms the ‘revisionist works’ (in particular de 
Young, 2004; McRobbie, 1994a; McRobbie & Thornton, 1995) which still rely 
upon “cognitive, behavioural, and normative measurement criteria” (Hier, 2008: 
180). Hier seeks, in other words, to understand panic as a ‘rational’ response 
however ‘irrational’ its appearance seems to the analyst or what prejudicial ends 
are served. However, as argued in Chapter One, it is the whole reaction that is 
denoted by panic researchers as ‘irrational’, after it has been subject to processes 
of inflammation and amplification independent of any one party’s control. 
Moreover, as Critcher (2009: 32) contends:  
 
If there is no disparity to identify between the reality of the social problem and its 
representation – if perhaps the distinction between reality and representation is 
denied – then the whole political point, the urge to social justice, has been lost.   
 
It appears thus far that the contextual question (the location of real-type panics) 
has yet to bear upon the extreme example or theoretical question (the location of 
                                                
32 Though, there remains in this categorisation, a focus upon the aspects of function in place of 
aspects of cause. 
33 This may reflect the tendencies of analyses informed by Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ to view 
concerns as conceptually and epistemologically incompatible with sociological approaches (see 
Garland, 1997).  
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the ideal-type) in the terms that I have proposed. I want to now turn to an 
emerging perspective that seeks to view the relationship by employing the 
sociology of Norbert Elias. This is the work of Amanda Rohloff (2008, 2010).  
 
Decivilising Episodes: an Eliasian Approach  
 
The argument begins with Elias’s (2000) developmental idea of civilisation as a 
process entailing an increase in interdependencies at the local level and the 
growth of state authorities at the structural level.34 That is, as populations grow, 
the division of labour increases so societies become more complex, differentiated, 
and increasingly dependent on each other. This corresponds with an increasing 
monopolisation over the control of violence and taxation on behalf of the state. 
Fundamentally, individuals are compelled towards increasing self-restraint as the 
state moves into a more executive role; a long-term process that also generates 
increased mutual identification and a corresponding decrease in cruelty (Rohloff, 
2010, see also Mennell, 1990). However, such civilising processes were not 
conceived of by Elias (2000) as linear and unproblematic; indeed often “several 
types of change, even in opposite directions, can be observed simultaneously” 
(Elias, 2000: 450). Elias (2000) termed these ‘opposite’ changes ‘decivilising 
processes’, and others have since proposed that we can identify these through 
‘symptoms’ and criteria (see Mennell, 1990; Fletcher, 1997). However, as Rohloff 
(2010) argues, while decivilising symptoms may appear as the reversal of 
civilising symptoms, it does not follow that decivilising processes are civilising 
processes in reverse. In fact, the long chains of interdependencies and the 
advances of technology that are characteristic of civilising processes may enable 
decivilising processes to materialise.35  
 
                                                
34 Elias (1984) uses the terms ‘civilized’ in a detached (non-normative) sense to represent the 
configuration of state processes, social interdependencies, and the internalization of constraint 
among individuals.  
35 Elias (1996) sees the Nazi regime as a primary example of where civilizing processes give rise 
to decivilising trends.  
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Rohloff’s (2008, 2010) argument is that moral panics can be seen as a short-term 
decivilising episodes that arise, in part, from civilising processes. There appear 
three main characteristics to the Eliasian concept of decivilising processes:  
 
… a shift away from self restraint towards restraint imposed by external authorities; 
the development of behaviour and sensibilities that generate the emergence of less 
even, stable, and differentiated patterns of restraint; and a contraction in the scope of 
mutual identification between constituent groups and individuals. When these occur 
they are likely to be accompanied by a decrease in the state monopoly of violence, a 
shortening of interdependencies, and a concomitant rise of fear, danger, and 
incalculability (Pratt, 2005b: 259).    
 
For Rohloff (2008, 2010) the similarities with panic are striking when we 
consider, for example, the attribute of ‘concern’ and the impetus that ‘something 
must be done’; ‘hostility’ and ‘volatility’; and the creation of an ‘other’ or ‘folk 
devil’ who leads to a decrease in a shared identification and an increase in cruelty 
(whereupon calls for extreme measures to counter the problem and its perpetrators 
are deemed legitimate).36 But to avoid merely applying decivilising symptoms to 
a moral panic and determining that panics are indeed decivilising episodes (much 
the same way as one might apply a heuristic moral panic model and state that this 
phenomena qualifies as a moral panic), Rohloff (2008, 2010) argues for the 
empirical assessment of the interplay between civilising offensives (deliberate 
attempts by a person or group to initiate changes in behaviour of another person 
or group – to ‘civilise’ them) and long term processes (both decivilising and 
civilising). For Rohloff (2008, 2010) the identification that offensives (though 
they are means through which increased ‘civilising’ is sought) may contain 
decivilising symptoms, opens up the conceptual space for examining campaigns 
such as those undertaken by ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Becker, 1963) during moral 
panics.  
 
                                                
36 Similar to his criticism of Hier (2002a, 2008) Critcher (2008) would note that Rohloff (2008, 
2010) is here interchangeably employing the attributional model of moral panic with the 
processual.  
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Using a figurational approach, Rohloff’s (2008, 2010) research focuses firstly on 
the content of the documentary An Inconvenient Truth presented by former United 
States presidential candidate Al Gore. This she identifies as a moral 
entrepreneurial campaign. Locating several themes akin to panics (for example 
the event of hurricane Katrina as a prediction of things to come; the imagery of 
Katrina to symbolise potential devastation) this real-type occurence is explored in 
terms of its relationship with either civilising or decivilising symptoms. Her 
conclusion is that we might view moral panics as decivilising episodes which both 
further and counter civilising processes. The call for increased self-restraint with 
regard to the consumption of consumer goods in An Inconvenient Truth, for 
example, may be seen as reflective of longer term processes of increasing mutual 
identification. That is, there are/were already trends evident of increased foresight 
and recognition of the interdependencies of human beings with nature; already 
movements toward consumer restraint. Gore’s campaign and its prophecies of 
doom attempts to accelerate this pattern.  
 
Rohloff’s (2008, 2010) focus is upon how moral panic can be located as an 
extreme example of something by looking at the relationship between real-type 
episodes and their contextual locations. Consequently, of the thinkers involved in 
the project of ‘rethinking moral panic’, it is her assessment that is most in line 
with my proposals. However, there is little of a distinction between a real-type 
episode and the ideal-type concept and therefore an evaluation of this relationship. 
This can be seen in her anticipation that entrepreneurial efforts may initiate new 
categories of deviance by creating a moral divide between those who adhere to the 
callings of the campaign and those who do not. In itself, this development may 
stimulate panic, however, Rohloff (2008, 2010) suggests that it is increased 
interdependencies that are more likely to generate conditions within which moral 
panics thrive (and hence our ‘age of panic’). In line with Beck (1992) she argues 
that the expertization of knowledge may be seen as a long term unplanned 
civilising process (akin to the monopolisation of violence). But knowledge has to 
be mediated, and so a monopolisation of knowledge (on behalf of experts) co-
insides with a demonopolisation of knowledge (the mediated version). In addition, 
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increases in technology have enabled a plurality of claims in a variety of mediums 
to be heard (McRobbie & Thornton’s (1995) ‘multi-mediated social worlds’). 
This contributes to make claims of danger increasingly incalculable, and 
increasingly contestable, both of which have implications for the success and 
failure of panics.  
 
Like Hier, Rohloff (2008, 2010) is also keen to dispute the notion that moral 
panics erupt on the back of ‘irrational’ behaviour. Her argument is that the goal of 
establishing disproportionality relies on an involved analysis (from an invested 
position), and thus closes research to the possibility that a social reaction may not 
be an irrational peculiarity. This is why the figurational approach is attractive. It 
circumscribes a relative detachment principle (where the sociologist is neither 
completely involved, nor completely detached from the subject matter), which is 
viewed as being more conducive to increasing the ‘reality congruence’ (and 
decreasing the ‘fantasy content’) of knowledge (see Bloyce, 2004; Dunning, 
1992; Elias, 1978; Maguire, 1988). Rohloff’s position is that questions such as 
‘how do particular social problems lend themselves to panic construction?’ and 
‘how do particular people become subject to disidentification?’ are still 
conceivable, but that they must come after the reaction in question has been 
subject to inquiry so as to lessen the bias of the researcher intruding into the 
research (see Rohloff & Wright, 2010). However, if the ‘judgement’ is to be made 
only after the research is done, would the research upon which to make such an 
assessment be undertaken in the first place? Indeed, the question turns from 
‘whose side are we on?’ (Becker, 1967) to ‘why are we doing this?’  
 
In the last section of this chapter, I turn my attention to recent scholarship in the 
sociology of punishment where the concern for the relationships between real-
type phenomena and contextual trends, and between conceptual notions and 
theoretical locations unfold in a way that reflects the real-type/ideal-type, 
contextual/theoretical formula that I have proposed for the study of moral panic. 
Moreover, these works are not overridden with a motivation to diffuse a charge of 
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normativity. In turn there emerges a remarkable idea that may be informative for a 
renewed understanding of panic.  
 
The Criminology of the Other, the Heterogenaic, and Energy in Excess 
 
Garland (2001) interprets contemporary criminology in terms of two new 
currents: the ‘criminology of everyday life’ and the ‘criminology of the other’.37 
The first is late modern in character – it accepts crime as a fact and manages the 
risk of crime in terms of situations and opportunities. It aims, not to change 
individuals, but the systems of approaching them, of dealing with them. Its 
philosophy is:  
 
… a matter not of shared values but of smart arrangements that minimize the 
opportunities for disruption and deviance. This is a very self-conscious, very 
sophisticated approach to social order in a complex differentiated society. It flies in 
the face of traditionalist ideas that see order as emerging out of moral discipline and 
obedience to authority. But it also subverts the old welfare state of belief, that for 
society to work, solidarity must extend to all members who must be made part of an 
all-encompassing civic union (Garland, 2001: 183).  
 
The second emergent criminology is distinctly anti-modern. It upholds order, 
reinstates authority, asserts an absolute moral agenda, and thrives on the notion of 
common sense. Offenders thus, are ‘intrinsically wicked’, dangerous others who 
threaten our way of being. Social order here requires, in no uncertain terms, a 
social consensus, but it is a consensus of “a pre-modern, mechanical kind – based 
upon a set of shared values not a pluralism of tolerated differences” (Garland, 
2001: 185). Distinguishing between the two criminologies, Garland (2001: 184) 
writes:  
 
If the criminology of everyday life de-dramatizes crime, treating it as a routine part 
of the normal scheme of things, this other criminology re-dramatizes it – depicting it 
                                                
37 Both, notably, are a response away from the correctionalist criminology (or penal modernism) of 
past decades and its perceived failures.  
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in melo-dramatic terms, viewing it as a catastrophe, framing it in the language of 
warfare and social defense. 
 
Garland (1996, 2001) interprets the irrationality that underpins this ‘other’ 
criminology as a ‘strategy of denial’. Drawing upon Nietzsche’s (1963) claim that 
the modern state can only exercise tolerance and mercy in times where it is secure 
in its own power (and territory), Garland (1996) identifies the criminology of the 
other as a symbolic reassertion of state power that occurs when its sovereignty has 
been challenged; when the limits of the state have been revealed for their capacity. 
In such times, the consistent challenge that is presented by the criminal needs to 
be dealt with more fervently than in times of perceived security, and this is often 
achieved via a “recourse to a dramatic and festive display of violence” 
(Hallsworth, 2000: 149).  
 
There are already parallels to be made between Garland’s (1996) notion of 
dangerous others and Hier’s (2003) conception of the ‘enemy stranger’ as a new 
form of ‘folk devil’ in contemporary ‘risk’ focused moral panics. Both initiate 
increased state action and facilitate the erection of boundaries between us and 
them. However, unlike Hier’s generality in his conjecture of what moral panic 
might explain, there are limits in terms of applying Garland’s (1996) argument 
beyond panics that are not specifically crime centred, or have as their precipitating 
event a criminal act. In what I see as an important extension of Garland’s work, 
Hallsworth (2000) locates the criminology of the other within a re-emergence of 
an economy that is undermining many aspects of the modern project.  
 
Drawing on the work of Georges Bataille, Hallsworth (2000) argues that the 
irrationalism and emotionalism of the ‘criminology of the other’ reveals its place 
within the ‘heterogeniac’. This is a term used by Bataille to describe features of 
social life that escape categorisation within the ‘restricted economy of limits’ – an 
economy that emerged with capitalist exchange and relations of productivity – 
which now permeates through all areas of modern social life. Hallsworth (2000) 
argues that the shift towards principles guided by this restricted economy can be 
seen in how modern penal systems were reorganised from premodern 
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‘spectacular’ and ‘festive’ displays of law enforcement to a productivist ethic of 
redemption and rehabilitation, conducted under a panoptic order. He contends: 
 
Like Weber’s religious ghosts in an age of rationalisation, the modern penal order 
had little space for excess in a world defined by a more rational calculating ethic in 
which the ‘cruel and unusual’ would have no place (Hallsworth, 2000: 152).  
 
For Hallsworth (2000) the punitive shift that can be seen gaining ground in many 
western nations in contemporary times is an indication that the features relegated 
to the heterogenaic are again surfacing and combining to undermine the positive 
practices and outcomes of a utilitarian approach to justice. He provides some 
formative examples, from the ferocity of the Californian three stikes law which 
has seen 192 people incarcerated for life for the possession of marijuana to the 
mandatory 15 year sentence in New York for the possession of two grams of 
cocaine (the same sentence is given in this state for murder) (Hallsworth, 2000: 
154). However, this is where a notion of a normative judgement becomes 
somewhat mute. Though intrinsic to punishment is the expression of emotion (and 
this is regardless of what rational or instrumental ends are added into the equation, 
see Steen & Bandy, 2007), on the whole responses to crime can be located along a 
continuum that has at one end the values of liberty, due process, and human 
rights, and at the other end security, crime control, and retribution. A response or 
punishment that is too far along the former end sees the state fail in its obligation 
to ensure order and one that is too far along the latter risks intruding into citizen 
rights. Therefore, though ultimately there is still a sense of ‘judgement’ on behalf 
of an assessor, there is a balance to attain that relies on a measure that is more 
particular than one defined by left or right politics (indeed, it transcends these 
paradigms) (see Tonry, 2001). This is arguably why scholars are less likely to 
concern themselves with – or be accused of – polemic assessments. Moreover, as 
Steen and Bandy (2007) suggest, what tempers any trend of responses and ensures 
(in the end) this balance is fiscal realities. Incarcerating 192 people for life for a 
relatively minor offence is an unnecessary burden on the tax-payer; one that 
impinges on the economic security of the law-abiding.  
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Nevertheless, reflecting upon Hallsworth’s (2000) argument, and seeking to 
explain why current punishment trends sit too far along the 
security/control/retributive end of the spectrum, Loader (2009) identifies that 
responses to crime do not exist outside of and in isolation from other 
social/cultural/political phenomena. Indeed, in order to examine trends and 
movements within the penal realm, one must consider the relations between these 
trends and movements with other, more general social practices that can be 
characterised by a tendency towards excess. He argues:  
 
Consider for a moment the following features of contemporary social life: cheap air 
travel; SUVs (coupled with an increase in the size of all types of car); chocolate in 
breakfast cereals; double-sized Mars bars; rising rates of childhood obesity; the 
disappearance of ‘small’ cups of coffee (or indeed of any take-away beverage); 
cheap alcohol; the quick and easy availability of credit; the instant access to 
information, images, goods and people afforded by mobile phones and the Internet; 
cosmetic surgery; the social worship of footballers, celebrities and entrepreneurs; the 
explosion of corporate pay; 20/20 cricket, multi-channel television and so on and so 
on. What these seemingly disparate things commonly give effect to and symbolise is 
the idea that the world is – or at least ought properly to be – organized so that one’s 
immediate desires can be instantly satisfied in ways which often permit one to 
disregard, perhaps even trample over, the interests, feelings and well-being of 
others. It is a world that pays homage to self-regarding self-fulfilment; where speedy 
access to what one craves is paramount; where the great enemies are obstacle and 
delay (Loader, 2009: 242).  
 
For Loader (2009) the excess in all of these things, together with the beliefs 
underpinning demands for security and punishment in the modern era, is marked 
by and can be explained by an appetite which is propogated by a familiar cluster 
of features (familiar, that is, for a student of moral panic); increased 
understandings of and sensitivity to risk, a climate of anxiety, increased media 
attention, an absence of community, political responsiveness to lay desires (in a 
climate of deference) and so forth. I will reflect on this common ground in a 
moment. For now I want to briefly demonstrate how these ideas can be seen in the 
terms I have proposed for the study of moral panic.  
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First, the ‘criminology of the other’ and the ‘criminology of everyday life’ 
describe real-type responses to crime. Hallsworth’s (2000) location of the 
‘criminology of the other’ in the spaces of the heterogeniac then makes the direct 
leap – much like Rohloff – into a theoretical reflection. However, Loader (2009) 
intersects with the notion of an appetite. This can be seen as conceptual insofar as 
it might be applied to other like phenomena, which he then locates within a 
context that is particular to late-modern times. Within this nexus of ideas there can 
be configured a systematic course from real-types to ideal-types, and from an 
understanding of the contexts in which that relationship resides, an opening for 
imagining in a more theoretical sense how that relationship can be explained.   
 
Loader (2009) makes moves in this direction by asking why the contextual 
features described above are all–pervasive in the late-modern era. His answer, 
along with others (see Pratt, 2008), is that the appetite in each sphere he describes 
above reinforces another, which in turn reinforces another, reflecting a dialectical 
relationship between social phenomena and its contexts. He also identifes a 
tendency (on behalf of the lay public) to intrepret security as identity which is 
exploited for commerical gain by security market operatives, and by a fantastical 
claim on behalf of power-seeking political bodies that there can be a ‘risk-free’ 
society (see Loader, 2009). Both bear upon and augment the sensitivity to ‘risk’ 
and the condition of anxiety. However, I believe that Bataille himself can be 
instructive here. Fundamentally, Bataille’s (1988) belief was that all human (and 
other worldly) activity has surplus energy; that is, energy that goes beyond what is 
required for any particular task. This is because all tasks have natural limits on 
their operation and on their expansion (or sovereignty, as Garland argues). 
Kosalka (1999) gives the example of how plants use the energy from the sun. As 
the light and energy from the sun’s rays are received, most goes towards the 
plant’s continued survival. The excess is used for either growth or reproduction, 
or, if that limit has been met (for example, the plant’s life cycle is at a stage where 
reproduction is no longer viable) the excess energy is used for the beautification 
of folliage, or simply expended onto the ground. In human societies, when the 
limits of a task have been met, such excess energy manifests in glorious ways 
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such as art, laughter, sex, festival, poetry and feasts, or in catastrophic ways like 
warfare. Indeed, the ways by which a society expends its surplus energy defines 
that society – as festive, or as destructive. Bataille’s (1988) main point, however, 
is that this surplus energy needs to be discharged. This poses problems for the 
late-modern era in which we currently reside. The restricted economy of limits 
that now permeates through social life does not have pre-thought mechanisms for 
channelling this energy when those limits of expansion have been met, quite 
simply as its governing principle is the notion of scarcity, not excess.38 As 
Thompson (1997: 606) argues, all that which cannot be assumed under the control 
of resources for the purposes of capitalist production and exchange; the 
“unproductive expenditure, profitless exchange, [and] ritualistic, sacred and 
symbolic activity” is rendered unintelligable and relegated to the margins of 
everyday life – to the spaces of the heterogenaic.  
 
It can be imagined at this point that such un-discharged energy put aside by the 
restricted economy of limits would, in due course, manifest itself in uncontrolled 
and unpredictable ways. It would give reason for the reappearance of a punitive 
urge and the development of policies that resemble the ‘spectacular’ and ‘festive’ 
displays of the pre-modern order. It could explain the appetite for excess that 
Loader (2009) identifies, for an appetite gobbles and consumes and discharges 
energy as much as it might ask for more. Perhaps then it can also explain the 
freefloating ‘anxiety’ and ‘insecurity’ of the late-modern era that are said to 
propel moral panics and, if it can be imagined that the heteorgeniac has reached a 
point of overflow – of limit – henceforth the ‘age of moral panic’. But can it 
explain the time-honored processes of moral panic within which the logic of the 
amplification cycle resides? Is it more than a set of descriptive stages? In the 
concluding chapter I will revisit these questions in light of the empirical study of 
‘killer kids’ and propose that it indeed can, and that it is.  
 
 
 
                                                
38 In pre-modern societies the ‘gift’ and its close cousin the ‘sacrifice’ was a way to discharge 
excess (see Bataille, 1988; Kosalka, 1999; Hyde, 1983).   
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Approaching the Case of ‘Killer Kids’ 
 
In Chapter One I argued that I would approach my case study of moral panic as a 
real-type episode that could be seen in relation to the ideal-type concept. That is, 
the study of ‘killer kids’ would be assessed in terms how it met the features of an 
ideal-type model at the same time as how it deviated and challenged the concept. 
In the introduction of this chapter, Chapter Two, I identifed that at the centre of a 
contemporary project of ‘rethinking moral panic’ was a primary question: what 
are moral panics extreme examples of? I then suggested that if this was the age of 
moral panic, then the question of why a panic occurs was more important than 
ever. Moreover, if the ideal-type was intimate with real-types then what moral 
panics could be seen as extreme examples of is fundamentally intimate to why 
they occur. What I would learn about aspects of the particular socio-historical 
context in which ‘killer kids’ emerged would be important for imagining how the 
concept of moral panic can be explained. This is what distinguishes my account 
from other analyses where context has mattered. As reviewed in the last chapter, 
both de Young (2004) and Jenkins (2005) superbly located their respective panics 
within the particular social, cutural, and political environments in which they 
appeared. But these scholars were not concerned with how those locations could 
inform an understanding of the concept of moral panic. Hall et al. (1978) remain 
the exemplar insofar as they understood panic processes as strategically employed 
to manage a crisis in the interests of the powerful. However, as argued, such an 
‘elite-engineered’ formulation impedes the transferability of the concept for 
assessment of interest-group and grassroot driven panics.39  
 
A review of the work of four scholars contributing to the project of ‘rethinking 
moral panic’ revealed that the relationships between the material (real-type) and 
the conceptual (ideal-type) and between the contextual (why) and the theoretical 
(extreme example) was acknowledged variably and assessed in different ways. 
                                                
39 Though arguably a strict Marxist account would view the actions of interest groups and 
communities to be motivated by a ‘false consciousness’ which the elite would then make the most 
of by jumping on board in amplifying the said issue and/or implementing institutional measures. 
As argued in Chapter One, Jefferson (2009) is adamant that Policing the Crisis was not an 
example of strict top-down Marxism.  
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Ungar (1992, 2001) placed emphasis upon the material/contextual association 
which he argued rendered the concept of moral panic problematic. Critcher (2003, 
2006, 2008, 2009a, b) focused upon how the concept might be renewed for 
application across material cases, but left alone how these cases might initiate 
changes in how the concept is conceived. He was also tentative about whether 
context mattered. Hier’s (2002a, b, 2008) emphasis was upon how the material – 
which he assessed via discursive configurations of risk, harm, and responsibility – 
informed a theoretical idea of moral panic as a volatile manifestation within the 
more routine processes of moral regulation. This conjecture, however, meant that 
reactions to relatively benign matters could be seen in the same terms as those that 
normally stimulate ‘panic’. Rohloff (2008, 2010) examined 
material/contextual/theoretical connections using the figurational sociology of 
Elias. However, she did not conceive of an ‘ideal-type’ panic, at the same time as 
she was concerned to demonstrate the ‘rationality’ of panic reactions. I then 
brought into the fold directions unfolding in the sociology of punishment which I 
argued demonstrated more of a systematic development of the relationship 
between the material/conceptual and of the relationship of this first connection to 
the contextual/theoretical. This line of scholarship, though not yet connected to 
moral panic research, promised to be useful for shifting the approach to panic in 
clear real-type/ideal-type terms and in such a way that considers how each 
location (the contextual and the theoretical) can enlighten the other. 
 
With this call in mind, the first task is to employ an approach to case-studies that 
can guide research in real-type or material, and ideal-type or conceptual terms. 
The second task is to imagine a way by which the material/conceptual relationship 
can be extended to include a contextual/theoretical relationship. In the next 
chapter I discuss how a Critical Discourse Analysis framework would offer a way 
by which to approach both tasks while retaining a commitment to the idea of 
‘social justice’. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Methodology 
 
Method must always be a creative enterprise (Carney, 2010: 31). 
 
In Chapter One I proposed the study of moral panic be approached via the 
relationship between a real-type material case and the ideal-type conceptual 
model. In Chapter Two this was extended to include a contextual and theoretical 
relationship. The assignment for Chapter Three is to explore the ways by which I 
put these proposals into action for the study of ‘killer kids’. Fundamental to my 
approach is Fairclough’s (1995b) three part framework for Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). I first examine the relationship between a moral panic 
epistemology and a ‘discourse analysis’ perspective. Second, I look at how the 
CDA framework can assist in addressing my proposals and in what ways I 
amended its categories for a suitable approach for moral panic. Following, and 
third, I examine the methods this approach informed for the study of ‘killer kids’. 
Because the way in which I structured the approach would have implications for 
what data would be acquired and used, a synopsis of my data and the collection 
process is discussed alongside the discussion of methods.     
 
The Epistemology of Moral Panic  
 
Moral panics are understood as phenomena constructed from the actions of social 
agents.  By corollary, the sociology of moral panic holds that such phenomena can 
be deconstructed and examined for its disproportionality against a measure of 
empirical ‘reality’. Hence, while it is a constructionist epistemology that 
underpins the study of these acute and volatile social reactions, it is a contextual 
constructionism whereupon a value of ‘truth’ –  evident within the specific social-
cultural-political environment – is called upon in assessment. These terms and the 
distinctions between them require some discussion. Burr (2003) argues that a 
social constructionist epistemology has, broadly, four central tenets. First, 
research is critical about taken-for-granted understandings. It holds that the world 
and its objects, subjects, actions, and processes do not reveal themselves 
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unproblematically, and that there are no unbiased observations. This is in stark 
opposition to an empiricist or positivist epistemology which holds that the social 
world can be uncovered via the same ‘scientific’ method employed for 
understanding the physical world, and that there are laws of generality that can be 
applied across all human societies. Second, knowledge is historically and 
culturally dependent. Burr (2003) offers the example of the ways non-western 
terms and understandings are often unable to be translated into western terms and 
understandings.40 The point is there is no essentialism or universalism to human 
knowledge. Third, knowledge is created and sustained through social interaction. 
Fourth, and following, knowledge and action go hand in hand. Scholars concerned 
with social problems – to which the sociology of panic has a close affinity – 
identify that constructionism comes in two varieties (see Best, 1995; Spector & 
Kitsuse, 1977). Strict constructionsists argue that ‘truths’ are constructs as much 
as any other construct, and as such there is no distinction to be made between 
them (in assessment). Contextual constructionists – as suggested above – do 
distinguish between constructs, and ‘truths’ are employed to test the validity of 
competing claims.  
 
So why turn to discourse? Phillips and Hardy (2002) suggest that the excavation 
of ‘discourse’ is the methodology that constructionism informs.41 Others have 
rightly observed that moral panic lacks a method as such, of its own (see Klocke 
& Muschert, 2010). Essentially it can be said that moral panics, because they are 
constructed through talk and depend upon mediation, are discursive events (see 
Critcher, 2009b). This is not a fresh observation; indeed, the Mods and Rockers 
and the mugging episode were both deconstructed by how they were ‘talked 
about’ (see Cohen, 1972; Hall et al., 1978). However, new understandings about 
how and why discourse works in the ways it does have challenged moral panic 
assessments to adopt a more vigorous and thorough exploration of discourse. For 
some this has remained prospective (see in particular Cohen, 2002; Thompson, 
                                                
40 It follows that the reverse is also true. In the Aotearoa/New Zealand context a case in point is the 
term ‘sovereignty’ which, in Maori, has no exact translation.  
41 However, there are other means by which the act of ‘deconstruction’ can be done (see Burr, 
2003).  
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1998). For others it has transformed the research agenda (see de Young, 2004; 
Critcher, 2003, 2006; Hay, 1995; Hier, 2002a, 2008). A discourse perspective 
would become central to the ways in which I conducted the study of ‘killer kids’ 
and for the approach to moral panic that I both employed and would propose for 
further research. Before examining specifically how, I want to begin by probing 
the notion of discourse through the scholarship of Michel Foucault.  
 
Foucault and Discourse 
 
Foucault’s work is the most crucial in the development of a range of approaches 
that we may broadly group as ‘discourse theory’. Essentially, Foucault was 
concerned with how meaning is produced through connections between particular 
statements and practices which thereupon “systematically form the objects of 
which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49). In other words, our understanding of and 
knowledge about our world is derived from the regularities in how it is spoken of, 
written about, and acted upon. This is not to say that ‘things’ in our world do not 
have a concrete reality, but that they do not have meaning outside of how we 
speak, write, and act with or upon them. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 108) 
explain,  
 
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists…But whether 
their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or 
‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. 
 
Broadly, Foucault used the term ‘discourse’ to refer to the ‘general domain of all 
statements’, or all utterances and text that have meaning and effects. ‘A discourse’ 
refers to a regularity in which we may identify an ‘individualized group of 
statements’ that structure our knowledge about a more specific something (Mills, 
1997). However, a discourse is never just one statement or text or action but the 
articulation of a knowledge about a something across a range of texts and 
institutions. Where there is the same referent, style, and support for a way of 
saying and doing among a number of statements then we have a ‘discursive 
formation’: a system of dispersion (Hall, 1997).  
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Crucially, Foucault argues that a discourse can only produce objects and subjects, 
and divisions and classifications through regular application and with consistent 
acceptance (Hall, 1997: 49). This depends on the relationship a discourse has with 
power – institutional power, political power, economic power and so forth. He 
suggests that a claim to ‘truth’ resides at this intersection between knowledge and 
power. That is, nothing is absolutely ‘true’, a truth becomes once it has assumed 
an authority (via application and acceptance) and produces effects under that 
authority (Rose, 2001: 38). Despite this power/knowledge nexus, discourses are 
always in competition and must labour against other discourses and social 
practices over questions of legitimacy. This is because power circulates, or “needs 
to be thought of as a productive network which runs through the whole social 
body” (Foucault, 1980: 119). A top-down and repressive perspective of the 
production of ‘truth’ ignores the microphysics of power; that regularities between 
discourses may surface from within any level, location, or sphere of society and 
facilitate change in the way we think, speak, and practice.  
 
Indeed, Foucault’s argument is that there is no trans-historical continuity in our 
knowledges and practices as historians would suggest; rather, that history is a 
series of radical breaks and ruptures between periods and between one discursive 
formation and another (Hall, 1997). At the same time, there is no ‘author’ of 
knowledge in the sense that there is a specific ‘someone’ or ‘something’ that 
precludes these breaks and ruptures. Discourse ‘works’ through creating ‘subject 
positions’ and we locate ourselves within the position that makes the most sense 
to us. In other words, as we subject ourselves to meanings, power, and regulation, 
we become its subjects and it is through us that knowledge is practised and 
legitimated. However, it is not inevitable that all individuals in a particular period 
will be subjected and so discourse must organize itself in ways to make sense and 
to be persuasive (Hall, 1997; Gill, 2000). It follows that discourse will always be 
historically and culturally located, and this is reflected in Foucault’s investigations 
into the ways discourse delimits the field of knowledge in specific areas of social 
life in particular historical periods.  
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Already it can be seen that there are some key alliances between the study of 
moral panic and Foucault’s more descriptive – what he terms genealogical – 
approach. His essential characteristics of discourse; that it is a social action, 
constructed and related to institutional contexts, and that it constructs or has 
identifiable effects in that it delimits a field of knowledge, establishes who is to 
speak, and prescribes ways in which it is possible to speak about a particular 
object, issue, or process (Mills, 1997; Wetherell, 2001) are particularly relevant to 
moral panics. Panics are located in the media, parliament, and pressure groups, 
include and exclude topics, and lay down the ways by which a problem is 
perceived (see Critcher, 2003). Further, the notion of power as something that 
circulates, rather than coerces from above relates to Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s 
(1994a, b) categorisation of panics via their origins with the public (grassroots), 
moral entrepreneurial or institutional propaganda (interest group), or the top down 
(elite-engineered). Furthermore, Foucault’s notion of the ‘subject’ and the 
implication that knowledge is not a deity that produces itself identifies that 
worldviews and ‘subject positions’, social relations, and ‘reading positions’ are 
how panic discourses mobilise participants (see also Kress, 1989). Employing 
both these understandings (that is, of power and the subject) promises much for 
the analysis of how folk devils are able to ‘fight back’ against their demonisation 
(see de Young, 2004; McRobbie, 1994a, b).  
 
Despite these alliances, it is the issue of normativity that proves most problematic 
in attempting to unite Foucault with moral panic. The ‘measure’ against which 
one decides a panic reaction is “fundamentally inappropriate” (Cohen, 1972: 204) 
is but a claim to an essential truth – which for Foucault does not exist.42 This has 
led Critcher (2003) to suggest a panic analysis need only (and that it is legitimate 
to) appropriate from Foucault the essentials of discourse (as described above) 
alone. I considered at this point that, though important, these essentials still left 
                                                
42 However, Locke (2004) argues that it might be possible to measure the claims to truth (the 
claims of moral panic participants) against a ‘regime of truth’ (an established, accepted 
knowledge) though privileging the latter on the basis of its endorsed authority. Of interest to the 
panic analyst would be the ability of claims to erect and cement themselves as impending regimes. 
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me with a void in terms of how to navigate the relationships between my twin 
proposals: between the real-type case and the ideal-type concept, and between the 
context of the real-type and a theory of the ideal-type. Moreover the notion of an 
ideal-type described by Weber (1904/1949: 90) as a methodological “utopia [that] 
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality”, appeared at odds with 
Foucault’s genealogical approach. Indeed, comparing the two thinkers on this 
point, Poster (1984: 15) argues “Foucault prefers to show the limits of the present 
by juxtaposition with a different past, not with an ideal”.43 Further, because his 
focus is upon how discursive and practical conditions facilitate truths and 
meanings, he refutes the notion that there may be a deeper reason or source – 
theory – for their emergence (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Then again, despite 
the significance of Foucault’s work to the study of discourse, as Gill (2000) 
observes, there are at least fifty-seven varieties of discourse analysis (which she 
groups according to their relationships to wider theoretical traditions) from which 
to choose one’s approach. One that offers much to the concerns for this thesis is 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
It is necessary to first comment upon the term ‘critical’. The study of discourse is 
by its nature critical despite that there is a continuum along which to differentiate 
postmodern approaches (which adhere to a strict constructionist interpretation) 
and approaches that are more focused upon exposing the unequal power relations 
in talk and practice (and thus adhere to a contextual constructionism). Indeed, as 
Locke (2004) explains, even Foucault’s approach – with its abhorrence for 
essential truths – was critical insofar his ‘method’ sought to challenge traditional 
approaches to thought; to expose tensions and incompatibilities to be found within 
concepts that were hitherto believed to be contained. Nevertheless, there can be 
seen a spectrum of critical approaches to discourse; their shared aim is to embed 
the data within its social context, for data to be viewed as situated, constructed – 
occasioned (Gill, 2000), and therefore amenable to change (Locke, 2004). Wodak 
                                                
43 However, see Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) on the similarities in practice between Foucault and 
Weber.  
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(2001) adds that a critical approach involves situating oneself from the data, 
taking an explicit position (political, cultural, historical – or all three 
simultaneously), and reflecting on one’s work as scholarly; an interpretation (see 
also Gill, 2000).  
 
Most predominantly associated with Norman Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995a, b), 
CDA sits on the more political end of the spectrum of critical approaches. It 
works with the tenet that there is unequal access to discursive resources, and thus 
one’s task is to expose the often opaque relationships of determination between 
talk, text, and social practice and the wider socio-cultural environment with all its 
power relations and power struggles. This foundation appears to fit, quite 
naturally, with Cohen’s (2002: xxxv) proclamation about panics:  
 
… moral panics are condensed political struggles to control the means of cultural 
reproduction. Studying them is easy and a lot of fun. It also allows us to identify and 
conceptualise the lines of power in any society, the ways we are manipulated into 
taking some things too seriously and other things not seriously enough.  
 
Position aside, it is the three-part framework for the study of discourse that was 
principally attractive of CDA to this study. Fairclough (1995b) identifies that 
there are three dimensions of any communicative or discursive event that are 
interconnected but analytically separable; it is written or spoken text; it is the 
production and interpretation of that text – discourse practice; and it is a moment 
of social practice (Fairclough, 1995b). Crucially, each ‘part’ sits in a dialectical 
relation with each other part. Text, for example is both constituted by and 
constitutes its production and interpretation and its moment as a piece of social 
practice, and so this approach is an understanding of the embedded nature of text 
at the same time as it recognises the potentially transformative properties of that 
text. These three dimensions of discourse are related by Fairclough (1995b) to 
three processes of analysis: description, interpretation, and explanation. The 
relationships between the three dimensions and their processes of analysis are 
demonstrated in Figure 3.1: 
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Figure 3.1. The dimensions of discourse and processes of discourse analysis for 
understanding a communicative event, adapted from Fairclough (1995b: 98). 
 
 
Fairclough (1995b) goes on to say that the analysis of discourse (or a discourse) 
involves two complementary foci; of ‘communicative events’ and of the ‘order of 
discourse’. A ‘communicative event’ or ‘discursive event’, as indicated, is “an 
instance of language use” (Fairclough, 1993: 138) that is examined via the 
relationships between the three interrelated dimensions (text, discourse practice, 
socio-cultural practice). Fairclough (1995b) argues that the CDA analyst should 
always be concerned here with continuity and change; that is, how the 
communicative event continues familiar ways of expression, and supports familiar 
cultural notions, at the same time as how it may be creative – using old resources 
in original ways and challenging meanings. The ‘order of discourse’, on the other 
hand, refers to the “totality of discursive practices of an institution and the 
relationship between them” (Fairclough, 1993: 138), or the “discoursal 
organisational logic of a field” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 114).44 It follows 
that orders of discourse are made from particular configurations of discourses and 
genres (discourse types), and the analyst is to (again) examine how such 
                                                
44 Another way of articulating (and understanding) an ‘order of discourse’ is to view it as 
Discourse (capitalised – see Gee, 1999) or as a discursive formation (Foucault, 1969).  
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configurations both shift and stay the same in relation to the context of social and 
cultural changes. Fairclough (1995b) stresses that these (communicative event, 
order of discourse) are not alternative foci, but two corresponding perspectives 
that one may swing between in analysis.  
 
Operationalising CDA for Moral Panic 
 
How are these qualifications of CDA significant for the purposes of this 
dissertation? I suggest that a real-type moral panic (say, about drugs, or child 
sexual abuse, or murderous teenagers) can be imagined as a ‘communicative 
event’. In turn, the ideal-type moral panic can be imagined as an ‘order of 
discourse’. It is Fairclough’s (1995b) argument that the analysis of discourse 
practice (which is the link between the textual and the socio-cultural) is, in part, 
an examination of how far the communicative event draws upon the order of 
discourse (normatively or creatively) and how far it then affects the order of 
discourse – reproducing or recreating its boundaries and relationships. In moral 
panic terms it is an assessment of the relationship between a real-type (constituted 
by text, discourse practice, and socio-cultural practice) and the ideal-type.  
 
I identified in Chapter Two that I would need to contextualise my real-type panic 
in order to answer one of the big questions; why? By imagining the case of ‘killer 
kids’ as a communicative event, and via the three-process framework for analysis, 
I could examine the ways by which the episode materialised (and how they 
materialised) was dependent upon what was going on in the socio-political 
environment at that point in time.45 However, I also needed to imagine how the 
                                                
45 This structure is not dissimilar to Critcher’s three dimensions for the study of panic, to which I 
am indebted for direction (see also Garland, 2008; Valverde, 2006). However, in Critcher’s 
proposal, processes are made up from discourses, and it is within and from the discourses that we 
can determine what part of the moral order had been offended. Critcher’s ‘discourse’ then, refers 
to text and discourse practice within a bounded panic trajectory (processes, or set of practices) and 
in relation to a socio-political context. As argued, this approach does not address either ‘bigger 
question’ of moral panic research (that is, why this or that panic has occurred and of what are 
moral panics extreme examples of) for the reason that it leaves undeveloped the relationship 
between processes and context. By employing discourse as Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995a, b) 
proposes - a three part inquiry of text, discourse practice, and social practice, we can begin to 
view from where a particular panic discourse emerges and dissipates; that is, the socio-political 
context becomes as much a part of how and why a text (and a discourse) materializes as opposed 
to a semi-detached and after-the-fact feature. In this way, the concept of ‘discourse’ becomes more 
than a connective variable; it is the central means through which we can view how the processes 
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ideal-type (informed by my real-type) could be understood theoretically in order 
to offer an answer to the other big question; what are moral panics extreme 
examples of? Fairclough’s view was that ‘orders of discourse’ were very much 
embedded within their socio-cultural environment. In other words, what the order 
might be ‘an example of’ was as much a material question as why the 
communicative event had materialised in the way it had (see Jorgensen & Phillips, 
2002). This reflects that an ‘order of discourse’ (in Fairclough’s terms) is not 
quite as allegorical as an ‘ideal-type’ and so the ways by which an ‘order’ might 
be understood via connections to social theory are not essential, if necessary at all. 
However, inadvertently, this qualification would fit with my proposal that the 
project of ‘rethinking moral panic’ had moved too hastily in locating panics 
theoretically, and that the answer to what the concept of moral panic (the ideal-
type, or order) was an extreme example of was dependent upon a collation of 
contextual answers (the why of real-types, or communicative events). For the 
proposals for the study of moral panic put forward thus far, I amended 
Fairclough’s three-part framework for an analysis of the relationship of the 
communicative event with the order of discourse, as Figure 3.2 demonstrates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
of panic come into play, and how and why the content of those processes belong within a 
particular socio-historical period and to a particular socio-political environment.  
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Figure 3.2. The dimensions of analysis for understanding a moral panic contextually and 
theoretically via the relationship between a real-type and an ideal-type.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. is not a substitute for Figure 3.1, but can be seen as an extension of it. 
Where Figure 3.1 prescribes specific processes of analysis (description, 
interpretation, explanation) alongside each dimension of the communicative event 
in question (text, discourse practice, and socio-cultural practice), Figure 3.2 
identifies at what points an analysis of the relationship between a communicative 
event (a real-type) and an order of discourse (an ideal-type) can be seen. It 
encompasses the notion that the practices of discourse are as much a part of an 
order as they are particular to a communicative event. The three dimensions of the 
communicative event remain, but with changes. First, I have changed the category 
of text to content. Although Fairclough (1995b) argues that text is multisemiotic 
and thus able to capture other modes of communication such as images, 
photographs, sounds and so forth, the term content, I argue, more aptly captures 
the idea that there is something inside of (and independent of) each and any mode 
that gives it its meaning. I have also reworked ‘discourse practice’ into process 
and ‘socio-cultural practice’ into context. The former is to reflect the ways by 
which a moral panic develops via processes of amplification (which include 
discourse practices); the latter I changed not so much to reflect a change in 
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category, but for it to ‘fit’ procedurally (and aesthetically) with the other changes. 
I examine each of these revisions further in the sections below. Further, because a 
moral panic can be distinguished as having stages in which processes unfold, I 
wanted to imagine that the ideal-type moral panic (the concept) could be seen as 
having two levels at which it has identifiable ‘discoursal arrangements’; one 
internally at the level of discourse practice (process), and one externally at the 
level of the communicative event as a whole. Thereupon, there are two levels at 
which analysis can look at the relationship of the real-type with the ideal-type. 
The first; the cycle of amplification, can be explored during an examination of the 
second part of the communicative event; discourse processes. The second; stages 
of description, can be looked at adjacent to the analysis of the communicative 
event as it comes to a close with the study of context.46 As argued above, theory – 
the third part of the ideal-type equation – comes after the real-type/ideal-type 
relationship (as it pertains to the communicative event) has been explored.   
 
In sections below I focus upon the relationship of my methodology – this 
amended analytical structure – with the methods employed. Indeed, I have 
organised the sections by the real-type categories of empirical enquiry; content, 
process, and context, pausing to reflect upon how I would examine the 
relationship with the adjacent categories of the order of discourse (at each level) 
and the proposition for what moral panic might be seen as an extreme example of 
(theory) where appropriate. Prior to this, I give a detailed synopsis of the data 
employed. However, as mentioned earlier, the amended structure determined that 
further sources were needed, and I identify these where appropriate.  
 
Data 
 
I determined that primary data set for the episode of ‘killer kids’ could be found in 
the media coverage over the course of the issue; all ‘hard news’ reports, articles, 
editorials, and features relating to the event of the murder of Michael Choy, the 
trial and incarceration of the youths convicted, and the formulation of the Young 
                                                
46 The ‘stages of description’ can be seen in relation to Cohen’s opening paragraph; the stages (or 
parties) by which a moral panic can be identified; the ‘processes of amplification’ refers to the 
interaction between those stages (or parties) involved.  
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Offenders (serious crimes) Bill from the period of the time of the event 
(September, 2001) until the period immediately after Bailey Kurariki was released 
from prison in April, 2008. This sample period is important for although the 
image of Bailey did not appear until August 25, 2002, as I am working with the 
hypothesis that ‘panic’ erupted only upon its appearance, it is imperative to view 
data back to the date of the event itself to ascertain the nature of the shift in media 
coverage thereafter. Moreover, the issue remained relatively newsworthy between 
2002 and 2008. Immediately after Bailey’s release, however, media attention 
waned.47 
 
From the print press, I chose to use four broadsheet newspapers that are published 
daily in each of the four main cities of Aotearoa/New Zealand; The New Zealand 
Herald (Auckland), The Dominion Post (Wellington), The Press (Christchurch), 
and The Otago Daily Times (Dunedin).48 Although all of these four are readily 
available alongside regional papers in all cities and towns relative to location (The 
Dominion Post is available in Wairarapa for example; The Press can be bought in 
Blenheim), I also chose several regional papers; the Waikato Times, the Taranaki 
Daily News, The Southland Times, The Manawatu Standard, and the Nelson Mail. 
The choice of these publications was determined in part by access (these can be 
found on the same database as the main four, whereas the nine other English 
language regional newspapers could not be located this way), and in part as their 
respective audiences were significantly larger than the other, smaller papers. But 
fundamentally, the choice to also look at regional papers was because preliminary 
analysis showed that while at most times the storylines between both the main and 
regional papers were consistent, there was, at particular periods, a distinct 
variation. The murder of Michael Choy occurred in South Auckland (an area oft 
termed ‘the Badlands’ for its profuse poverty and gang related problems) and it 
may have been that the ‘big’ and distant issue needed to be given specific 
resonance to the smaller issues closer to home. In light of this, I also chose two 
weekly newspapers available in all cities and towns to provide a consistency 
                                                
47 Though, as I point out in Chapter Six, he remained ‘newsworthy’. 
48 I term these ‘broadsheet’, though the Aotearoa/New Zealand press environment has a 
conspicuous absence of alternative genres or ‘tabloids’. 
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‘check’ of sorts; to ascertain what points of the story appeared to resonate across 
the board; the Sunday Star Times and the Sunday News. One further note; I have 
included (but not differentiated) three associated websites as part of this data set 
that are the online versions of the printed press; www.nzherald.co.nz (The New 
Zealand Herald), www.odt.co.nz (The Otago Daily Times) and www.stuff.co.nz 
which is the website of Fairfax Media, the press organization that owns the 
remaining publications stipulated in this sample. These websites were important 
to include for two reasons. First, though at the beginning of the working day 
reports and articles in print are also published here, the sites are able to be updated 
regularly. Therefore some articles that appeared on these sites did not appear in 
print. Second, it can be assumed that many people source their ‘news’ (either 
solely, or in addition to other media) from such sites. ‘Stuff’ (www.stuff.co.nz) 
for example, boasts one million browsers daily.  
 
Using the newspaper database EBSCOhost and employing the search terms 
‘Michael Choy’ or ‘Kurariki’ I located 344 relevant articles within the period 
August 2001 – May 2008, in digital form. Using this information, those articles 
with accompanying images were then retrieved in their original print form from 
the National Library of New Zealand archives (n= 71).49 This was to ascertain 
how many different images were used and which of them were used in relation to 
which discursive thread or theme (described below). I chose not to locate all 
original articles predominantly because my interest was less in the aesthetic 
features of format (layout, etc.) and more in the substantive ways in which threads 
and themes (and images) were dependent upon narratives and sources.  
 
The second part to my data sample was the televised coverage. Aotearoa/New 
Zealand has six free-to-air television channels; three with regular news slots and 
current affairs commentary. I chose to approach the public-owned channel 
Television New Zealand (TVNZ) for their coverage, namely as this is 
Aotearoa/New Zealand's largest television broadcaster and, perhaps, the one with 
the most clearly defined ‘social’ responsibilities. It is argued, for example: 
                                                
49 This number does not include the images of Bailey as an 18 year old, which appeared at the end 
of the sample (n= 15).  
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The TVNZ Charter provides a guide to our broadcasting responsibilities and makes 
it clear that TVNZ's role is to reflect and explore what it means to be a New 
Zealander. To New Zealanders this unique and special responsibility means quality 
television that educates, informs and entertains through local home grown 
programming and the best of international programming (TVNZ, 2008).  
 
Though by principle it is television that is the most ‘visual’ of media, locating the 
televised imagery in its original form proved difficult. I was able to purchase 
copies of original news bulletins and programmes relating to the event and the 
issue, yet all frames in which Bailey (and his co-accused) appeared were restricted 
for resale, just as the newspaper images were, and thus ‘blacked out’. Therefore, I 
had to rely upon my own ad hoc recordings captured at those times I was alerted 
to Bailey’s appearance in the news which I then matched with TVNZ’s provided 
‘shot-lists’ (that is, written descriptions of what was in the frames originally). 
Moreover, this part of the sample is not complete due to the expense of the copies 
and restricted funding on my part. Through a number of negotiations with 
TVNZ’s purchasing officer I aimed for a balance between the visually and the 
verbally dominant bulletins and programmes, the ‘hard news’ versus commentary, 
and chose accordingly (n= 32).  
 
Content 
 
I define content as the substance or material in ‘text’, which is analytically distinct 
from its form or style.50 At the surface of the communicative event, it is here 
where meaning is accessible, and patterns of meaning can be traced. It is useful at 
this point to make a distinction between text and discourse (as it will be seen, both 
are important in how the content of ‘killer kids’ could be examined). Text, for 
Fairclough (1993: 138), refers to “the written or spoken language produced in a 
communicative event”. ‘Discourse’ is used in two senses of the noun. As an 
abstract noun it refers to “language use conceived as social practice” (Fairclough, 
                                                
50 Social semioticians argue that this is artificial; that the content of a message cannot be separated 
from its form or from the perspective and interest that are embedded within (see Hodge & Kress, 
1988). However, Valverde (2006) argues that by bracketing the question of ‘how’ and ‘in whose 
interests’, the fine texture of representations – and the slight but significant differences between 
content and form – can be examined more thoroughly.  
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1993: 138), or all utterances and texts that have meaning and effects. As a 
countable noun, it refers to a “way of signifying experience from a particular 
perspective” (Fairclough, 1993: 138), or a regularity in which we may identify an 
‘individualised group of statements’ that structure our knowledge about a more 
specific something (Mills, 1997). The two nouns can be distinguished with the use 
of an indefinite article; thus we can refer to ‘discourse’ (abstract) and ‘a 
discourse’ (countable).51  
  
Describing content  
Fairclough’s (1995b) prescription for the description of text is primarily 
linguistic; that is, how vocabulary (words), grammar (combination of words), 
cohesion (connections between sentences), and text structure (organisational 
properties) make up the intricate and intimate properties of text. Cohen (1972) 
argues that a key part of the inventory of a moral panic is the employment of an 
explicit melodramatic vocabulary, the use of sensational headlines and metaphors 
of crisis that work to provide the context in which the event is to be understood. 
Moreover, at times, the practice whereby key significations are made can be 
markedly opaque. As Cohen (2002) contends, moral panic discourses are apt at 
the clandestine operation of drawing out connections whereby this issue is made 
to appear similar to that other known issue of trouble (this sort of thing), as 
leading to other unknown potential troubles (it’s not only this), or as becoming, on 
its own terms, an issue of full-size trouble (it will get worse). It is how they 
achieve appeal, and work to become dominant against their competitors.  
  
However, a conventional CDA analysis usually works with single texts, whereas a 
moral panic analysis deals with large amounts of data. Moreover, moral panics are 
characterised by volatility, amplification, and a rush to narrative closure or the 
imposition of one meaning over an event or issue by various claims-makers and 
parties. A crucial point of interest is the development of, and the nature of (and 
the intensity of, across real time) competition between meanings put forth. My 
task, as I took it, was to trace the meanings (content) created in text and thereafter 
                                                
51 Where there can be identified a particular discourse – we may use a definite article ‘the 
discourse’.  
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to examine connections and dislocations between threads of meaning (the 
volatility of competition and amplification) in addition to exploring their 
relationships to real time (temporality). In the first action I would be looking for 
traces of combinations, connections, and organisations that produce meaning and 
in the second action, I would be looking for how those meanings would come 
together to construct countable discourses.  
 
Mindful of these qualifications, in practice I followed Gill’s (2000) relatively 
generalised schema for the analysis of discourse in my approach to content. The 
first step was to employ a spirit of ‘sceptical reading’; to tentatively employ my 
task objectives in ‘reading’ and organising the data, but to also let the data speak 
(so to speak) for itself. I began by identifying key passages and statements within 
each piece, and collating these according to their common threads of meaning 
across pieces. To give an example, the notion that Bailey Kurariki was an unusual 
child appeared consistently as a statement for much of the most immediate part of 
the sample, making for a discursive thread of meaning. Moreover, many 
subsequent threads of meaning appeared to rely upon this notion as a point of 
reference for how they developed. As I progressed I then returned to each piece 
and looked for dissident statements to the discursive threads identified thus far, 
both evaluating their consequence to the wider sense of emerging meaning, and 
exploring regularities among them (which would suggest a ‘new’ thread). This 
process, as Gill (2000) proposed it would be, required a great deal of going back 
and forth, forming hypotheses and then testing them against ‘re-readings’. Of the 
376 print and broadcast articles analysed, 104 were included in the final write-up 
as evidence. These articles had statements within them that most demonstrated the 
threads materialising in each ‘discourse’. Full results of this analysis are presented 
in Chapter Four.  
 
Process  
 
For Fairclough (1995b) the analysis of practice examines institutional practices, 
the intertextual and interdiscursive practices (that is, the ways in which other texts 
and discourses are used in the construction of the text under analysis) and 
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thereupon, the relationship of the communicative event with the identified ‘order 
of discourse’. Each of these will be discussed in turn. As argued above, I have 
employed the term process to capture the ways by which the discursive practices 
in a moral panic amplify an issue into something larger than it could have, or 
should have become. Yet, CDA’s ‘practice’ procedures are still applicable with 
some specifications. For a moral panic, institutional practices are those primarily 
of the media, simply because though not all moral panics begin or end with the 
media (the satanic ritual abuse scare is exemplary – see de Young, 2004; Victor, 
1998), or even have the media as their central vehicle, most do. Critcher (2003) 
outlines the qualifications between the press and a panic. First, the events that 
often begin a panic tend to be excellent assortments of raw materials for creating 
or crystallizing attention around a ‘good story’ (examples), and a ‘good story’ is 
crucial for commercial saliency. Second, because such events are usually about or 
related to deviant acts or persons, the press is able to draw on the simple and yet 
powerful inferential structure of good versus evil as an explanatory framework. 
Third, claims-makers and moral entrepreneurs are able to reach a much wider 
audience with media attention and so the media is often their first (and most 
important) ally. Thus, as Cohen (1972: 7) argues, “the student of moral enterprise 
cannot but pay particular attention to the role of the mass media in defining and 
shaping social problems”.  
 
The second part of the practice stage for a CDA approach involves a focus on 
consumption; the identification of how readers do actually respond (Locke, 2004). 
However, in a moral panic consumption practices can be seen as immersed within 
the practices of production. To clarify, I need to revisit, briefly, the debate 
regarding the role of the public in panic development. I discussed in Chapter One 
how this role is an empirical quandary insofar as it is difficult to access public 
concern on a vast scale and in a time-frame that coincides with the typical 
volatility of ‘panic’.52 Thus panic theorists have tended to equate public attention 
with media attention at the same time as they have assumed the public as a 
monolithic mass who indubitably consume media content (for example Burns & 
                                                
52 The links between discourse and social action is also an identified problem of CDA (see 
Scollon, 2001; Jorgenson & Phillips, 2002). 
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Crawford, 1999). More convincingly, the public’s role has been questioned as a 
necessary variable; its sentiment excused on the basis that the public are spoken 
for (Critcher, 2003, 2006; Hall et al., 1978), with a more practicable approach 
being to assume that the panic narrative seeks and is able to mobilise participants 
and that it does this through inviting (interpellating) through points of resonance 
with lived subjectivities (see de Young, 2004; Hay, 1995, 1996; Hier, 2002a, b). 
Examining responses therefore, is an examination of both the relationships 
between the powerful P’s (the press, politicians, the invoked public, pressure 
groups, and the police - see Critcher, 2003) and the ways of speaking (the texts 
and discourses) by which they ‘define up’ the issue in question and construct the 
countable discourse/s of content (see Cohen, 2002). In this way, it is almost a 
disclaimer of moral panics that intertextual and interdiscursive practices will be 
present as by nature they (moral panics) are parasitic upon other texts and 
discourses in order to dramatise the issue and to sensitise potential ‘panickers’. 
Moreover, the ways by which one discourse emerges as dominant occurs via a 
reverse process – the clearance of other texts and discourses.53  
 
Accessing and interpreting process 
To deconstruct the more overt processes of news-making, particularly, for this 
case, in relation to crime reporting and the relationships news-makers have with 
their sources for crime facts and opinion, I recruited seven professional journalists 
and asked a series of semi-structured questions relating to the ingredients for a 
‘good story’, how raw events are made communicable, and what sources are 
called upon (for the full questionnaire/interview schedule, see appendix). Despite 
the vast body of literature to draw from in terms of the institutional practices of 
the media (see Abel, 1997; Altheide, 1996, 2002; Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 
1991; Hall et al., 1978; Hall, 1980; Surette, 1988), taking heed of Fairclough’s 
(1995b) assertion that discourse practice is the mediator between the textual and 
the social and cultural (that is, in real-type terms), I wanted to refrain from relying 
                                                
53 See Critcher (2009b) on the hierarchies of moral panic discourses.  
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solely upon secondary resources as they would only afford a part-way account of 
news-making processes as they pertain to Aotearoa/New Zealand.54  
 
Using the snowball method, which relies on referrals from first connections to 
generate additional connections, contact was made with approximately 100 
journalists working here and overseas (these, however, had trained and worked in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand prior to leaving). Of these, twenty-five returned the call, 
but I was only able to secure seven of these to follow through to participation. 
Colleagues had, prior to the process of recruitment, informally warned me that 
journalists were the hardest group of people to enrol for academic study, in part 
because of their suspicions of our craft, and in part because their profession 
demanded they be constantly ‘on call’ should a story present itself. Thus, I was 
excited to have got seven participants on board.55 Moreover, the quality of their 
contributions annulled any sense that the quantity of respondents should have 
been higher.  
 
I began my analysis by organising the interview/questionnaire data into themes, 
guided by the questions I had asked and again by Gill’s (2000) approach to 
interpreting discourse. I used these themes as an interpretative scaffold for 
interpreting how the events of the murder of Michael Choy and the subsequent 
trial of the six youths accused had been portrayed in the press via the 
documentary data. In order to then see where the proverbial news story ended and 
the momentum of moral panic took over, I then looked for evidence of the 
processes of amplification; sensitisation, diffusion, escalation, dramatisation, and 
exploitation. I was tentative in this exercise, aware that I needed to be sensitive to 
the real-type development of a ‘crisis’ with all the nuances and departures that this 
might have in relation to the ideal-type. Thereupon, I examined the relationship 
between the real-type crisis unfolding and the internal processes of the moral 
                                                
54 An awareness also, that crime reporting in Aotearoa/New Zealand was an area under-
researched, cemented this decision.  
55 Evidence from six of the seven respondents made the final analysis.  
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panic ‘order of discourse’ (ideal-type): the cycle of amplification.56 The full 
analysis can be found in Chapter Five.   
 
Context 
 
Fairclough (1995b: 57) describes socio-cultural practices as “the social and 
cultural goings-on in which the communicative event is a part of”. The analysis of 
such goings-on involves the examination of the relationship between the 
processes of discourse and social processes. Essentially this is achieved via an 
evaluation of how it was possible for the particular combination of texts and 
discourses to materialise in the way in which they did in relation to the different 
levels of the socio-cultural environment – the immediate situational context, the 
wider context of institutional practices, and the even wider frame of society, 
history, and culture. Whereas the last stage examines the relationship between the 
real-type moral panic and the ideal-type (at least at the internal level or processes 
of amplification) this stage explains this relationship insofar as it is a 
consideration that the context of which a reaction is part is fundamental to its 
materialisation; that is, what is inside the theatre is dependent upon what is 
outside the theatre (Cohen, 1972).  
 
Accessing and explaining context 
Fairclough (1995b) argues there are two parts to the examination of socio-cultural 
practice (or context). One is to first locate how the text (content) and practices 
(process) are reflective of context (affected by), and the other is to view how they 
can be seen as an instance of social practice (affecting of). In practice the 
relationship between the ideal-type (internally, the cycle of amplification) and the 
real type explicated in the last (interpretative) stage revealed a compilation of 
features upon which the cycle unfolded towards a particular direction (rather, a 
particular discourse, to be identified in Chapter Four). I took this compilation as 
my guide to a direction for what parts of the ‘social’ to consider. 
 
                                                
56 I need to remind here that it is Cohen’s (1972) conception of the ideal-type that I am employing 
in this study.  
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However, I was wary of the multiple levels at which the socio-cultural analysis 
can be explicated, insofar as they offered considerable leeway for recourse into 
the explanatory variable of anxiety in response to social, moral, or economic 
breakdown (real or constructed). My argument is not to doubt that there are times 
where anxiety is a legitimate answer. Indeed, as Garland (2008) identifies, there 
are many cases where the facilitating conditions towards the construction of a 
moral panic are in turn successfully illustrated as surface manifestations of deeper 
sources; anxiety, ambiguity, and insecurity (see also Chapter Two). My argument, 
here, is that assessments on a whole be more rigorous and more certain with such 
claims; that analytically (and methodologically) there are clearer links made 
between surfaces and sources (see Rock, 2007). Therefore, though I did draw 
from literary sources, in order to remain ‘grounded’ in context I also drew from an 
eclectic mix of the text, the interviews with my respondents, editorials, opinion 
columns, letters to the editor, film reviews, media releases, and websites that were 
present in and around the same space and time of the primary data sample. It must 
be acknowledged that this part of the analysis depended heavily on my location 
within the context in which the episode unfolded. Though I employed the 
compilation of features that had materialised from the analysis of process as cues 
to what socio-cultural phenomena might be significant, without my familiarity 
with such phenomena and its interweavings with other phenomena the final result 
may have been quite different. Thus, arguably, it is at this point that I may be 
accused of a polemic assessment. However, as will be seen, it is not the 
phenomena per se that will be important for my ultimate conjecture of what a 
panic can be seen as an extreme example of; it is the nature of that phenomena. I 
suggest that any specific socio-cultural phenomena located for this assessment 
would exhibit the same character.  
 
It was at this point that I could look at the real-type episode as a whole (a three-
part communicative event) and assess its relationship to the ideal-type concept of 
moral panic in the external sense; stages of description. Did the episode of killer 
kids fit these stages or depart in a significant way? What bearing would this 
relationship have upon the concept and thereupon its relationship to what moral 
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panics might be seen as extreme examples of? This assessment and the 
explanation of context are discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
Limitations and Issues of Practice 
 
When one employs a model in analysis one is always bound by that model to 
more or less of a degree. Though I was aware that I was to ‘let the data’ tell the 
story, and I took great care to be sensitive to its tale, I was concerned about how 
far the concept of moral panic had ingrained itself on my interpretative thinking. 
Had I inadvertently worked the data too rigorously against the ideal-type 
processes of the amplification cycle? Was I blinded, thereupon, to the possibility 
of another stage, another process at work? Like any scholar, I can only claim that 
what I have presented here is an interpretation, as Gill (2000) pledged it would be.  
 
Limiting my analysis was my focus upon one case study. As seen, many of the 
most intricate analyses of moral panic – Cohen’s (1972) Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics, Hall et al.’s (1978) Policing the Crisis, de Young’s (1994) The Day Care 
Ritual Abuse Moral Panic – were one-case studies. This reflects the necessary 
space required to flesh out the minutiae of real-type panics, but it also means that 
such accounts suffer from a case-specificity of sorts. My proposal that the ideal-
type required regular appraisal in relation to real-types, and that the contextual 
locations of such real-types were crucial to the theoretical location of the concept 
was essentially a demand that a larger body of empirical work be established, and 
this is something I have added to in the least possible way. I can defend this by 
way of my intention to demonstrate an approach to moral panic alongside an 
analysis of the episode of ‘killer kids’. Should the three-part framework outlined 
in this chapter be accepted as a way forward, perhaps future studies could rework 
and refine its components for application across two, three, or many cases 
simutaneously, or, given my argument that context matters, place emphasis upon 
the context/theory nexus at the expense of content and process in relation to the 
internal processes of the ideal-type.  
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Further, though I had justified that the public were not a necessary variable for the 
assessment of moral panic, I nevertheless found that I was curious whether there 
were ‘other’ interpretations and perhaps, somewhere, grassroots agency on behalf 
of those ‘folk devilled’ in this case to ‘fight back’. Much of this stemmed from 
inquiries about my thesis topic from friends and aquaintances, who in turn 
demonstrated little knowledge about the events of the murder of Michael Choy 
other than how it had been portrayed in the media. Consistently, for example, 
Bailey was understood as the ‘killer’ which clearly indicated that the media are 
able to sustain their interpretation of events. Another regular theme in comments 
made was that an ‘eye for an eye’ justice was the only suitable response. 
However, when presented with the ‘facts’ of the case, this attitude consistently 
changed. With hindsight then, I suggest that the study of public sentiment should 
be considered as a variable in the development of a panic, if only to establish that 
there is a lack of understanding, or levels of indifference to what is unfolding 
between the powerful ‘P’s’ (the press, politicians, pressure groups, an invoked 
public) which inadvertently permits the amplification cycle to gather pace.  
 
The Empirical Enquiry 
 
The next three chapters cover the empirical study of the case of killer kids 
employing the methodological framework and approach outlined in this chapter. 
In Chapter Four I describe how three countable discourses spanned two distinct 
phases. In Chapter Five it will be seen that though the real-type case followed the 
processes of amplification, there appeared no particular logic to their development 
in relation to each other; rather, the processes were dependent upon a set of 
material features that operated to propel the cycle from one to the next. These 
features would provide the cues for identifying – in Chapter Six – that the episode 
of ‘killer kids’ resided at the intersection between three social phenomena present 
in space and time. In turn, it would be these phenomena that would become 
significant in making connections to social theory.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Three Discourses, Two Phases, and One Moral Panic 
 
Are our children worse than they used to be? Is this the onset of a wave of hideous 
child crime, payback for some creeping national deficiency? (Dekker, 2002). 
 
This chapter describes the content of ‘killer kids’; the ways in which the episode 
became meaningful in the media across the sample period. The data is structured 
into three countable ‘discourses’ that emerge in a configuration of relationships 
with each other. The first discourse is a moral reprisal discourse characterized by 
its attribution of blame to malevolent children, social disorder at the hands of 
dysfunctional families, and moral decay in the move towards a more ‘permissive’ 
society.57 The second discourse, a social rescue discourse is set apart to the moral 
reprisal discourse through its argument for perspective in relation to the 
inflammatory claims made, for ‘the system’ to be held accountable, and for the 
crime to be seen as a result of the social consequences of the free market. The 
third discourse, a criminal risk discourse, deals with the complex task of 
addressing ‘justice’ in addition to community safety and crime prevention. The 
ways by which it approached these three factors would culminate into the 
development of a private members Bill proposing the criminalization of children 
from twelve years of age. 
 
These three discourses operate within two phases: from the appearance of the first 
news image of Bailey Kurariki up to and including the sentencing of the offenders 
(from September, 2001 to November, 2002) and from that point until Bailey 
Kurariki’s release from prison in May 2008. The first is an acute reactive phase, 
where a bevy of explanations and predictions arise with regard to the crime and its 
perpetrators (and thus we see in this phase the moral reprisal and the social 
rescue discourses); the second, a less explosive and more lengthy containment 
                                                
57This is a familiar discourse to moral panics over violent children, and one perhaps most notably 
associated with the hysteria over the murder of two-year-old James Bulger by ten-year-olds Robert 
Thompson and Jon Venables in Britain in 1993 (see Franklin & Petley, 2001; Green, 2008a, 
2008b; Hay, 1995; Young, 1999). 
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phase, where debate focuses upon the potentialities (both positive and negative) of 
the custody of the offenders (here, the discourse of criminal risk is dominant).  
 
The discourses have each been organized into the discursive threads from which 
their whole was constructed. Of the first two discourses (the discourse of moral 
reprisal and the discourse of social rescue) these threads are presented along a 
semblance order relating to their account of the crime, the anticipation of an 
emerging issue, and the identification of a social crisis. It is from the connections 
and departures in this order that the relationships between the discourses can be 
seen. The third discourse (the discourse of criminal risk) is presented along an 
order relating to how to manage risk and then how to prevent it, and it is through 
the ways by which these measures are sought that the relationships with the 
‘reactive’ discourses become visible.  
 
Before getting started there is a disclaimer to be made. Though the descriptive 
task is to trace across the top layer of the real-type episode under consideration, 
because this surface layer is a result of its sustaining layers of processes and of 
context, there are times at which I do probe beneath it and briefly consider how or 
why this or that feature has appeared.58 Moreover, because the hallmark of a 
moral panic is the production of a singular, consistent, and incontestable or 
‘closed’ discourse (Critcher, 2003, 2009b) which creates effects that are out of 
proportion to an empirical reality, there was an ultimate requirement to identify 
which of the three discourses in attendance commanded the interpretative field of 
the phenomenon of ‘killer kids’ and by what measure the effects of this 
interpretation could be seen as ‘out of order’. 
 
At other times, I chose to focus only upon describing despite that what I was 
describing demanded more attention. A good example of this is the imagery of 
Bailey Kurariki, which I have argued is central to the development of the episode 
of ‘killer kids’. However, I deal with it only briefly in this descriptive chapter 
namely because the images themselves did not shift or vary in their content; what 
                                                
58 In the last chapter, I noted that by Fairclough’s (1995b) admission the divide between the three 
tiers of the CDA framework (upon which my framework is built) is artificial. 
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did vary – across the episode – were the interpretations of the images and the 
wider meanings that circled them and it is these that become important in how the 
threads within the discourses would connect with each other (and disconnect with 
threads of other discourse/s). The content – or, rather, the preferred meaning (see 
Hall, 1980) – of the images themselves is better captured in Chapter Five where I 
look more closely at their production by the media and in Chapter Six where I 
examine what social-political conditions gave rise to the images’ production (as 
well as their later interpretations and meanings).  
 
I begin with describing the first discourse to arrive on the scene in the reactive 
phase; the discourse of moral reprisal. This discourse is marked by its 
disciplinary tone and the way in which it seeks to erect firm boundaries between 
an inside group and ‘evil’ outsiders. In this way it can almost immediately be 
delineated as a panic discourse; however, as the reactive phase developed it would 
face a hefty challenge from the discourse of social rescue.  
 
Moral Reprisal  
 
The discourse of moral reprisal began to take form after the image of Bailey 
Kurariki appeared in the Sunday Star Times on August 25, 2002. However, the 
groundwork for the threads that would make up this discourse was already under 
construction with how the media depicted the events of the murder of Michael 
Choy prior to that appearance.59 The scene at which the crime took place, for 
example, was described as having a long and dark driveway (“Pizza Robbers’ 
Roles Planned,” 2002), which was purposely chosen for its dim light and 
seclusion from the street. Having planned an earlier robbery that was reportedly 
abandoned when a female delivery person arrived, each role of each perpetrator 
had been firmly designated prior to the attack (“Pizza Robbers’ Roles Planned,” 
2002) and there had been discussions regarding “how much damage we wanted to 
do to him” (“Jury Told Of Stolen Pizzas,” 2002), to ‘silence him’ (“Murder 
Accused Aimed,” 2002) before implementing plans for stealing his money, food, 
and then possibly his car. It was said the accused then placed an order for pizza, 
                                                
59 In Chapter Five the practices of the media in the construction of the crime story are explored in 
detail.  
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and “lay in wait” for Mr. Choy’s arrival (“Pizza Robbers’ Roles Planned,” 2002) 
whereupon they would carry out their attack with “murderous intent” (“Murder 
Accused Aimed,” 2002) upon an unwitting and defenseless subject.  
 
As will be seen, this would set the tone for how the event would be understood by 
the discourse of moral reprisal. Another early interpretation of the crime, no 
doubt due to the timing of Michael Choy’s death, was an association with ‘terror’:  
 
The recent killing of pizza deliverer Michael Choy in Papakura by six youngsters, 
one as young as 12, was a heinous act as evil as the US tragedy (“Fortuin Pleads,” 
2001). 
 
The aggravated robbery and subsequent death of a pizza delivery man in South 
Auckland reminds us that evil is also close to home … [it is] terrorism in suburbia 
(Sharp, 2001).  
 
The media also placed much emphasis upon the fact that at 12, Bailey Kurariki 
was the youngest person in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s history to be charged with 
murder. Immediately after the accused were arrested, it was reported: “Gasps of 
shock greeted the appearance of a sobbing 12-year-old boy in Papakura court” 
(McLoughlin, 2001). A year later, during the trial, he was described as the ‘kid 
next door’ (“Murder Accused,” 2002) who “was barely able to see over the dock” 
(“Jury Reach Verdict,” 2002). Afterwards, this was identified as “the most 
chilling aspect of a horrific story” (“Time To Act,” 2002). The public would bear 
witness to this aspect, with that first Sunday Star Times image. In Chapter Five I 
examine the construction of the image by newsmakers, and in Chapter Six I 
discuss this image and the others in the set of images of Bailey as units of 
communication within a regime of representation. Both, it will be seen, informed 
the text that would, in turn, imply a preferred reading of the image/s. At this point, 
however, I want to focus on the headline accompanying the first image, which 
firmly positions it within the discourse of moral reprisal’s first discursive thread.  
 
Not your average 12 year old 
The headline reads “Our youngest killer” (Wellwood, 2002; see the digital trace 
of the original in the Introduction). Indeed, the discourse of moral reprisal’s first 
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contention was that Bailey Kurariki was no ordinary child; that he was very much 
the killer the headline claimed him to be. The adjoining text argued he was pivotal 
in the death of Michael Choy, as it was he who was “nominated to greet him [Mr. 
Choy], drawing him into the killing zone”, and when it came time to strike “it was 
Kurariki who gave the command” (Wellwood, 2002). The thread would then 
expand beyond the crime. Former school principals and teachers were cited as 
describing him as a ‘bundle of trouble’ even as a new entrant. As he grew older, 
he was both a chronic truant and was well known to the local police for a series of 
petty crimes. He had, it was said, been “running riot for years … terrorizing, 
beating and robbing other children, encouraging friends to wag school, 
shoplifting, tagging, sniffing glue and smoking cannabis” (Wall, 2002). One 
report offered an account of an earlier incident in which Bailey was involved, one 
that clearly illustrated a predator of “cold-blooded and heartless behaviour” 
(“Who Is Responsible?” 2002) in the making:  
 
The small boy with the cherubic face lingered in a Papakura alley, waiting for his 
victim to pass on the way to school. Eleven-year-old Bailey Junior (BJ) Kurariki had 
stalked his quarry and knew this was the route he took each morning. When the boy 
walked into the alley BJ pounced, punching him repeatedly in the head and leaving 
him cut and bloodied on the ground. The reason? The boy had ‘got smart’. The 
spiteful attack in February last year was BJ’s trademark – he had become feared by 
children across South Auckland (Wall, 2002).  
 
Bailey Kurariki was, in no uncertain terms, “a dangerous little boy” (Newbold 
cited in Andrew, 2002); a “thoroughly evil little snot” (Clarke, 2002).  
 
Feral children, the underclass, and South Auckland 
However, at the same time that Bailey’s role in the crime was seen to stem from 
his own pathology, he was also depicted as “a textbook case of the child destined 
to go off the rails” (Rudman, 2002) who “did not stand a chance” (“Time To Act,” 
2002). In other words, his actions were the inevitable result of his membership of 
an emerging underclass, who were both ill equipped and lacking in the proper 
virtues required for appropriate parenting practices. The following passage 
illustrates this discursive thread well: 
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In the end, when people breed, they should take on a never-ending responsibility for 
their offspring … too many youngsters produce a baby as an accidental byproduct of 
recreational sex. If the parents are but children themselves, the chances of that mite 
flourishing with love, in a stable two-parent home supported by whanau, are 
minimal. And thus continues a cycle that has already created an under-class of non-
achievers, drug-takers and drunkards, people without work living in relative poverty 
and taking little responsibility for their own plight and that of their families (“Put 
The Family Back,” 2002). 
 
In a further extension, and despite this association between class and crime, the 
Choy murder was emphasized as “the latest story in a saga of youth crime that 
appears to be sweeping New Zealand” (“Time To Act,” 2002). Headlines such as 
“Children Who Kill: Stand By For More” (Mirams, 2002) and claims that the 
nation should “prepare itself for more violent teenage crime” (Lashlie cited in 
Mirams, 2002) followed the convictions of the six teenagers. In many respects 
this section of the discursive thread can be seen as part of the practice of 
escalation, which I locate and discuss as a process towards a moral panic in more 
detail in Chapter Five. Important here, however, were the ways by which Bailey 
was singularly positioned as the archetype: 
 
 He (Kurariki) is not unique by any stretch of the imagination (Lashlie cited in 
Mirams, 2002). 
 
Boys like Kurariki are no longer rouge aberrations (“Young Killer,” 2002).  
 
Also crucial were the ways by which Bailey’s actions were noted in terms of his 
practiced criminal ‘career’; the five others convicted with him his “associates” 
(“Young And Bad,” 2002) or “partners in crime” (“Choy Sentencing,” 2002). 
This lent to the discourse a suggestion that “young offenders are becoming more 
sophisticated” (“Sorting Out Children,” 2002); that we were to be bombarded 
with “an ugly rash of young killers” (Dekker, 2002) with no sense of boundaries 
or responsibilities (Mirams, 2002) operating on a level beyond their years:  
 
Today it has been almost commonplace for children to be committing crimes once 
the preserve of adults (“Police Need Support,” 2002).   
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It suddenly seems that young punks are not just troublesome but also potentially 
lethal, capable of casual violence of the worst sort (“Young And Bad,” 2002).   
 
What is happening in these threads are the beginnings of an identification of a 
‘folk devil’ (Bailey), in addition to the segregation of a part of the community 
based upon their self-imposed membership of an underclass; the conditions seen 
to harbor many potential ‘Bailey’s’. This is the functional aspect of panic 
discourse at work as discussed in Chapter One; the creation of outsiders, to whom 
‘we’ may look upon in order to remind ourselves of who not to be (see Cohen, 
1972; Erikson, 1966). In a moment it will be discussed how the discourse of 
social rescue would seek to negate this segregation. At this moment I want to 
pause and look briefly at South Auckland as an implicit variable operative in this 
segregation; a variable that I will identify in Chapter Six would operate as a 
‘code’ of sorts for the variable of race.  
 
The significance of South Auckland is neutral in a first sense, simply as it was the 
area in which the crime took place – Papakura is one of its outlying suburbs. 
However, there have long been connotations between the district and entrenched 
generational poverty, family dysfunction, crime and disorder and it has since (that 
is, after 2002) become known as ‘The Badlands’. I discuss these connotations and 
this label in more detail in Chapter Six. For now, I want to look how they would 
allow for one element in the events that led to Michael Choy’s death to slip under 
the radar of importance. A pathologist at the trial testified that Michael Choy’s 
injuries were not positively fatal, that he could have survived should he have 
received prompt medical attention. That he was refused aid from the neighbouring 
property to which he stumbled after being attacked, despite that he was described 
by the occupants as ‘grovelling’ and ‘writhing’ and shouting in a ‘desperate tone’, 
was attributed to the notion the neighbourhood was ‘dangerous’ with “packs of 
young children” roaming the streets (Purdy, 2001). At the time Mr. Choy’s family 
said they understood this reluctance to open the door and therefore held no 
grudges towards the occupants. Paradoxically, they later condemned the six 
young offenders for having not thought about calling for help after the attack: 
“When he asked for help, there was no help. You wouldn’t do that to an animal” 
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(Rita Croskery cited in Gay, 2007). Similarly, while the neighbours to whom 
Michael Choy appealed would face no sanction, the sentencing Judge reportedly 
argued that the “callous failure” to seek help for Michael Choy was an 
aggravating factor in the length of the sentences handed down for each of the 
young defendants (“Seven Years For Bailey,” 2002).60 
 
A lenient justice system 
The discourse of moral reprisal argued that aiding and abetting the development 
of this burgeoning bunch of ‘seasoned criminals’ (both in South Auckland and 
beyond) was our ‘world-leading’ youth justice system and its emphasis upon 
restorative practices, which were identified as feeble in practice, indulgent even:61 
 
Let’s stop these wishy-washy sentences (Ken Croskery cited in Purdy, 2001).   
 
 Some even carry out the dirty work for older accomplices, knowing that if they get 
caught they will be treated with greater leniency (“Sorting Out Children,” 2002).   
 
The Family Group Conference (FGC), whereupon victim/s and their families seek 
redress from the offender/s and their families without criminal proceedings, was a 
particular target:   
 
At present, all that can happen is a smack with a wet bus ticket at a family group 
conference, where it is not unknown for thuggish children and their families to 
menace further the frightened victims (“Underclass Of Young Crims,” 2002).  
 
If this ‘soft’ approach was not changed, these youths would be ‘doomed to a life 
of crime’, an inevitability that Bailey’s case was a clear indication of:  
 
The most frightening example of where this [getting away with minor crimes] can 
lead to is Bailey Junior Kurariki (“Sorting Out Children,” 2002).  
 
 … like Bailey Kurariki they may already be lost causes … New Zealand’s youngest 
killer serves as a clear warning to [the rest of us] (“Lining Up To Kill?” 2002).  
                                                
60 This can only be attributed to the differentiation between the neighbours as being in South 
Auckland, while the defendants were of it.  
61 Aotearoa/New Zealand’s hybrid welfare/justice approach to youth justice implemented as part 
of the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act (1989) has oft been considered as ‘world 
leading’ by academics and justice officials worldwide. For a clear assessment of this claim, and a 
formative review of the principles underpinning the model employed see Becroft (2003).  
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Upon this, murmurings towards lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 
ensure deterrence and accountability began to surface almost immediately, 
remaining a point of debate through into the containment phase, particularly from 
the conservative end of the political spectrum:  
 
[a call for] the age of responsibility to be reduced to 12 will strike a cord with many 
around the country, who are worried about the number of children facing charges for 
crimes as serious as murder  (“Sorting Out Children,” 2002).  
 
“It’s clear that heinous crimes are being committed by younger and younger people 
and it’s time that if they do the adult crimes they should be confronted with the adult 
justice system. It’s clear we are not dealing with little angels and, in this case, the 
system needs to deal with them” (Ryall cited in Henzell, 2003).   
 
Not surprisingly, much of the responsibility was directed at the incumbent Labour 
Government who had not only nurtured a ‘politically correct’ ideology whereupon 
“it’s not seen as the done thing to discipline your kids” (McVicar cited in 
Batchelor, 2003), but had tended to “gloss over what the youth offending statistics 
really show”, and subsequently had made their plans for ‘youth offending teams’ 
comprised of youth workers, police, and other welfare professionals “too little too 
late” (Andrew & Warren, 2002).   
 
But by and large, the Choy case was interpreted by the discourse of moral reprisal 
as yet another incident that indicated the practices of and principles behind our 
criminal justice system on a whole were failing, particularly in the address to 
victims. This was an argument that had already become a platform from which 
conservative parties were putting forward their manifestos. Earlier in the year, for 
example, in their official campaign launch for the 2002 election, the Act party 
called for ‘zero tolerance’ on all offences arguing the 1999 Citizens Initiated 
Referendum (CIR) on crime where ninety two percent of voters had ticked the 
box for tougher sentences had been ignored:  
 
Parliament has treated the referendum, and the public, with contempt (Prebble cited 
in Beston, 2002).  
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Godzone gone wrong 
However, more critical than a deteriorating justice system was the perception that 
Aotearoa/New Zealand had moved from a ‘golden age’ of an egalitarian and 
inclusive society, relatively free from the plagues of modern life that other 
western nations were known to be subject to:  
 
Not too long ago, a story such as Kurariki’s would have been considered monstrous 
and unthinkable in New Zealand, an aberration. Now it is becoming a regular jolt to 
our senses. We cannot allow ourselves to become inured to it (“Time To Act,” 
2002). 
 
 That there had been a series of recent occurrences whereby children were both 
committing and being victimized by violent crime had made “a mockery of the 
reputation New Zealand once enjoyed as a great place to bring up kids” 
(“Godzone Failing Its Children,” 2002). Indeed, Aotearoa/New Zealand had 
become, it was argued, “one of the most violent countries in the western world” 
(McVicar cited in “Youngest Killer,” 2003) and the subscription to a ‘godzonian’ 
fantasy had blinded people for too long to the harsh reality that ‘we’ were just as 
‘bad’ as the rest of the world and it was “time to wake up” (Lashlie cited in 
Collins, 2002).   
 
The discourse of moral reprisal would put forward several explanations for this 
apparent cultural denigration. Reflecting the designation of ‘outsiders’, one was 
that this case was clearly a symptom of the systematic annihilation of moral 
decency which, in turn, is in every respect associated with the ideal of the nuclear 
family unit.  
 
Liberal politicians, academics and social engineers have presided over the 
destruction of the sanctity of marriage, the institution of the family and the mystery 
of sex, the denigration of manhood and fatherhood and have sanctioned the 
wholesale slaughter of the most defenseless among us, the unborn child … yet we 
wonder why the likes of 13-year-old Bailey Junior Kurariki turns out to be the evil, 
twisted, cruel little psychopath he is (George, 2002).  
 
Another diagnosis was more spiritual:  
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As a nation we are all reeling by the realization that there are children in our midst 
that have been turned into killers … it stems from our society’s attempt to rid itself 
of any meaningful place for religion and spirituality (McBride, 2002).  
 
Further, the crime was seen as an indication of the demise of the human condition: 
 
The killing of Michael Choy was a calculated, premeditated crime that saw an 
innocent man lose his life for little more that a handful of change. It was a breach of 
human trust, a vile abuse of the sanctity of life and another body-blow to the bonds 
of respect and faith in human nature that are vital to holding the community together 
(“Benefits Disappear,” 2002).  
 
Overall, the discourse of moral reprisal constructed a clear trajectory towards the 
demise of the moral order; from one extraordinary ‘evil’ child, to dysfunctional 
families, to a permissive society whose ‘wishy-washy’ approaches to crime is 
underpinned by a left-wing ‘politically correct’ ideology. In this way, the 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were constructed via the variable of class and 
by political leanings. Later in the chapter I discuss what effects this discourse 
would wield, why these can be interpreted as ‘out of order’, and how, on a whole, 
this discourse contributed to the episode that was ‘killer kids’. In the next section I 
describe the development of a discourse that would challenge the discourse of 
moral reprisal’s claims. This is the discourse of social rescue.   
 
Social Rescue 
 
For the most part the discourse of social rescue can be seen as a response to the 
discourse of moral reprisal, inverting the latter’s trajectory at every intersection. 
The following sections describe how this discourse situated the blame for the 
murder of Michael Choy firmly in the hands of a neo-liberal ideology that was 
responsible for an under-funded system of welfare services which in turn had let 
too many children ‘fall through the gaps’. The discourse of social rescue also 
worked to reverse the segregation of outsiders by class, and the demonisation of 
Bailey Kurariki as a ‘folk devil’. This discourse was also relatively self-aware of 
itself in relation to its nemesis. The discourse of moral reprisal, it was argued, 
was a “cacophony of hate, anger, resentment, pain and bewilderment” by the 
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“swelling tide of the lock ‘em up and throw away the key brigade” (O’Conner, 
2002).  
 
A ‘pathetic prank’ 
At the outset an impetus to redefine the behaviour that led to the death of Michael 
Choy is evident. This is the most overt confrontation between the first two 
discourses, which inevitably structures the development of each into opposing 
lines of argument. Where, for example, the discourse of moral reprisal claimed 
the events of the crime were premeditated, callous – murderous (and subsequently 
the ‘problem’ becomes one of a pathological child, a dysfunctional community, 
and a decaying society), the discourse of social rescue argued for temperance and 
contextualization:  
 
This was not a ‘highly organized unit’ carrying out the robbery with military 
precision … it was a ragbag bunch of neighbourhood kids … [and] a harebrained 
scheme to get some food and some small change (Mansfield cited in “Alleged 
Murder Decoy,” 2002).62 
 
Just growing up and testing the boundaries (Moore cited in Dekker, 2002).  
 
In this sense, the notion of an isolated – if not accidental –  incident was the most 
credible and thus, any claim that there was inevitability – by predetermined actors 
– to the situation was unfounded:  
 
The reality is that there’s a bunch of factors in these kids’ backgrounds which 
collided with their age and the group dynamic which resulted in what happened 
(Latta in “Interview with Paul Holmes,” 2002). 
 
… the community, in fairness, should stand back and say that young people – all 
people, but especially young people – do some things that are really stupid, really 
bad on occasions but it doesn’t warrant them being judged as totally irredeemable, 
totally without hope (Hogan cited in “No Words”, 2002). 
 
                                                
62 Interestingly the victim’s mother Rita Croskery, also, just following the trial, reportedly 
described the events as a “lark” (Rita Croskery cited in Aronson, 2002).  
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This dialogue also called for perspective in relation to the figures cited by the 
moral reprisal discourse; that a few high-profile cases had created an inaccurate 
perception that youth offending was on the rise. An expert in the field, a youth 
lawyer, for example, argued:  
 
I’ve always found it comes in peaks and troughs. I certainly don’t believe there is a 
wave of youth offenders out there ready to swamp society … There’s a view in 
society that young people are innately evil. That’s absolutely ridiculous (Scott cited 
in Tait, 2002).   
 
Rather, the killing of Mr Choy was no more than a “random incident”, in no way 
indicative of a trend (Hegarty cited in Andrew & Warren, 2002). Perspective was 
also urged in terms of what the ‘real’ problem was, the timing of the event, and of 
the enduring nature of anxiety about youth crime:  
 
Children remain far more offended against, than [are the] offenders (Dekker, 2002).  
 
Claims of deteriorating youth usually surface in election year and complaints about 
the younger generation go right back to Pliny in Ancient Rome (Dekker, 2002).   
 
 … when you look at the newspapers there were headlines in 1886 deeply concerned 
about young people out of control and roaming the streets … Every community 
takes offending seriously and every generation worries because, trite as it may be, 
those young people are tomorrow’s future. That’s probably why youth offending 
captures public interest … but contrary to popular belief, its not skyrocketing 
(Becroft cited in Claridge, 2002).  
 
 We are all to blame 
Although the temper of the discourse of social rescue was less formidable than its 
opponent, the events of the crime were still couched, intermittently, in terms of a 
bigger problem requiring explanation and immediate remedial action: “it’s 
definitely a warning” (Moore cited in Dekker, 2002). Culpability was firstly 
thrown in the direction of Child, Youth, and Family Services (CYF), the welfare 
department under whose custody Bailey had been at the time of the crime. 
Headlines screamed: “Welfare Failed Boy Killer” (Wall, 2002b) and “CYF 
blamed for lack of action” (“CYF Blamed,” 2002). Though a report into the crime 
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had revealed a communication breakdown between police, education, and welfare 
agencies – each of whom were unaware of each other’s involvement in the 
offender’s lives – one police officer was clear where blame lay. Constable Len 
Johnson claimed that he had applied for a court order placing Bailey into CYF’s 
care in June 2001 because the department’s social workers had come up with all 
sorts of ‘master plans’ for dealing with Bailey but failed to put them in action and 
had ‘dragged their arses’ in response to his urgent requests for them to apply for 
custody. Thus, Bailey’s involvement in Michael Choy’s death was “the end result 
of CYF’s failings” (Johnson cited in Wall, 2002b). It was reported that the same 
social workers would ‘lose’ Bailey as he ran away from the foster home where he 
had been placed, and subsequently did not relocate him until after he had been 
arrested (Wall, 2002b).  
 
On the other hand, Bailey’s role in the crime was seen as a reflection of ‘the 
times’ and the responsibility therefore community wide; not, as the discourse of 
moral reprisal had ascribed, to one particular sector, or to one particular set of 
ideas. One of the lawyers for the defense in the trial for the murder of Michael 
Choy claimed at the sentencing: “To some extent we are all in the dock today” 
(“Choy,” 2002). A letter to the editor had also earlier summed up this notion well:  
 
A child does not turn bad by itself, not even through the influence of its parents and 
family. It takes sustained ignoring by the whole community (McBride, 2002).  
 
It was also argued that modern children faced a number of unique ‘life hurdles’. 
Teachers reported that they knew of a number of ‘latchkey kids’; children whose 
parents worked full time and who regularly returned home from school to an 
empty house (Dekker, 2002). Another argument was that contemporary kids 
suffered an unprecedented exposure to vivid violent and sexual messages via the 
media. This is a claim that tends to be routine feature in social problems involving 
youth and violence and is normally couched in terms of a ‘permissive society’ and 
thus on the conservative side of the fence. It is interesting then, that in this case, a 
‘diet’ of visual and aural violence was seen as fine for well-adjusted children, but 
those without adequate support in their lives found it hard to separate fantasy from 
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reality, particularly if they had regularly witnessed violence in the home (Dekker, 
2002). The idea was, however, also refuted:  
 
It’s rubbish. It’s easy to blame – let’s blame television this week. It’ll be the music 
next week and … the funny clothes they wear after that. There are far more root 
causes (Scott cited in Tait, 2002).  
 
One of these ‘root causes’ was the logic of the free market. In essence this was the 
identification of an underclass, just as the discourse of moral reprisal had done. 
However, the discourse of social rescue firmly refuted the notion that 
membership of this underclass was self-imposed; rather, it was the principles and 
practices of Rogernomics that was systematically responsible for the destruction 
of an inclusive society; one of the principles of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s 
‘Godzone’.63     
 
… the number of younger and younger offenders has escalated, signaling a deep 
social and economic malaise. These youth have come, in the main, from home lives 
full of violence, deprivation and abandonment, against a background of the market-
driven social and economic policies launched in the 1980s … Of all of the OECD 
countries, New Zealand is among the least generous when providing assistance to 
low income and beneficiary households with dependent children (Robson, 2002).   
 
One area in which Aotearoa/New Zealand had remained in view as ‘world-
leading’ however was in its development of youth justice initiatives, particularly 
the ‘family group conferences’ that the moral reprisal discourse sought to 
undermine. However, it was acknowledged that such initiatives were inefficient in 
isolation from wider practices of care.  
 
Education, intervention, rehabilitation: ‘it’s not rocket science’ 
In addition to addressing poverty as one of the “the conditions that breed children 
who kill” (Gordon, 2002), untangling the psychological and emotional damage 
rendered upon individual ‘hardcore’ children was seen as imperative. This was to 
involve a multi-agency approach and ‘multi-systemic therapy’, involving 
psychologists and other experts working with the offender and his/her family for 
                                                
63 ‘Rogernomics’ is a portmanteau of ‘Roger’ and ‘economic’ to describe the free market 
economic policies implemented by Roger Douglas who was Finance Minister from 1984 to 1990.  
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an extended period in order to build new patterns of behaviour (Boyd, 2005). 
Much of the dialogue in this thread depended upon experts within the education 
system and other social services, many of whom demonstrated frustration at 
knowing ‘what to do’ but finding there was little in the way of bureaucratic 
support with which to do it. Teachers, for example, argued that ‘problem’ children 
could be identified as early as primary school but noted the difficulty in getting 
help within the system (Dekker, 2002). Intervention was also seen as costly. 
Spokespersons for various truancy services reported a serious lack of funding: 
“we can’t do this [monitor problem children] on the smell of an oily rag” 
(Crackett cited in “Lobby Seeks,” 2002). Additionally, while our youth justice 
system was fervently defended in principle, in practice it was: “seriously in need 
of a blood transfusion” (Becroft cited in Boyd, 2005). The implication was that a 
lack of forward planning on behalf of political bodies was responsible not only for 
failing to prevent serious crimes (by not intervening early) but costing the 
taxpayer undue expenditure upon a conviction. As it was summed up in an 
editorial:  
 
To break the cycle, wayward children have to be identified by kindergartens, 
schools, doctors and neighbours. Support for parents and children has to come from 
presently under-funded state organizations. The cost will be great. The cost not to 
act will be greater (“Wasteland,” 2002).  
 
Echoing that neo-liberal ideologies had much to answer for, another commentator 
argued: 
 
We need to look behind the ‘no tolerance for crime’ slogan. If we had ‘no tolerance’ 
for illiteracy, ‘no tolerance’ for school expulsion, ‘no tolerance’ for school failure, 
and ‘no tolerance’ for neglecting our most vulnerable children, then the youth crime 
rate would fall dramatically … It’s a shame, is it not, that he [Bailey] had to commit 
such a terrible crime to get some decent opportunities? (Gordon, 2002).    
 
Overall, though the discourse of social rescue acknowledged that “normal, well-
adjusted kids don’t go around killing people” (Johnson cited in “Young Killer 
Thinks,” 2002), it sought to undermine the trajectory of the discourse of moral 
reprisal through redefining the crime, who was responsible, and the ways by 
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which the ‘problem’ could be appropriately addressed. In this way it can be 
identified as a ‘fight back’ discourse (though on behalf of the ‘outsiders’) (see 
McRobbie, 1994a). In the next section I once more take a brief pause from the 
descriptive task and ask the question; did it work?  
 
Panic Over? 
 
Thus far my analysis has collated and described the two countable discourses that 
appeared during the reactive phase of killer kids. In a sense my action here has 
‘flattened’ the true picture as I have given equal weight to each discourse’s 
description. The question of whether the discourse of social rescue succeeded in 
fighting back is essentially a question of which discourse was triumphant over the 
other; if there was indeed a hierarchical order between the two discourses. The 
first evidence of an order is rather rudimentary, but important nonetheless. Few 
articles (both hard news reports and opinion pieces) were solely social rescue 
oriented; rather, the norm was that articles would open with a statement in the 
tone of moral reprisal and either follow this opening through, or temper it 
thereafter – for balance, it appeared – with the opposing view. The significance of 
this becomes clear in Chapter Five, where professional journalists attest to 
opening their reports according to what they interpret as the most important 
details. This is because readers are imagined to read the first paragraph with 
interest, and will continue only if such interest is stimulated. The second evidence 
of an order can be seen as the reactive phase came to a close. Panic scholars 
identify that an episode often dissipates with a repressive (though largely 
symbolic) change in law, which serves as an indication that something has been 
done to mitigate the behaviour in question (see in particular Goode & Ben-
Yehuda, 1994; Hall et al., 1978). Here, the initial ‘something’ that had been done 
was a set of custodial sentences for the group involved in the murder of Michael 
Choy that would later be described by the defence team as “adult sized … 
manifestly excessive and inappropriate” (Hogan cited in “Boy Did Not Plan,” 
2003). Notwithstanding the media’s favour of the arguments of the discourse of 
moral reprisal, I can tentatively claim that it is this that indicates it was this 
discourse’s arguments that had secured the interpretative terrain. Because too, the 
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sentences would mark the close of the reactive phase it can be inferred that the 
discourse of moral reprisal was content that their length met its disciplinary 
objectives.  
 
However, the panic was not yet over. A sense of crisis in which the Choy case 
was again central would erupt a few weeks beyond the close of the reactive phase 
into one that was focused upon containing the offenders now that they had gone 
to jail. Emerging and commanding the interpretative space in this containment 
phase was the discourse of criminal risk which sought to manage and prevent the 
criminal for which something had yet to be done. The notion of ‘risk’ is an 
implicit feature of both discourses dominant in the reactive phase; the risk of not 
intervening early and of not responding in a coordinated manner, the risk of a 
meager approach to young offenders and of the rising number of sole-parent 
households: “[welfare] numbers to increase … there will be a lot more Bailey 
Junior Kurariki’s on their way” (Milne, 2002). As the discourse of criminal risk 
evolves, the discourse of moral reprisal’s command can be seen more clearly as 
the notion of risk is spoken about alongside calls for vengeance. In Chapter Two I 
discussed Hier’s (2003) contention that risk language had become a moral 
technology. In this case, at the level of description, this conversion transpired 
more by association (and omission) than it did by how permeable the notion of 
risk was to the discourse of moral reprisal’s understandings.64 It will also be seen 
– at the level of description – that it would be via a challenge by a newly 
invigorated discourse of social rescue that the containment phase would come to a 
close.   
 
Criminal Risk 
 
As indicated, the discourse of criminal risk took centre stage after November, 
2002 (upon the commencement of the containment phase) and continued through 
to May, 2008. I want to commence the exploration of this discourse with an 
editorial in September, 2003 that markedly captures the temperament which the 
discourse of criminal risk was both a response to and a part of.  
                                                
64 In Chapter Five I explore how this association was facilitated by moral entrepreneurship which 
had adopted the case as the prototype for changes to be made in the criminal justice system. 
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The type of sentence in our justice system must balance a number of factors: 
society’s odium for a particular crime; the need to keep the community safe from 
certain offenders; and rehabilitation. It is quite true that home detention, whether at 
the front or back end of a sentence, should offer a better prospect for rehabilitation 
and community integration than a prison cell. But the trend towards this being given 
to serious offenders suggests that the balance has swung too far away from the idea 
of punishment (“Doing The Time,” 2003).  
 
Indeed, what will be seen is that managing the criminal focused upon the first two 
of these; society’s odium and the community’s safety. Questioning the notion of 
justice, the first thread in the discourse of criminal risk began to gather 
momentum the day following the sentencing of the six convicted youths.  
 
Just deserts and community safety  
Despite the seven year term handed down to Bailey it was argued that he would 
“probably be out of jail” (“Doubtful The Choy Quest,” 2002) after serving only 
one-third of his sentence. This was anticipated to be a direct result of the new 
Parole Act, 2002, which signified that the severity of the sentences (for the six 
youths) was mere lip service. The projection that Bailey would receive parole 
meant that he would become part of the trend of offenders “leaving prison early 
for the living room sofa” (“Doubtful The Choy Quest,” 2002) and this was seen as 
offensive, and to “anyone’s sense of justice” (Dilemma Over What,” 2002).  
 
It was also fairly quickly argued that Bailey was one of the ‘chosen few’ (that is, 
as a violent offender so young he cannot be sent to an adult prison) and as such, 
would be “heaped with special attention” in the form of education, recreation, and 
cultural opportunities (Bingham, 2002). Leapt upon as yet another example 
concerning our ‘warm fuzzy’ and ‘offender friendly’ criminal justice system with 
its undue emphases upon re-integrative practices, by November this perception 
would again find expression in the responses to a visit to Bailey by two All Blacks 
and so-called horse whisperer Monty Roberts soon after his seven-year term 
began. This was not ‘punishment’ it was argued, but ‘preferential treatment’; 
unjust rewards at the wrong end of the crime which, in turn, sent a perilous 
message to other potentially delinquent youths. One letter to the editor exclaimed: 
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Hey, kids, want to get your photo taken with some of the All Blacks? … It’s easy. 
Just kill a pizza delivery person (Broadmore & Broadmore, 2002).   
 
As Bailey’s first parole bid approached, claims of injustice gave way to claims for 
safety. Michael Choy’s mother Rita Croskery’s was particularly vocal with her 
view that Bailey was a ‘shrewd and cunning criminal’ who would be a “real 
menace” if released early (Rita Croskery cited in Crean, 2003). Another claimant 
argued, “the streets are safer without him” (Yee cited in Booker, 2003). Indeed, 
the parole board rejected his bid, reportedly unsatisfied that he would not pose an 
“undue risk to the community” (“Parole Board Got It,” 2004). However, it was 
still a point that “…the boy got what he deserved … In the case of Bailey Kurariki 
justice is still being done” (“Parole Board Got It,” 2004; emphasis added), with 
claims such as “the New Zealand Public is still adamant that the punishment must 
fully fit the crime” (“Doing The Time,” 2003).   
 
What can be seen happening here is that ‘risk’ is becoming something that is 
unmanageable insofar as it is coupled with (subject to) the indefinite aspirations 
of vengeance and without clear indications of how community safety might be 
assured. The third factor the criminal justice system needs to consider in a 
sentence; rehabilitation, is for the most part spoken about in terms of ‘special 
treatment’ or privilege, which is at odds with the idea of ‘punishment’. In fact, the 
discourse of criminal risk would come to determine that punishment itself was a 
‘risky’ practice. Indeed, expert opinion across the board appeared hesitant about 
the effects of incarceration. Then Commissioner for Children Roger McClay 
argued early on:  
  
I don’t think adult prison’s going to help him [Bailey] one iota. He’ll come out a 
well heeled little apprentice for crime in my opinion (McClay in “Jury Reach 
Verdict,” 2002).  
 
Just prior to his handing down of two life terms for murder, and between seven 
and ten years for the remaining four manslaughter convictions, the sentencing 
Judge also pondered:  
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If the prison system turns you out ultimately as more hardened criminals and the 
public suffers as a consequence, the public would be justified in asking some very 
hard questions of their political leaders and prison authorities (“Choy,” 2002). 
 
At the other end of the sample, whether Bailey would offend again upon release 
was a prediction that was, quite simply, down to “a dirty big guess” (Newbold 
cited in Cumming, 2002b). A commentator questioned: 
 
Some of the most formative years of his life were confined in a custodial sentence 
with other anti-social youth. It’s just a breeding ground isn’t it? (Lambie cited in 
Boland, 2007).   
 
It appears that part of this ambivalence was due to the clandestine nature of what 
went on ‘inside’ by way of therapy, education, and other means towards the 
rehabilitation of offenders. Michael Choy’s mother would argue:   
 
[its] meant to be all confidential, what he [Kurariki] is doing, and I can’t understand 
why, we as tax payers who are paying for his care … its costing the country 
thousands and thousands – millions – for all those people, and why aren’t we 
allowed to find out what’s going on down there? (“Rita Croskery,” 2003).  
 
If the supervision of risk via the criminal justice system was surreptitious, 
unknowable, the discourse of criminal risk saw that the means to its control – in 
relation to young offenders – was to stamp down on them early.  
 
Accountability and deterrence  
All overseas research had shown that “the earlier they come to court, the harder it 
is to ever get them out of the system” (Becroft cited in Boyd, 2005) by virtue of 
the compounding nature of prior convictions and sentences upon official 
responses to subsequent offences and sentences. This was an observation that had 
hitherto informed Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ‘world leading’ youth justice system 
with its practices of warnings and diversions; for youth to be made accountable 
but via routes other than the formal court system. Now, however, it was 
interpreted to mean that early deviancy led to long-term criminality. To negate 
this there was a need for deterrence which could be achieved, paradoxically, by 
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getting them into court, and early. This was a tender that initiated debate 
immediately following the trial for Michael Choy’s murder and engendered 
support particularly from the right-wing political party ACT (“Sorting Out 
Children,” 2002). However, with the introduction of the Young Offenders (serious 
crimes) Bill by New Zealand First Member of Parliament Ron Mark in March, 
2006 it became a formal proposal.  
 
The Bill proposed to lower the age of criminal responsibility from fourteen years 
of age, to twelve. Significantly, though four years on from the trial (although Mr. 
Mark claimed to have drafted it in 2002 – “Underage,” 2006) it appeared to have 
been the Choy case that was the driving force behind the Bill’s formulation:  
 
It is those crimes that, left unchecked, create the long-term adult criminal. We 
believe we will stop some young people graduating to serious crime and ending up 
like Bailey Kurariki in jail” (Mark cited in “Bill Urges Jail,” 2006).65 
 
Taking on board the discourse of moral reprisal’s discursive thread of leniency in 
the criminal justice system in this sense of the control of risk, ironically it would 
be in the spirit and language of ‘rescue’ that ‘safety’ would be assured. The 
following exchange between Ron Mark and Breakfast host Paul Henry in an 
interview following the Bill’s introduction demonstrates this well:  
 
PH: People will say what you are doing is branding people, for life, at perhaps the 
age of twelve, a criminal … 
 
RM: I’m saving them Paul, by putting intervention in place that enables the police to 
actually intervene, or at least use as a deterrent … 
 
PH: Are you worried about saving them, or are you worried about saving society 
from future crimes they may commit … 
 
RM: Both, and tragically we’re talking about the same thing. We’re saving that 
young person from becoming an adult graduate and an occupant of Paremoremo, 
                                                
65 This statement is more astute than Mr. Mark presumably intended, as indeed the Bill would 
have, in effect, dealt with offenders just like Bailey, or rather, in the image of Bailey. This will be 
seen when I consider the Bill’s anticipated effects in a section below.  
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and therefore a cost and a burden on the tax-payer. We’re saving future victims from 
being confronted with this person (“Underage,” 2006).66 
 
The Bill would pass its first reading but remain in the select committee stage for 
two years. During this time, the discourse of social rescue would re-emerge and 
erect a challenge upon the Bill’s assumption that youth were knowledgeable about 
the law and as such, could, and did, make informed cost/benefit analyses. A 
professional working with young offenders, argued: 
 
I don’t believe there are any twelve year olds that know the meaning of deterrent for 
one, or the meaning of indictable offence for another, and I don’t believe that 
sending young people into an adult system or being treated as an adult - in this case 
at twelve or thirteen - is going to deter them from serious offending (“Underage,” 
2006). 
 
Not long after, the discourse of social rescue described the Bill as an ‘abysmally 
drafted’ document put together in response to a problem that simply was not there 
– “where is the statistical evidence to suggest offending by 10 to 13-year-olds is 
spiraling out of control?” (Becroft cited in “If It’s Not Broken,” 2007). The youth 
justice system in place was working, it was argued, insofar as those who 
committed the most serious crimes could already be sent to jail. 
 
Ultimately however, that the Bill was thrown out of parliament on May 21, 2008 
(incidentally, four weeks after Bailey Kurariki was released from jail), in turn 
signifying a close to the containment phase, was largely due to some significant 
timing and the arrival of a new oppositional ally. I identify and discuss the 
significance of this ally in more detail in Chapter Five. In the next and final 
section of this chapter I consider the dominant discourses of moral reprisal and 
criminal risk and how their effects for the episode of ‘killer kids’ can be seen in 
terms of a moral panic.  
 
 
 
                                                
66 ‘Paremoremo’ is Aotearoa/New Zealand’s only maximum security prison. 
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Discourses toward Moral Panic 
 
I noted earlier that the hallmark of a moral panic is the production of a singular 
and incontestable or ‘closed’ discourse. In this case I have identified three distinct 
discourses that appear over two conceptual phases. At the closure of the reactive 
phase I argued that it was the discourse of moral reprisal that had secured a result 
in the punitive sentences that were handed down to the offenders in the murder of 
Michael Choy. I then identified that a sense of crisis would continue beyond a 
reactive phase to one focused upon containing the offenders within which the 
discourse of criminal risk would become central. This discourse sought first and 
foremost to be pragmatic about the management and forestalling of risk. 
However, because ‘safety’ was talked about in conjunction with vengeance 
(informed by the discourse of moral reprisal) and in the relative absence of talk 
about effective rehabilitation (for which the discourse of social rescue would have 
been informative), it can be argued that though the discourse of moral reprisal 
would triumph in the first phase, the second was heavily influenced by its 
character. In turn, ‘risk’ was talked about alongside moral objectives, 
subsequently appearing to become something that was unmanageable in 
calculable terms. To re-grasp control, the discourse of criminal risk would argue 
for the prevention of the young offender via early criminalization.  
 
It is at this point that I need to consider how the effects of the discourses can be 
seen as disproportional effects in a moral panic. Though the sentences handed 
down to the offenders in the murder of Michael Choy were identified as 
‘excessive’, because this was on behalf of the defense team it is more a subjective 
assessment that it is a reliable objective marker. Nevertheless, the predicted ‘saga’ 
of ‘violent teenage crime’ posed to follow the Choy case can also be tangibly (and 
retrospectively) identified as out of proportion. As figure 4.2 shows, though 
apprehension rates of violent crime appeared to have risen overall during the ten-
year period from 1998-2008, in whole numbers it was the 31-50 age group that 
showed the largest increase, and by percentage it was the over 51 group. 
Comparatively, the 13 and under group – which the discourse of moral reprisal’s 
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predictions were about and which the Young Offenders (serious crimes) Bill 
would later target – had the lowest increases by both measures. 
  
Figure 4.1. Apprehension rates of violent offences by age groups 1998-2008 67   
 
 
On the other hand, the discourse of criminal risk would have immediate and direct 
effects upon Bailey Kurariki’s jail time as well as a set of anticipated indirect 
effects upon a particular population. The first of these can be identified as 
relatively extreme (if not disproportional); the second as tendentious (see Cohen, 
1972). At the time of sentencing, Justice Robert Fisher had not set fixed terms; 
that is, he had not circumscribed that a period of time must be served before any 
of the youths involved could apply for parole. This may have been as the 
legislative changes in the Sentencing and Parole Acts of 2002 determined that the 
proportion of time served (in violent crime cases) was a mandatory two thirds 
with the possibility of the whole sentence to be served “depending upon 
individual circumstances” (“Sentencing For All Offenders,” 2007).  That Bailey 
was not ‘released’ in the full sense of the term until his seven year sentence was 
complete, having been granted ‘home detention’ in April 2008, demonstrates that 
                                                
67 Data compiled from Statistics New Zealand website (www.stats.govt.nz ).  
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the change was, in this case, exercised to its full potential. Further, the parole 
conditions under which Bailey was eventually released were seen as “special” 
(NZ’s Youngest Convicted,” 2008), “unusually stringent” (Misa, 2008) so as he 
would not “pose an undue risk” (“Kurariki Out,” 2008).   
 
With regard to the second set of effects, if risk was to become unmanageable in 
the discourse of criminal risk by virtue of a lack of assurance in relation to safety, 
later it would at least have a definitive marker. This can be seen in that though the 
Choy case sparked a sense of nationwide crisis about youth crime, later this crisis 
essentially returned to the site from which it began – South Auckland. Indeed, the 
“daily fodder of the Youth Court” (Claridge, 2005) were said to be from South 
Auckland communities and it was South Auckland that was identified to be rife 
with ‘persistent life-course offenders’, or ‘career criminals’. This group shared a 
number of similar characteristics; eighty-five percent were male, eighty percent 
had drug and alcohol issues, seventy percent were not in school, and at least fifty 
percent were of Maori or Pasifika descent.68 Moreover, because it was this group 
that would be disproportionately affected by the Young Offenders (serious 
crimes) Bill should it have passed into law, when the ‘risk’ of young offenders 
was spoken about, implicitly the risk of young brown men is what was said. Few 
commentators made overt statements in regards to this, but when they did, they 
were clear about its presence. Early in the containment phase one commentator 
argued, for example:  
 
Most Pakeha see only the face of Bailey Kurariki, who was, yes, part Cook Islander, 
when they think of merciless little killers (Misa, 2002). 69 
 
At the other end of the sample it was Mr. Mark himself (who, incidentally, is of 
Maori descent) who claimed that an established correlation between brown faces 
and social disadvantage had (and would have) no bearing upon conduct 
undertaken: 
 
                                                
68 ‘Pasifika’ is the Samoan term for ‘Pacific’. It has come to be used in Aotearoa/New Zealand to 
denote people of Pacific Island descent – particularly those who are Aotearoa/New Zealand born 
(see Misa cited in Perrott, 2007).  
69 ‘Pakeha’ is the term used in Aotearoa/New Zealand for citizens of European descent.  
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Don’t tell me about being brown and disadvantaged. You couldn’t get any more 
disadvantaged than I was (Mark cited in McDonald, 2008).   
 
By acknowledging a connection between transgression and Maori and Pasifika 
youth, and by rebutting the social variables that may have bearing upon such 
transgression, Mr. Mark was in effect implying that it was these youths that were 
inherently ‘risky’ and this demographic the Young Offenders (serious crimes) Bill 
was actively targeting. In Chapter Six I present evidence that suggests that a 
perception of a link between deviance and the ethnic ‘other’ has a long cultural 
history, and how its materialization in this episode was supported by its operation 
in other socio-political goings-on.70  
 
Though a description of content has revealed much about how the episode of 
‘killer kids’ unfolded, Cohen’s (1972) seminal analysis sought to demonstrate that 
moral panics emerge via many players; the campaigns of moral entrepreneurs, the 
work of the media, the (assumed) concern of the public, and, ultimately, the 
response of elite figures. The next chapter probes the second layer of the episode 
of ‘killer kids’ (processes of the real-type) to identify the players and to examine 
the ways in which they are fundamental to how the discourses came into being. 
This will show, provisionally, why it was the discourse of moral reprisal that 
commanded the stage in both phases and also how the episode came to an end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
70 It is important to note that Mr. Mark’s use of the term ‘brown’ refers specifically to Maori and 
Pasifika peoples. The term is used in the sense that despite that such youth may not share an 
ethnicity, a culture, or a history, they do share an experience as ‘other’ in Aotearoa/New Zealand. I 
discuss this point again in Chapter Six.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Media Practices, the Murder of Michael Choy, and the Cycle of 
Amplification 
 
Newspapers select events which are atypical, present them in a stereotypical 
manner, and then contrast them against a backcloth of normality which is over-
typical (Young, 1974: 241). 
 
In Chapter Four I identified and discussed the relationships (in the making of a 
social problem) between three countable discourses; the discourse of moral 
reprisal, the discourse of social rescue, and the discourse of criminal risk. 
Concluding from the tangible effects that indicated that a moral panic had 
occurred, I argued that it was the discourse of moral reprisal that occupied the 
trajectory towards a crisis over ‘killer kids’ in the reactive phase. Moreover, its 
explicit relationship with the discourse of criminal risk, which dominated the 
containment phase, indicates that it (the discourse of moral reprisal) commanded 
the interpretative terrain concerning the issue as a whole. Here, in Chapter Five, 
the task is to examine the practices by which this discourse emerged and 
prevailed over its competitor – the discourse of social rescue.  
 
I have structured the discussion into three parts. The first part examines how the 
media construct crime stories (the production of text). I wanted to concentrate 
specifically on how crime stories are constructed for Aotearoa/New Zealand, as I 
was concerned to capture specificities to crime reporting in this country. To do 
this I recruited seven working crime journalists, and asked a series of questions 
relating to the ingredients for a ‘good story’, how raw events are made 
communicable, and what sources are called upon (for the full 
interview/questionnaire schedule, see the Appendix).  
 
The second part of the chapter employs this backdrop to interpret how the events 
of the murder of Michael Choy were transformed into a news story. As will be 
seen, the productive practices of the media would be subject in this case to some 
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unusual legal rulings and to some extraordinary timing, both of which were 
compelling for understanding how the imagery of Bailey Kurariki would become 
central and how in turn, a sense of moral crisis developed.  
 
The third part of the chapter interprets how a trajectory towards a perceivable 
social problem that was markedly removed from its observable reality developed 
via processes of amplification (see Cohen, 1972). This includes the ways by 
which the practices of news-making continued to come into play and how a 
constituency was both assumed and recruited into a particular version of events – 
which, in turn, strengthened the sense of ensuing disaster.71 Tentatively looking 
for evidence of the first conception of ideal-type practices of panic (the internal 
sense of the order of discourse) in action, I then reflect upon why they unfolded 
in a particular real-type trajectory that would support the success of the discourse 
of moral reprisal.  
 
Making Crime News 
 
The focus of the first section of the first part of this chapter is upon how crime 
news is made. This is important, as though objectivity and transparency underlie 
our perception of our daily ‘news’ and the practices of those who assemble it, it is 
an institutionally subjective set of news values that drives all newsrooms and 
news reports. News values are the criteria that determine what is newsworthy or 
not. My respondents testified to three broad sets of news values for the making of 
crime stories in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
Bad and unusual 
 
First, media professionals look for bad news; particularly violent bad news. This 
appears to be a universal feature of crime reports. As Hall et al. (1978: 68) argue:  
 
                                                
71 I see this in CDA terms as the consumption of text. I argued earlier that the analysis of the 
practices of consumption in a moral panic necessarily leaves out an analysis of the public and 
focuses instead upon the practices by which the event is interpreted and transformed within media 
space. However, this includes the ways by which the public is invoked.  
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Violence represents a basic violation of the person; the greatest personal crime is 
‘murder’, bettered only by the murder of a law-enforcement agent, a policeman. 
Violence is also the ultimate crime against property and against the State. It thus 
represents a fundamental rupture in the social order. The use of violence marks the 
distinction between those who are of society and those who are outside it (original 
emphases).  
 
The journalists I spoke to added that elements of chance and irrationality were 
important insofar as they provoked an ambiguous emotional response; empathy 
with the unsuspecting victim at the same time as a sense of one’s own potential 
risk:  
 
Those sudden, senseless, random crimes – they leave a question mark in your mind. 
There’s always something tragic about that wrong place, wrong time scenario. 
(Respondent A) 
 
A ‘great yarn’ or great story, would be when a crime occurs that ‘could happen to 
anyone’. When innocent members of the public are going about their daily lives and 
get tied up in awful situations where it could have been anyone …I guess a lot of 
people can’t identify with gang-type crimes so they don’t tend to be interested in 
gang on gang murders for example, unless it is an extreme situation like the shooting 
of Wanganui toddler Jhia Te Tua. When children are involved, it also adds an x-
factor. (Respondent C)   
 
Indeed, the more unusual or x-factor qualities a crime had, the more it offered 
itself as ‘good copy’. As an example, one respondent noted the murder of fireman 
Tony Stanlake, whose handless body washed up on Wellington’s South coast in 
July of 2006. 
 
It was classic … body on the beach, hands cut off. You know – what it’s all about. 
(Respondent A) 
 
An additional way by which a sense of the unusual could be got was seen to be 
by the identities that are involved. Particularly attractive for my respondents were 
‘fall from grace’ situations, especially in relation to deviant sexual activity, drug 
offences, or abuses of position (Respondents B, D). One respondent saw the 
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involvement of former All Black Joe Karam in the Bain case as broadening the 
appeal of a case already saturated with newsworthy complications (Respondent 
E).72   
 
Drama and emotion 
Drama and emotion were seen as essential to crime stories.  
 
When there is a crime, naturally there is drama and emotion. That sort of speaks for 
itself. (Respondent C) 
 
Drama and emotion are the key drivers of any story-telling, either fiction or non-
fiction. (Respondent B) 
 
Other respondents saw their emphasis upon drama and emotion as a way to keep 
competitive within the profession, something they were not apologetic for:  
 
The media needs to keep up audiences and attract advertisers. I can’t see anything 
wrong with entertainment. Conflict, drama, and emotion appeal to readers and 
viewers. (Respondent E)  
 
I don’t think there’s any doubt that things are played up much more than used to be 
– horror, shock value etc – um, and part of that is probably a general, um, it reflects 
the public attitude I think. Everybody’s blasé about crime, everybody’s blasé about 
murder – it has to be a pretty good murder these days to capture the imagination and 
you do need to rev things up a bit, maximize the drama. (Respondent A) 
 
Many of my respondents also spoke of the saliency of a ‘whodunit’ case 
whereupon they could follow ‘unfolding events’. Essential to this was a sense of 
‘pace’, both to retain the public interest, and in which the journalist feels part of 
the investigation towards a result. 
                                                
72 In 1995, 23 year-old David Bain was convicted of shooting dead five of his family members in 
Dunedin in June, 1994. However, it was claimed (predominantly by Joe Karam who had studied 
the case and published the book ‘David and Goliath’ in 1997) that the crown case was fraught with 
inconsistencies and therefore a grave miscarriage of justice had occurred.  After a long campaign 
and a retrial in 2008, David was found not guilty.  
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In an ideal world [you want] a case that moves quickly from an offence to a 
reasonably firm result within a week and there are developments each day, where, 
like, there are requests for information and all of a sudden you’ve got an arrest … 
you know, you want to get a result, you’re a little bit like a police officer in that 
way, you want it to be resolved so there’s a happy ending to a horrible story. 
(Respondent A)  
 
Pictures are primary  
It is said that in television news there has always been a bias towards a good 
picture as opposed to a catchy story (see McGregor, 2002b). This was reflected in 
my research. Respondent A, for example, argued:  
 
The beauty of TV is that pictures can tell the story better than your voice ever can. 
You’re in trouble; put it this way, if your script is the best thing about the story. 
(Respondent A) 
 
Indeed the same respondent remembered his move from working as a print 
journalist to a television journalist as challenging:  
 
It’s quite hard to make the transition ‘cause in print you do have that license to write 
quite scripted and its nice, and it took me a while to make the adjustment to TV 
where actually its not about your words anymore. You’re actually writing to the 
pictures … You need in TV to reverse the mindset of fitting pictures to words. You 
need to be on your cameraman’s shoulder and say ‘what’s my best opening shot’ so 
that you know how things are going to look. (Respondent A)  
 
However, it has been observed that images are becoming increasingly important 
for the print press as papers work to capture a younger market with magazine-
type news (see McGregor, 2002b; Jewkes, 2004; Greer, Ferrell & Jewkes, 2007; 
Greer & Jewkes, 2008). Moreover, whatever the medium, it appears that 
journalists are prepared to go the extra mile to create the perfect picture: 
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If you have a mum crying, you lead with that – its very hard to go past that … its an 
awful thing to admit, but if you see that a person [interviewee] is holding back tears 
you’ll ask them a pushy question, or an even more intrusive question … you know, 
there are buttons you can push … there’s no question you want to wring the emotion 
out of the story and you’re pretty shameless about the fact you do. (Respondent A) 
 
Much of the above discussion indicates that the ‘making’ of news is inadvertently 
happening at the point of selection (determined by news values). Nevertheless, 
once selected, events are subsequently moved through a definitive narrative 
structure whereupon events are transformed into meaningful stories (see 
Altheide, 2002; Epstein, 2000; Hall, 1980; Jacobs, 1996; Jewkes, 2004; Johnson-
Cartee, 2004; Muncie, 1999; Schlesinger & Tumber, 1994). Thus, I now turn to a 
discussion of the crime narrative.  
 
The Crime Narrative  
 
For most of my respondents the narrative structure of all news stories began with 
the movement of raw events through an ‘inverted pyramid’ whereupon all of the 
crucial information is presented in the first sentences. I then asked my 
respondents where they sourced their information, who they would seek out to 
find ‘balance’, and whether it was important to follow an existing angle (one 
already in the news). Most argued that it was the events themselves that had the 
main bearing upon the shape of the narrative.  
 
You have to understand its already unfolding in a certain way, that is the story and 
to seek balance to that would be artificial – it would be like doing a story about the 
holocaust and a lead came up that Hitler was a vegetarian – you know, at some point 
you just have to get the story. (Respondent A) 
 
At the same time, other angles were considered important:  
 
To keep a story fresh, reporters are always looking for new angles. (Respondent F) 
 
We always try to discount other angles so we aren’t missing anything, or try to find 
new witnesses, or accounts of what happened etc. (Respondent C) 
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You don’t want to be seen as just a mouthpiece … you earn your stripes as a 
journalist, you want to be digging and coming up with something that no-one else 
has got. (Respondent A) 
 
The accessibility of ‘other angles’, indeed of ‘the story’ itself, however, was often 
dependent upon the ‘stage’ of the event (which usually coincided with a police 
inquiry) and the sources available. Here, the relationship with the police was 
significant, but it was one that was often on police terms: 
 
[if] the crime is unsolved, there is no ‘other side’ to go to. So you are reliant on the 
police and victims or victim’s family for the story. (Respondent B) 
 
The relationship with the police is crucial really … but there’s a mutual mistrust … 
because they’re using you, you’re getting a good story … Police will often say ‘stay 
and we’ll have a press conference’. The police are very good at playing two hands – 
on the one hand they don’t want you doing your own stuff so all the media will be at 
the press conference at 3 o’clock and they’ll actually be searching the crime scene 
again … I have seen that happen on a number of occasions. (Respondent A) 
 
At that [early] stage of the inquiry the police are generally friendly, co-operative ‘its 
good to see you mate’ and that sort of thing and as soon as an arrest is made they go 
into shutdown. (Respondent A) 
 
Once the event had moved past the investigative stage, and into court:  
 
It is difficult because by the nature of court proceedings it’s often one side that is 
putting up the argument and if witnesses aren’t cross-examined it’s very hard [to get 
an alternate angle]. (Respondent A) 
 
These annotations reflect what scholars, particularly those with radical or critical 
concerns, have long argued; that a structured dependence upon institutional 
sources for information about crime means that these sources establish the ‘terms 
of reference’ for how a crime can be understood, or, in relation to the discussion 
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here, they establish the scaffold of the crime narrative (see Ericson, Baranek, & 
Chan 1987, 1989, 1991; Hall et al., 1978; Surette, 1992).  
 
Bearing upon the raw (and newsworthy) events as they unfolded in relation to 
sources and stages, was, however, the scripting of a story. Respondent D was 
particularly avid about describing crime stories as melodrama, with one-
dimensional characters (villains, heroes, and victims) and a simplified formulaic 
arrangement of good triumphing over bad. Within this narrative, we see the 
‘usual suspects’ and ‘suitable victims’. Respondent D went on to argue, for 
example: 
 
Because by definition, crime stories are about people who break society’s rules – 
and are consumed by people who don’t – the narrative is commonly about an alien 
Other. It will commonly use race, gender, generational and class stereotypes as a 
ready shorthand for characterization. (Respondent D)  
 
Such stereotypes must, as must the content of the narrative, be culturally 
apposite; that is, able to be understood and interpreted by an audience literate in 
its codes (Barthes, 1977; Hall et al., 1978).73 Respondent D insinuated what these 
might be in Aotearoa/New Zealand:  
 
What would an ideal crime story be? … A Waitangi Tribunal judge who secretly ran 
a posse of teenage crack whores on the East Coast who, together with their dole 
bludging Mongrel Mob boyfriends, ran a protection racket among local pensioners 
to pay for their habits, while funneling the rest of the booty back up the chain to 
Judge Dread, who used his clout with the local coppers and iwi to keep things under 
wraps…until NOW! (Respondent D)74 
 
                                                
73 This is not to suggest, however, that news narratives are ultimately predetermined, colluded 
about, or permanently fixed (see Jacobs, 1996).  
74 The ‘Waitangi Tribunal’ is a legislative body that deals with claims made against the principles 
of the ‘Treaty of Waitangi’, a document signed in 1840 between representatives of the British 
Crown and a number of indigenous Maori iwi (tribes). The treaty is often seen as the founding 
document of the nation of Aotearoa/New Zealand, and in present day it serves as a guide for 
processes of redress for past colonial harms (see Brookfield, 2006; Moon, 2002; Orange, 1987). 
The ‘Mongrel Mob’ is an established gang that is involved in organized crime. Maori 
predominantly populates this gang. ‘Iwi’ is the Maori term for ‘tribe’.  
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My respondents claimed that part of the dependence upon such ready shorthands 
in their crime stories was due to the reduction of complexity and ambiguity of 
issues so as to ‘fit’ them to the more general format of ‘hard news’, and to 
changes within the industry, particularly for ‘investigative journalism’.  
 
Reporting is only the tip of the iceberg. It’s hard to do it; it’s hard to focus it [in-
depth analysis] into a story format especially on TV, on the 6 o’clock news. There’s 
no scope for it. You’ve got ‘Close-Up’; that’s more their area really, but I don’t 
think anybody would feel that we cover social issues particularly well in this 
country. I don’t think we have a particularly informed media and partly that’s 
because we have so few specialists … it’s a fact that most journalists now are multi-
taskers. (Respondent A)75 
 
[we have] an under-resourced and overworked news media … forces converging to 
create hyper emotional soundbite capsules devoid of social and historical context 
and meaning. (Respondent D) 
 
How, then, would these institutional news values and the formulaic structure of 
the crime narrative in Aotearoa/New Zealand have bearing upon the ways by 
which the murder of Michael Choy was reported? In the next section I look at 
why the events of the murder were newsworthy, how they would become 
additionally newsworthy by virtue of their extraordinary timing, a series of 
significant legal decisions, and the accusative argument of the crown, and how, in 
turn, the event that would ultimately shape the story would be the imagery of 
Bailey Kurariki.  
 
The Murder of Michael Choy 
 
The crime is first, a violent crime: random and senseless (in the sense that the 
motive was robbery and not murder), perpetrated against a person going about his 
routine business. It is second, a crime with an unusual factor; the offenders being 
a group of teenagers, the youngest of whom was also the youngest person to be 
                                                
75 ‘Close-Up’ is a current affairs programme that broadcasts weekdays for thirty minutes in prime 
time.  
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charged with murder in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s history. Thus, fulfilling par 
extreme the first two news values, it can be imagined that the event may have 
been front page news for at least a good few days. However, timing would 
determine otherwise. As observed in the Introduction to this dissertation, the 
media were pre-occupied with the exceptionally newsworthy terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in New York. Ironically, it was via this diversion that the 
case acquired a greater sense of newsworthiness.  
 
The High Court trial for the murder of Michael Choy began on July 22, 2002 and 
the jury retired to consider its verdict exactly one calendar month later. In a pre-
trial hearing on July 4, however, the presiding Judge made two quite significant 
rulings. He first continued name suppression for the six accused of murder, and 
he then rejected an application on behalf of The New Zealand Herald to take 
photographs inside the court while the trial was in progress. This was cited as an 
‘extremely rare’ move by media watchdogs; one that threatened the nature of the 
public’s ‘right’ to know, and endangered customary press freedoms (“Gag 
Order,” 2002). Putting aside the judge’s concern to minimise the stress of the 
accused so they were not impeded from participating in their defence, in effect 
these rulings can be said to have greatly increased the news value (specific to the 
story) of both the names and images of the accused. Indeed, it is almost as if the 
media bided their time, and in doing so, were able to capture the events in such 
way so the story would then meet every crime news value as described above. 
 
Though interest in the youngest offender in the group arrested for the murder of 
Michael Choy was already high, as reports in the year leading to the trial often 
opened by calling attention to his age; “A 12-year-old boy was one of eight 
arrested at the weekend” (“Boy, 12,” 2001), “Nine people, including a 12-year-
old boy have been remanded in custody” (McLoughlin, 2001b), it would be 
intensified with the presentation of the first image in the Sunday Star Times on 
August 25, 2002. Gracing almost the whole front page, the face of the now 13-
year-old perpetrator Bailey Junior Kurariki emphasises the most extraordinary 
element of the crime – his childlikeness – as he is smiling as a child would, and 
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looking away from the camera as if his attention has been fleetingly caught by 
something else. This was important insofar as this was also an image of a killer – 
in court after his conviction, and on display for our ‘forensic gaze’ to reflect on.76 
Indeed, this double-barrelled depiction of the child and the criminal suggested 
that both cultural categories were now questionable.77                             
                                          
Subsequent pictures would maintain this juxtaposition, continuing to exhibit 
Bailey in court, and in characteristic youthful acts and expressions. However, just 
as I was unable to reproduce the first image, neither could I gain permission to 
use these additional images. Nevertheless, they can be found by sourcing the 
original articles, some of which are also available online (see, for example, 
Andrew, 2002; Clarke, 2002; Collins, 2002; Cook, 2007; Dye, 2007; “NZ’s 
Youngest Killer Denied,” 2007; Wall, 2002a; “Young Killer Is No Star,” 2002). 
In the main, there were three images of Bailey that were prolifically employed 
across the sample – although several others in the same vein also appeared 
intermittently – with a ratio of approximately one per every four and a half print 
articles.78 79 Notably, images of Bailey’s co-accused were not. This can account 
for why it was after the trial whereupon Bailey was ‘unveiled’ for the first time 
that there is a clear shift to a focus upon Bailey’s involvement over and above 
                                                
76 Valverde (2006) describes the ‘forensic gaze’ and its primary object – the mug-shot image – as a 
way through which we locate two things; first – the successful apprehension of deviant bodies by 
the criminal justice system, and second – confirmation of repentance and acceptance by the 
individual deviant (see also Smith, 1996). 
77 In subsequent uses of the first image of Bailey (as seen in the Sunday Star Times on August 25, 
2002) there is clearly a woman to be seen to Bailey’s right looking in the same direction as he is. 
In the first use of this image this woman was ‘doctored’ out of focus. Where she and her direction 
of gaze can be clearly seen does not have quite the same connotation of a child’s attention caught 
away. Seemingly this notion was important to emphasize when the image was first presented.  
78I depend only on the number of times the images appeared in print for two reasons. First, as 
argued, I was only able to obtain a small amount of the televised material due to access and 
funding limitations, so thus placed emphasis upon obtaining the relatively more in-depth pieces in 
the interest of having access to how this case was ‘talked about’. Unfortunately, these also 
happened to be the pieces that tended to leave out visual accompaniments and so a ‘count’ of the 
times the imagery appeared in these would be an artificial indication of how many times the 
imagery might have appeared overall. Of the print data, on the other hand, my sample was 
comprehensive. Moreover, and second, because print media is less dependent upon visual images, 
the repeated use of, or appearance of an image or set of images - in print - can be more revealing 
about how important the imagery is to the story. 
79 In January 2010, the weekly broadsheet magazine Listener ran a cover story titled “Shock and 
Awe: Photos That Shocked the World”. One of these images appears situated alongside 
photographs of the Bali bombings and adjacent to Michael Jackson holding his infant son over the 
balcony of a Berlin hotel.  
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that of his co-offenders. Of the 40 reports in the year prior to the trial for 
example, 32 mentioned all the offenders, but of the 111 reports immediately 
thereafter (that is, within the reactive period – from August 25, 2002 up until 
November 1, 2002) 81 wholly isolated Bailey and his actions in the crime from 
the group of which he was part. Therefore, the media can be said to have 
personalised the events through visualising them. 
 
Moreover, there was a close engagement with what was constructed in these 
images; that is, the juxtaposition of the child and the criminal. We see, for 
example, how both categories were subsequently (re)constructed – at least 
figuratively – through the ‘conceptual eviction’ of Bailey from the category of 
‘child’ (see James & Jenks, 1996).80 Consider the headline that accompanied the 
first appearance of Bailey in the Sunday Star Times:  
 
Our youngest killer: At 9 he was shoplifting, at 10 he was banned from school, at 12 
he helped kill a pizza delivery man (Wellwood, 2002).   
 
Beneath the image, the text continued to pathologise via a colourful chronology 
of his deviant behaviour:  
 
… described by police as being the worst of the bunch of young killers … out of 
control … flirting with disaster since he was nine … had not been to school for a 
year before the killing…had learned to fend for himself … (Wellwood, 2002).  
 
However, due to a further legal anomaly, this ‘eviction’ was already underway 
prior to the appearance of the imagery. Bailey Kurariki was a child by law, yet 
was facing an ‘adult’ charge. In a move reminiscent of the removal of the legal 
doctrine of doli incapax in the James Bulger murder case in Britain, the Crown 
was permitted to bring in evidence to ‘prove’ bad character, and to argue he knew 
                                                
80 Beals (2006) makes a similar observation, arguing the media can be seen to employ a notion of 
‘assumed innocence’ to highlight Bailey’s departure from childhood. His is a “corrupted 
innocence” (Beals, 2006: 79, emphasis added). However, in Chapter Six I will argue that a 
racialised regime of representation would impose an understanding of Bailey as inherently corrupt, 
and thus never innocent.  
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‘right from wrong’.81 82 The Crown prosecutor, for example, was cited in her 
closing address as arguing that the youngest of the accused was “not your average 
12-year-old … [he was] streetwise … He had a knowledge beyond his years” 
(“Alleged Murder Decoy,” 2002). Demonstrating the media’s structural 
dependence upon the prosecution side of court proceedings, news reports would 
actively pursue the ‘criminal in the making’ angle as the headline in The New 
Zealand Herald the day following the first article demonstrates:  
 
Cherub’s long, ruthless criminal career in 13 short years (Wall, 2002a).  
 
It is clear, therefore, that how the murder of Michael Choy came to meet a set of 
crime news values was, in part, due to the timing of the events, a series of legal 
decisions, and the accusative argument of the crown. This reflects the dependence 
of news angles and the construction of a story upon the stages of the event as it 
unfolds and the sources available, testified to by my respondents. In this case, 
these stages would bring to the fore a set of news images that would operate to 
convey all of the information that was deemed crucial about the case: a paradox 
of the appearance of the child and the knowledge of the criminal. This, in turn, 
would become the event, and thereupon the crime story would need little in the 
way of drafting, as the melodrama was already present and the villain already 
clear. What is more, following Bailey’s ‘unveiling’ the media would have their 
‘opening shot’ and begin to write to the pictures in such a way as to confirm that 
this was no ordinary child. This marks the first stage in the development towards 
the reactive phase of the episode in which the discourse of moral reprisal took 
                                                
81 Doli incapax means - literally – ‘incapable of evil’ and ensures in English law that cases where 
children between 10-14 years-old can be held accountable for crimes, they will be held in the 
‘youth court’ which differs in approach to adult court. For an insightful account of the implications 
and consequences of the removal of this doctrine in relation to the Bulger murder, see Morrison 
(1997).  
82 In Aotearoa/New Zealand law, details of prior convictions are not normally put before a jury. 
This has proved a controversial course of action in many criminal cases; a notable one being the 
trial for the historical rape of Louise Nicholas by several policemen, where the jury was unaware 
that two of the accused were already in jail for a subsequent rape on another woman (see Nicholas 
& Kitchin, 2005). In Bailey’s case, the unusual ability for the Crown to bring in such ‘character’ 
evidence became the basis of his 2004 appeal for a new trial to the Privy Council which was, 
curiously, promptly denied.  
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control. I want to now turn the discussion to the mechanics behind this 
development; namely, the cycle of amplification.  
 
The Cycle of Amplification 
 
For Cohen (1972) what is discernible about a moral panic is the process by which 
it inflames itself from the inside, via a spiral of features that he describes as 
sensitisation, diffusion, escalation, dramatisation, and exploitation.83 These, he 
explains, are parasitic on each other independent of the actual issue in question, 
which in turn amplifies a perception (of the issue) and escalates the control 
measures directed at it (Cohen, 1972: 118). In the case of ‘killer kids’ the first of 
these features to appear was dramatisation. 
 
Dramatisation 
Cohen (1972: 75) argues:  
 
Deviants must not only be labelled but also seen to be labelled; they must be 
involved in some sort of ceremony of public degradation. The public and visible 
nature of this event is essential if the deviant’s transition to folk devil status is to be 
successfully managed. 
 
Bailey Kurariki’s degradation was conducted in a markedly public and visible 
way. Indeed, the imagery can be understood as a component within a ‘spectacle 
of socialization’ whereupon the impetus to ‘display’ on behalf of the media (and 
by extension to ‘view’ by the public) is propelled by the function of that display 
to the collective conscience (see Erikson, 1966; Garfinkel, 1956; Garland, 1990; 
Katz, 1995).84 Arguably, the presiding Judge in the trail for the murder of 
                                                
83Although Cohen (1972) did not firmly stipulate that this order was particular, I inferred that that 
was what he intended.  
84 An impetus to ‘display’ can also be understood in less psycho-social terms; by virtue of a 
historical relationship between images and the criminal process. Jermyn (2003), for example, 
argues that the development of photography and the development of modern policing took place in 
tandem, and that both were bound up in the functions of each other; the former specifically 
providing the means for surveillance and enabling a growing pre-occupation with classification 
and order to develop with pace. 
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Michael Choy anticipated this action – during the trial – as premature, hence his 
ruling to prohibit cameras in the courtroom. Perhaps he also foresaw the marked 
shift, on behalf of the media, towards a focus upon Bailey after he was ‘unveiled’ 
for the first time.  
 
However, as I have already indicated, it was the accompanying text – the 
developing narrative – that would promote and cement the ‘dramatisation’. 
Particularly operational was the attachment by the media, to Bailey, of the 
historically significant ‘youngest killer’ label as it lexically brought together the 
illogical association between Bailey’s youth and his role in the crime.85 Like the 
imagery, this label was also prolifically employed, becoming almost synonymous 
with the name Bailey Kurariki.86 In many respects, this can be seen as evidence 
of what my respondents identified as working to ‘maximise the drama’ because 
Bailey was not convicted of murder but of manslaughter, an act commonly 
understood as unlawful but unintentional and described in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
law as “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” (Crimes Act 1961, 
emphasis added) for which intention is resolute. The term ‘killer’ however, 
definitively implies premeditation via its operation as a verb, therefore implying 
that there has been prior, and will be future ‘killings’. Thereupon it would 
provide the substance for acts of what Cohen (1972) terms ‘spurious attribution’ 
– the process of labelling to support a particular theory or course of action – as 
the reactive discourses emerged and the energy into panic gathered pace. We see, 
for example, the extension of the interpretative repertoire of the term killer – 
cold, sinister, and callous; psychopathic, cunning, and evil; wild, monstrous, a 
primate ‘prowling’ the streets of South Auckland – that would lend itself to the 
discourse of moral reprisal. In response, the discourse of social rescue sought to 
arrest the isolation of Bailey at the same time as it strove to redefine his identity 
as a mere wayward ‘youth’. In this discourse the perpetrators are, instead, the less 
inflammatory ‘high needs offenders’, ‘troubled children’, and ‘lost boys’.  
                                                
85 In this way the dramatisation was a ‘dramatisation of evil’ whereupon there is a movement from 
a perception of the act as evil to a perception of the actor as evil (see Tannenbaum, 1938). 
86 Indeed, at the time of writing, the now 19-year-old Bailey Kurariki was photographed by a 
reporter outside a court hearing for an alleged breach of parole conditions. The lead into the 
headline to the report is now a familiar one “Youngest killer …” (Ruscoe, 2009).   
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The notion of a ‘killer’ in our midst is also an alert to danger; a call for 
preventative action in the interests of likely risk to (any) one’s personal safety. 
Additionally, it circumscribes that that risk is perpetual, without end, insofar as it 
locates the danger upon the character of an offender implicating that they are 
irredeemable. Demonstrating the intimacy between the features and the circular 
manner in which the cycle unfolds, it will be seen in a moment that this drama 
would become important for the ways by which the case would very swiftly be 
employed – exploited – for the interests of a campaign for more punitive 
custodial sentences.  
 
Sensitisation 
For Cohen (1972) sensitisation describes the process whereby ambiguous 
situations are transformed into a more potent and concrete sense of threat. In the 
case of ‘killer kids’ this process took quite a unique route. Despite the conceptual 
eviction of Bailey from the category of the child in the crime narrative and the 
label ‘Bailey Kurariki; New Zealand’s youngest killer’ in the dramatisation 
process had together offered a clear preferred meaning to the event, the 
suggestion that the situation remained ambiguous was nevertheless put forward, 
and in earnest. Though, as argued above, crime news journalists favour stories 
that provoke ambiguous responses (and thus it might be imagined that the story 
might be constructed in terms of highlighting the points at which such a response 
could be invoked), much of this work took place in editorials and opinion pieces 
early in the reactive phase (August 25, 2002 to November, 2002). The following 
examples are typical:  
 
Clearly, something is deteriorating in the fabric of our society. And equally clear is 
the fact something has to be done … it is essential something is done (“Time To 
Act,” 2002, emphases added).  
 
[the crime] defies simple explanation (“Who Is Responsible?” 2002).  
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Thereafter the initial interpretation of the images (that is, by media figures as they 
chose which images to use in anticipation of a crime narrative) which emphasized 
the visible characteristics of the child and the explicit disturbance between 
semblance and substance (see Young, 1996) was re-invoked, revealing that the 
eviction of Bailey was not complete, simply perhaps, as his imagery did not 
violate how a child should appear.87 Part of this is arguably due to the prolific 
(re)presentation of the imagery of Bailey on behalf of a commercially savvy 
media (utilizing the visual component of the story), but also by the ways that 
(re)interpretation was suggested. Consider the following examples:   
 
… the face of an angel, but the mind of a cold-blooded killer (Collins, 2002).  
 
The angelic face of Bailey Kurariki … disguises the terrible reality (“Young And 
Bad,” 2002).  
 
His [Bailey’s] mugshot is that of a bright-eyed, fresh-faced youngster full of 
potential. The reality is that he is New Zealand’s youngest convicted killer (Clarke, 
2002).  
 
They [young killers] look disturbingly like the kids next door (Dekker, 2002).  
 
… the boy with the angelic face was no angel (“Parole Board Got It,” 2004).  
 
Indeed, the threat became understood as one more far reaching than a truant from 
South Auckland could ever pose:  
 
If such an innocent-looking child can take part in planning and executing such a 
senseless slaying, what hope is there for retaining the trust of others? (“Benefits 
Disappear,” 2002).  
 
We must ask ourselves how that face of innocence turned into a killer (“Time To 
Act,” 2002).  
 
                                                
87 For Jenks (1996), such a link is ‘iconologically irreconcilable’ and thus it will demand 
interpretation at the same time as it resists it (see also Young, 1996). 
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This re-interpretation did have a backdrop, however, with a story angle already 
‘in the news’. Sixteen months prior to the trial for the murder of Michael Choy, 
former probation officer and prison boss Celia Lashlie had made some prophetic 
claims regarding a youngster – whom, satirically, she described as having ‘the 
most angelic face you can imagine’ – who was on his way to prison (see “Life 
Pushing 5-Year-Old,” 2001). Though she would be fired from her job for making 
such claims, it would be Ms. Lashlie who the media would turn to for her 
‘expertise’.  
 
Escalation 
Indeed, upon the appearance of Bailey’s imagery, Ms. Lashlie’s words would be 
accredited as “chillingly accurate” (“Why No Inquiry,” 2002); her subsequent 
“dire predictions of more to come” (Mirams, 2002) saliently offering the sense, in 
turn, that this was a ‘problem’ larger than first supposed. Similarly, the then 
Commissioner for Children Roger McClay was quoted:  
 
I think we will go on getting this kind of thing occurring more and more unless we 
take dramatic action (McClay cited in “CYF Blamed,” 2002, emphasis added).  
 
Forensic psychologist Nigel Latta, who, incidentally, had sat in on the trial, also 
stressed:  
 
I think the important thing for people to understand is that these kids are no different 
to hundreds of others out there (Latta cited in “Interview With Paul Holmes,’ 2002).  
 
Stimulated by their own endorsement of these ‘experts’ – “We must listen to the 
Celia Lashlies” (“Lining Up,” 2002) – thereafter, the media took on an angle of 
the urgency for dramatic action. Headlines, for example, exclaimed: 
 
Time to act on child crime (“Time To Act,” 2002).   
 
Sorting out children before they turn on the adults (“Sorting Out Children,” 2002).  
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Clear warning (Allison & Markby, 2002).  
 
Lining up to kill (“Lining Up,” 2002).  
 
Teen crime predictions need action (“Teen Crime Predictions,” 2002).   
 
The text of many articles would follow this lead:  
 
[the] task is becoming increasingly urgent (“Young Killer,” 2002).  
 
… the country’s highest priority (“Children Who Turn,” 2002).  
 
Moreover, taking up the point made by Nigel Latta, police representatives 
and several editors claimed the ‘problem’ was not particular to South 
Auckland. In many respects, the label ‘New Zealand’s youngest killer’ pre-
empted this:   
 
Taranaki has not escaped … there have been recent examples in Taranaki where 
desperate parents have called the Daily News seeking help with problem children 
over whom they have lost control (“Sorting Out Children,” 2002).  
 
The answer is a hard slog, and a nationwide one. Only last week Timaru’s school 
support worker talked of non-compliant, violent and abusive five-year-olds 
(“Wasteland,” 2003).  
 
The reality is, the youth in Christchurch are challenged by the same things as the 
youth in Auckland, and there are Bailey Juniors in Christchurch (Hegarty, cited in 
Claridge, 2003).88 
 
For Cohen (1972) the process of escalation – it will get worse – calls for and 
legitimises responses that are immediate and retaliatory. This is what we see next.  
 
                                                
88 It is interesting that the officer quoted here leaves out Bailey’s surname as he attempts to locate 
the problem in Christchurch. I discuss in Chapter Six why Bailey’s ‘brown face’ was significant 
for his demonization. For now, note that Christchurch is a South Island city, known to have 
significantly smaller Maori and Pacific Island populations than its northern counterparts.  
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Diffusion 
What it was that ought to be done solidified along particular lines as particular 
identities (and respective worldviews) entered the theatre and adopted the 
‘problem’ as their own. It is at this point that a division between the identified 
discourses is at its most clear. For most ‘experts’, for example, remedies were to 
be found at the social-institutional level as blame lay predominantly with the 
education system and the Child Youth and Family department whose lack of 
direction and co-ordination had allowed Bailey (and therefore, had the potential 
to allow others) to ‘fall through the cracks’. This, in turn, was largely due to a 
historical lack of funding (thus, we can locate these actors within the discourse of 
social rescue). Roger McClay, for example, argued: 
 
We might be at a stage where we need to put a group of people together from 
various agencies … We seem to find very good brains to work on taxation issues or 
write reports on why we didn’t get the [rugby] World Cup. Why don’t we do the 
same to find out why we’ve just had the youngest person ever convicted of 
manslaughter? (“Truancy Linked,” 2002).   
 
Some media, in turn, were willing to adopt the possibility that the blame was 
indeed institutional. Broadcaster Paul Holmes, for example, posed the question:  
 
Were [the offenders] failed? Were they all exhibiting behaviours that could have 
been arrested? Did we fail them? (“Interview with Paul Holmes,” 2002).  
 
Largely, however, such a notion was seen to be in opposition to a common sense, 
which championed both the notions of justice and ‘personal responsibility’. Once 
more, it was editors who led the cause: 
 
The country’s mood, as expressed by widespread calls for harsher sentences, is a 
retributive one … That response is perfectly understandable. Principles of justice 
demand a punishment that fits a crime (“Children Who Kill,” 2002).  
 
Perhaps only in the past few weeks of the court case have some truths begun to sink 
in for Kurariki and his friends. They may now begin to have some idea of the 
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concepts of personal responsibility and accountability. What a tragedy for them, 
Michael Choy and his family, and for this country, that these notions, and many 
other values besides, could not have been instilled by someone long before now. If 
families will not take responsibility, who will? (“Who Is Responsible?” 2002).  
 
We can blame a society in which everyone has rights and no-one has responsibilities 
… in which everyone is a victim except for those of us – and thank God there are 
still hundreds of thousands – who won’t buy into this arid and meaningless manner 
of living (George, 2002).  
 
Notably, this ‘common sense’ was often conflated with the deliberations of other 
‘experts’, who would offer the lay view a sense of authority: 
 
The call from Hawke’s Bay youth lawyer Don Kennedy for the age of responsibility 
to be reduced to 12 will strike a cord with many around the country (“Sorting Out 
Children,” 2002).  
 
… the state cannot, nor should, be a parent. Where is the personal responsibility 
here? … As Ms Lashlie says, a real shift will come only ‘over the dinner table’ (“Put 
The Family Back,” 2002).  
 
But more significant was the invocation of the public as crucial to the momentum 
of a moral panic is the notion that the public is concerned. The often implicit 
assumption that this was so within the call for responses – the country’s mood; 
will strike a cord with many – continued well into the latter stages of the reactive 
phase. Tellingly, this (assumption of concern) was exclusive to opinion pieces, 
revealing how particular voices within the media assume an intimacy with public 
sentiment, often coming to speak for the public in panic discourse (see Hall & 
Jefferson, 1976; Critcher, 2003). Moreover, these opinions were predominantly 
unified about what the public were feeling:  
 
As a nation we are all reeling by the realisation that there are children in our midst 
who have been turned into killers (McBride, 2002).  
 
Public outrage … an angry citizenry (“Young Killer,” 2002).  
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… public horror … shock over the case (“Don’t Blame,” 2002).  
  
… crime [that] shocked the nation (“Doubtful The Choy Quest,” 2002).  
 
New Zealander’s are reeling from the fact that a 12-year-old, Bailey Junior Kurariki, 
was an organiser of a trap that led to the violent death of Auckland pizza deliverer 
Michael Choy (Robson, 2002).  
 
… expressions of outrage have echoed around the country (O’Conner, 2002).  
   
Later, upon dismissing the conviction and sentencing appeals made by the 
offenders in the murder of Michael Choy, Chief Justice Sian Elias delivered the 
court’s judgement, in which it was stated that while “youth was relevant in 
sentencing … [the court’s] consideration had to give way to public interest” 
(“Sentences Upheld,” 2003).89 
 
With the entry of other identities (editors, experts, the invoked public) to the 
episode in the processes discussed so far, the role of the news media could almost 
be overlooked. However, the processes of escalation and diffusion provide 
further bad news (it will get worse), more dramatic tension (something must be 
done), and emotion (the public are angry) fundamental to crime stories and so the 
self-augmenting loop of the amplification cycle feeds into the newsworthiness of 
the (perceived) event. In turn, drawing from and contributing to the unfolding of 
a cycle of amplification is the continuing development of a crime narrative that 
seeks to identify heroes and villains and come to a finale where good triumphs 
over bad. In this case, the personalisation of the villain (Bailey) was closely 
followed by the personalisation of the victim-hero – Michael Choy’s mother Rita 
Croskery.90 As one reporter observed towards the end of the sample: 
                                                
89 I read ‘public interest’ to refer to ‘public opinion’ here. However, it is just as likely that Justice 
Elias may have used the term to mean ‘welfare’ or ‘for the good of’. In 2009 the now Dame Elias 
would speak at the New Zealand Law Society with concern about the link between popular anxiety 
and the rise of punitive custodial sentences, and how the principle of ‘cool impartial justice’ had 
suffered as a result.  
90 The transformation of victims into heroes can be seen at its most acute in how the victims of the 
9/11 attacks are described (see Hume, 2004).  
 139 
 
[Bailey’s] six bids for parole have been closely followed by the media – with Rita 
Croskery’s pain laid bare (Cumming, 2008a). 
 
In turn, the quest to make the hero and to complete the ‘story’ would accord Rita 
Croskery a generous amount of media attention, and this would become 
important for the ways in which the case would then be employed for the 
objectives of a campaign for harsher sentencing. This is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
Exploitation  
Though the reactive phase continued into early November 2002, for the most part 
it loses its thrust with the sentencing of the offenders for the murder of Michael 
Choy on September 16, 2002. As argued in Chapter Four, it is significant that the 
‘something’ that had been done was a set of excessively punitive custodial 
sentences indicating that it was the discourse of moral reprisal’s arguments that 
had secured the interpretative terrain. It is also significant that at this point the 
crisis narrative shifts focus and is reinvigorated via encompassing discourse 
about the enduring risk of the offender/s and their containment for which 
something had yet to be done. This can be seen in relation to the entry of the 
Sensible Sentencing Trust (SST), a lobby group that had established itself in the 
preceding eighteen months as a voice for ‘ordinary New Zealanders’ 
disillusioned with the criminal justice system and its focus upon offenders’ rights, 
rather than those of victims. In November, 2002, Rita Croskery lent her voice and 
experience to the trust (indeed, at the Trust’s annual meeting that month, she was 
elected National Ambassador for Victims).91 As a result, just as Rita’s 
involvement would lend the Trust further legitimacy, the news story would now 
have a definitive hero. In turn the standpoints of the SST would define the terms 
for how the case (of ‘killer kids’) could be understood from here on in; that is, 
overlaid with notions of vengeance. This relationship, and its consequences, can 
                                                
91 Incidentally, at the time of the sentencing Mrs. Croskery was quoted as “pleasantly surprised” 
(“Seven-Year Term,” 2002) at the seven years handed down to Bailey.  
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be seen by looking more closely at the ways in which both parties spoke on 
behalf of each other.  
 
Though Mrs. Croskery was markedly personal in her campaign, describing 
Bailey, for example, as “a shrewd and cunning criminal … the mastermind 
behind [the murder of Michael Choy] … a real con man” (Rita Croskery cited in 
“Young Killer Applies,” 2003), her comments were also characterized by a 
definitive agenda to further the trust’s retributive ideals; particularly the stand 
against the practice of parole.92 Parole, she argued, was “a failed and dangerous 
experiment” (Rita Croskery cited in Davis, 2007) and “we do not want another 
tragedy such as ours … public safety is paramount” (Rita Croskery cited in “NZ’s 
Youngest Killer,” 2008). To exemplify her points, she would often re-invoke and 
reflect upon the drama of the reactive phase. Speaking, for example, of why she 
was opposing Bailey’s parole in July, 2007, Mrs. Croskery warned of the dangers 
of believing in his rehabilitation, and of taking him, literally, at face value:  
 
He has got a brilliant smile. You wouldn’t think he was dangerous. He doesn’t look 
dangerous but those are the worst kind, with all the cunning (Rita Croskery cited in 
“NZ’s Youngest Killer Fails,” 2007). 
 
On the other hand, spokesman for the SST Garth McVicar took every opportunity 
to showcase the position of the organisation, particularly the perception of New 
Zealand as “one of the most violent countries in the world” with a “soft approach 
to criminals” (“Youngest Killer Tries,” 2003), and of our world leading youth 
justice system as a “politically correct experiment” (Batchelor, 2003). 
Representing Mrs. Croskery at a home detention application hearing for Bailey in 
late 2003, he stated: 
 
Until this young killer learns some rules, he should stay where he is … If he comes 
out and goes back into the environment from which he came, and starts re-
offending, then we’ve for a criminal for life (McVicar cited in Kay, 2003). 
 
                                                
92 A SST press release in 2003 states parole is “a tool to unload Prisons and place potentially 
dangerous offenders back on the streets” (Sensible Sentencing Trust, 2003: para. 2).  
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Later in the sample he places more emphasis upon the rights of the victim. Here, 
Bailey remains the proverbial villain:  
 
I can’t see any sense in letting people like Bailey Junior Kurariki out … I think 
we’ve got to put the victims first. This whole offender-friendly system we have is 
past its use-by date (“Parole,” 2007).  
 
Unsurprisingly, both Rita and the SST ardently supported the proposal of the 
Young Offenders (serious crimes) Bill. Mrs. Croskery, for example, said:  
 
Kurariki began his numerous offending from the time he was eight years of age, he 
was never held accountable for the assaults he committed on other people (Rita 
Croskery cited in “Parole Hearings Cause,” 2007).  
 
However, as is the case with many moral panic trajectories (see Critcher, 2003, 
2006), because it was eventually rejected the Bill proved to be merely symbolic. 
Once more, timing would come into play. As argued, though drafted in 2002, it 
was not until 2006 (following a redraft and a lifting of the proposed age of 
criminal responsibility from ten years to twelve) that the Bill was introduced, and 
it was not until May, 2008 (approximately one month after Bailey had been 
granted home detention for the remaining five months of his sentence) that it was 
voted out by a significant majority (ayes: 14, noes: 107). The Bill had been put on 
the backburner largely as it was a private member’s Bill and these are notorious 
for the length of time taken to move through the legislative process due to their 
place in the order of priorities. However, by the time it did come to the fore, a 
new political force was present – the Maori Party – that had emerged from the 
fallout of the controversial Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004. The party had won 
seven seats in the general election of 2005 and was anticipatorily described the 
day following as a “potent force” (Thomson & Milne, 2005) with “significant 
heft” (“Four-Seat Sweep,” 2005). In due course, the party would prove a 
powerful ally for the discourse of social rescue.  
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Indeed, in the second reading of the Bill on May 21, 2008, it was the Maori 
Party’s Hone Harawira who vocalised that the effects, should the Bill be passed 
into law, would disproportionately affect Maori. He argued:  
 
[a]nalysing the statistics of those who are arrested most, prosecuted most, and 
convicted most, Maori youth get the prize three times more than anyone else … this 
Bill is crap – another knee-jerk reaction to a problem in society that government 
doesn’t know how to fix … it seems the two major parties have become obsessed 
with trying to bash Maori kids into submission with these tagging bills and youth 
offender’s bills (Harawira, 2008).  
 
Further, Harawira warned that the Bill could serve to alienate the very 
constituency it was purportedly responding to:  
 
[a] government that would ban the smacking of children, but react to problems with 
teenagers by simply getting a bigger and bigger stick, is a government destined for 
the opposition benches (Harawira, 2008).  
 
Though it is uncertain if it was due to Harawira’s challenge that the Bill won so 
few aye votes, considering it had been afforded a second reading, it is reasonable 
to assume that the astute foresight at this later stage into the determining effects 
of the potential legislation contributed to its downfall. Whatever the backcloth, 
the outcome would mark a significant victory for the temperence of the discourse 
of social rescue.  
 
Practices Toward Moral Panic 
 
The task for this chapter was to examine the ways by which the discourse of 
moral reprisal became the successful discourse in the reactive phase and an 
influential discourse in the containment phase. I began by examining how crime 
news stories were made in Aotearoa/New Zealand. I then looked at how, in this 
case, the story was subject to significant timing, some unusual judicial decisions, 
and the accusative argument of the crown. Thereupon, the event that would shape 
the crime narrative would be a set of images that emphasised the illogicality 
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between the appearance of a child and the knowledge of the criminal at the same 
time as they would cement Bailey Kurariki as the lone villain. Setting off a cycle 
of amplification, the ‘drama’ was then maximised though an employment of the 
historically significant ‘youngest killer’ label at the same time as the images were 
re-presented for reinterpretation. We see opinion pieces quickly respond through 
drawing upon the visible qualities of the imagery – the face of an angel – 
augmenting the juxtaposition of what could be seen and what was known, and 
identifying a threat that proposed to be much more existential than that of one 
child’s evil deeds. Thereafter, having priori identified a hypothetical ‘angel 
faced’ killer; Celia Lashlie’s prophecies would facilitate the development of the 
notion that the threat was both imminent and on the increase. Experts, 
broadcasters and editors (who, in turn, claimed to know what the public were 
feeling) would then champion solutions of ‘eye for an eye’ justice and the need 
for personal responsibility to be taken by offenders and their families, both before 
and after the crime. Emerging as the victim-hero, Michael Choy’s mother Rita 
Croskery was particularly vocal about such solutions, and about furthering the 
objectives of a campaign belonging to the SST, a lobby group formed in response 
to a perception that Aotearoa/New Zealand’s criminal justice system had become 
far too offender-friendly just as a rise in violent crime had become far too real for 
many victims and their families. 
 
Thus, ultimately, the real-type cycle of amplification unfolded in relation to a 
compilation of components that were crucial to the success of the discourse of 
moral reprisal. These components – or ‘real-type’ features – were the label ‘New 
Zealand’s youngest killer’, an interpretation suggesting an inherent irrationality 
between what can be seen and what is known, a story angle that suggested those 
who look like angels could be evil, a doctrine of ‘common’ sense, and a vocal 
victim-hero in Rita Croskery who was heavily involved with a lobby group 
campaigning for hasher penalties. Nevertheless, each stage of the ideal-type cycle 
can also be seen independently, and in relation to each of the other stages 
(signifying the circular process of amplification). In other words, the real-type 
appears to pose very little challenge to the internal ideal-type practices of moral 
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panic (the cycle of amplification). Did this suggest that there was an inherent 
logic to the cycle, independent of events? Or was there something about the set of 
features specific to this case that could be seen as archetypical of those of moral 
panics outside of such logic? What sustains such a compilation of features as 
productive of a countable discourse that creates a social problem that is largely 
made of hot air? That these questions emerge at this point emphasizes the 
importance of exploring why a panic occurs, particularly if we are ‘rethinking 
moral panic’. The next chapter seeks to address ‘why’ using the third dimension 
of the approach to moral panic – explaining context.  
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Chapter Six 
 
A Holy War, a Punitive Agenda, and the Spectacle of the Other 
 
Moral panic targets are not randomly selected: they are cultural scapegoats whose 
deviant conduct appalls onlookers so powerfully precisely because it relates to 
personal fears and unconscious wishes (Garland, 2008: 15). 
 
This chapter is concerned with exploring the social context in which the episode 
of ‘killer kids’ materialised. This is where I explore in what ways the social and 
cultural ‘goings on’ made it possible for the trajectory to unfold in the way it did, 
and reflect on its study as an understanding of why panics happen. I concluded the 
previous chapter, Chapter Five, with the identification that while the episode 
could be seen to follow traditional ideal-type processes of amplification, these 
processes were sustained by a compilation of real-type features. In order of 
significance these features were: the label ‘New Zealand’s youngest killer’, an 
interpretation suggesting an inherent irrationality between what can be seen and 
what is known, a story angle alleging that those who look like angels could be 
evil, a doctrine of ‘common’ sense, and a victim-hero who was heavily involved 
with a lobby group campaigning for hasher penalties. It is my argument that it was 
these features that enabled one discourse – the discourse of moral reprisal – to be 
triumphant as the reactive phase of the episode came to a close and to influence 
the discourse of criminal risk in the containment phase.  
 
What I will put forward in this chapter is that this compilation of features was 
meaningful and worked effectively towards the creation of a perceived social 
problem because they were located at the juncture between three social 
phenomena; the demonisation of children via particular race/space relations, a set 
of punitive penal practices characterised by a realignment of power, and a society 
of spectacle in which the exhibition of the ‘other’ pertains to a racialised regime 
of representation. I have structured the discussion to follow each of these 
phenomena in turn, locating each of the features and reflecting on the 
relationships between them (and how the imagery was central to their operation), 
as the chapter progresses. 
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The second task for this chapter is to examine the relationship of the real-type 
episode as a whole with the ideal-type concept in an external sense – the stages of 
description – as illustrated in Cohen’s (1972) opening paragraph. This will allow 
for an assessment of how, or indeed whether, the case of killer kids challenges 
and obliges the concept’s adaptation. As argued in Chapter Two, this is the first 
step towards an assessement of the ‘big question’ the project of ‘rethinking moral 
panic’ is concerned with – what moral panics are extreme examples of. As I 
contended, just as the ideal-type is subject to the nuances of real-types, the 
theoretical question (what the ideal-type is an extreme example of) is intimate 
with the contextual question (why this or that real-type panic occurred).   
 
Once again, however, I need to stipulate where and why I can be seen to move 
away from the formula for analysis prescribed in Chapter Three as I proceed in 
this third tier of the examination of the real-type. In Chapter Four I argued that the 
separation of the episode into the three tiers of content, process, and context was 
artificial. Similarly, in Chapter Five I argued that the processes of the cycle of 
amplification were just that; cyclical and overlapping, and so to separate them was 
also artificial. Here, in Chapter Six, the location of the real-type features that 
underpinned the cycle into one or other of the three social phenomena is again 
forced, perhaps more so than for the previous separations as each feature can be 
seen in relation to each of the phenomena, and each of the phenomena overlap 
into and reinforce each other in something of a second order cycle of 
amplification. For analytical purposes I have located each feature to the 
phenomena to which it most pertains; where the evidence is at its most clear.  
 
Returning to the immediate task at hand, the first of the three phenomena 
examined is the demonisation of children via race/space relations. It is here where 
the understanding of ‘New Zealand’s youngest killer’ can be located.  
 
The Demonisation of Children: a ‘Holy War’ 
 
The ‘child’ is a slippery concept, a product of history and culture rather than a 
definitive categorization based around the innate qualities of a particular time in 
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the life span of a human being (Holland, 2004; Jenks, 1996; Jewkes, 2004). In 
western societies this product is marked by its relation to adulthood, and denoted 
by its innocence, naivety, vulnerability, and dependence. Largely, these qualities 
can be seen as a reflection of the shift from agricultural societies to industry and 
the corollary ‘nuclear’ family formation whereupon children have moved from 
being conceived of as ‘chattels’ to having immeasurable or ‘priceless’ emotional 
value (Jenks, 1996). They are also a product of a host of social, legal, and 
institutional developments that have ensured children’s physical distance from 
adulthood, and emphasized their unique differences. Alongside the introduction of 
compulsory schooling, the outlawing of child labour and the development of 
welfare agencies, professions have emerged to ensure the wellbeing of the young; 
particularly paediatric and psychological theories and practices of child 
development and care (Best, 1990; Davies, 1997; James & James, 2004).  
 
Despite this – the social, cultural, and political history behind the development of 
‘the child’ – we invest in the characteristics of innocence, vulnerability, and so 
forth as natural characteristics, and understand them as inherent to all children 
(Davies, 1997; Hockey & James, 1993). Despite this, we practice childhood as we 
socialise real children into the norms of childhood, and regulate our own relations 
with them (James & James, 2004). Part of this practice is to reproduce not just 
‘childhood’ but society itself, as the idea of the ‘child’ often symbolizes all that is 
stable and all that is possible (see Jackson & Scott, 1999; Jenks, 1996). Furedi 
(1997) adds that as modern society erodes our solidarity and our experiences 
become less ‘real’, more mediated, we cling to the memories of our own 
childhoods as representations of a less complicated era. It is thus paramount to us 
to protect the category of ‘the child’ as it indirectly protects our sense of 
collective and individual being.  
 
In Chapter Five I argued that the label ‘New Zealand’s youngest killer’ played a 
key role in the process of dramatisation, simply because it suggested that Bailey 
Kurariki’s actions were far more sinister than his manslaughter conviction 
warranted. However, Jenks (1996) argues that inherent in the construction of 
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childhood innocence is its nemesis: the ever-present spectre of malevolence. 
When children commit acts of violence they reveal that the ‘child’ is but a 
construction, subject like any other to the threat of deconstruction, in spite of what 
guards have been erected and efforts have been made to ensure otherwise. In this 
sense, Bailey was guilty of a killing of sorts; indeed, he had slaughtered the belief 
of the idealised child in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and revealed that our society was 
not, perhaps, the one we imagined it was. In part then, the label was a challenge to 
the legitimacy of our practices of constructing and regulating the child, and a 
demand for immediate and increased control (see James & James, 2004). This 
demand was certainly responded to, as the calls for investigations into why kids 
kill and exclamations about what and who were responsible for our decaying 
society, evident in the processes of sensitisation and escalation, attest to. 
However, as I identified in Chapter Five, the discourse of criminal risk would 
imminently reveal that its targets were specific, that the ‘childhood’ we knew and 
cherished was not, incidentally, under assessment. There was an underlying 
suggestion that there was another terrain of childhood emerging, one that could be 
located to some children. How this designation would occur will become clear in 
a moment.  
 
It is pertinent to the discussion of this case that a recurrent overhead narrative in 
contemporary moral panics is the theme of childhood; those at risk, and those 
who, by virtue of their un-childlike actions, risk rupturing its conceptual 
boundaries (Critcher, 2003, 2006). Jewkes (2004) argues that one of the ways we 
cognitively manage and reconstruct the quintessential child figure is through 
locating each in stark division to the other: that is, in terms of ‘tragic victims’ and 
‘mini-monsters’ (see also Valentine, 1996). Over the past two decades, there has 
been an underbelly of thought pertaining to a rise in these little monsters, and thus 
a crisis in childhood, something that most commentators locate as commencing 
with the murder of two year-old James Bulger at the hands of two ten-year-olds in 
Britain in 1993 (see Davis & Bourhill, 1997; Green, 2008a; Hay, 1995; James & 
Jenks, 1996; Jenks, 1996; Muncie, 2004; Valentine, 1996). Despite that concerns 
over youth delinquency have been omnipresent across time and space (as the 
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discourse of social rescue went to pains to point out), so intense is this new wave 
of revolt that it is described by Scraton (2002: 15) as “the sharp end of a 
continuum of child rejection; a sharp end most accurately described as child-hate, 
in the same vein as race-hate, misogyny or homophobia” (Scraton, 2002: 15). 
Similarly, Zimring (1999: 260) interprets the revolt as a “holy war” against 
dissident children.  
 
It is not difficult to reflect upon ‘killer kids’ and its minutiae as an instance of, or 
a product of this ‘holy war’. As argued, a key feature is the way in which Bailey 
Kurariki was singled out, pathologised, and to some extent evicted from the 
category of the child. Moreover, as Shuker et al. (1990) map out, Aotearoa/New 
Zealand’s history is peppered with acute episodes of concern over youth deviance; 
from larrikinism, truants, and destitute children in the late 1800s, to concerns over 
juvenile delinquency in the 1950s and ‘hippies’ in the 1960s, to the anxieties over 
‘street-kids’ in the 1980s and ‘gothic suicides’ in the 1990s. All of these episodes 
can be said to have, as have similar episodes in other western societies now 
engaged in this ‘holy war’, paved the way for contemporary concerns to 
materialise. Nevertheless, it is my argument that the label ‘killer’ (and its more 
ominous extensions) could be so effortlessly attached to the face of Bailey 
Kurariki not simply because he was the latest manifestation of the young deviant, 
but also because he was brown. In the next section I look at how New Zealand’s 
youngest killer was foremost understood as South Auckland’s youngest killer, and 
how this understanding would underpin a suggestion that brown children as a 
whole were potentially problematic.93 
 
Race, and space  
Very few of the sampled articles make mention of Bailey’s race/ethnicity despite 
that his image is one of an ‘other’ child: his name – Kurariki – clearly denoting 
                                                
93 I use the term ‘brown’ to refer to Maori and Pasifika peoples, in the same way that MP Ron 
Mark did (see Chapter Five) and also following the lead of McIntosh (2004). My intention here is 
not to deny the multiplicity of differences between Maori and Pasifika peoples (and indeed, 
between Pasifika peoples), but to highlight the way in which having brown skin can serve a sole 
indicator for assumptions made about one’s character. It is my argument that in the case of ‘killer 
kids’ it did serve in this way.  
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that he is of ‘other’ descent.94 At the same time, however, it was made abundantly 
clear that he was a resident of South Auckland; a place that is understood as a 
‘moral and cultural wasteland’ predominantly populated by brown ‘others’ (see 
McIntosh, 2004). I will examine this understanding in more detail in a moment. 
For now, I want to briefly discuss a correlation of the brown ‘other’ and 
criminality in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
The association between ethnicity and crime is a longstanding one, and is not 
exclusive to Aotearoa/New Zealand. Indeed, ethnic minorities disproportionately 
populate criminal justice systems across the western world (Walters & Bradley, 
2005; De Coster & Heimer, 2006). In Aotearoa/New Zealand, for example, Maori 
made up 41.5% of the total figure for criminal apprehensions in 2009, and 
Pasifika peoples made up 9%. These figures are significant given that Maori make 
up 14.6%, and Pasifika peoples 6.9%, of the total population (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2009). Studies have consistently shown that such disparities are not 
because minority groups are inherently criminogenic, but that they are a direct 
result of contextual factors such as economic marginalisation and social alienation 
(see Fergusson, Harwood, & Lynskey, 1993; White & Cunneen, 2006). However, 
such evidence often fails to repudiate the ways in which minorities are subject to 
racialisation in criminal justice processes, whereby the behaviour and misconduct 
of minority individuals and groups is explained on the basis of racial 
characteristics. It is, in other words, an understanding that these groups are more 
criminally inclined, by virtue of their ethnic origin (Walters & Bradley, 2005). 
Racialisation can lead to lead to over-policing and over-charging of minority 
groups, as well as disparities in convicting and sentencing when compared with 
majority populations (Collins, 2005; Quince, 2007; Jackson, 1988).  
 
This racialisation of minorities within the CJS is often seen as a reflection of – an 
extension of – racialisation in other social, cultural, and political spheres. The 
media is a particular target of critics concerns. Matheson (2007: 93), for example, 
finds: 
                                                
94 Bailey is of Rarotongan or ‘Cook Island Maori’ descent. 
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There is little evidence of biculturalism in news agendas, but rather a focus – 
consistent over time – on Maori as problems, criminal, radical, dangerous, exotic, 
deviant; that is, as a racialised ‘other’ in all the many manifestations of that status.  
 
Most commentators determine that this is because the mainstream media operates 
from a Pakeha perspective (Abel, 1997; McGregor, 1993; Wilson, 1990). When 
asked about their construction of crime stories, my respondents were similarly 
defensive of their practices:  
 
I feel that we report the story regardless of who is the victim and who is the 
perpetrator and regardless of their ethnicity. (Respondent C) 
 
I don’t think there’s an agenda. The closest you could get to saying there’s a bias is 
that in any newsroom there’s a certain amount of gallows humour. Occasionally 
you’ll reveal some evidence with regards to an offender and someone might say 
‘Maori or PI, aged between 18-25!’ (Respondent A)95 
 
Mainstream news and current affairs invariably comes from a mainstream Pakeha 
perspective and even if the reporter is not Pakeha, it is very difficult to tell stories 
from a non-mainstream perspective and still be considered any good at your job. 
(Respondent B) 
 
Yet other critics firmly locate a one-sided discourse deliberately aimed at 
maintaining Pakeha interests (see Walker, 2002). Indeed, the media is seen as 
explicitly active in a ‘civil surveillance’ of types insofar as a major feature of 
media treatment of Maori (in particular) is the scrutinizing of their activities, 
organisations, and aspirations (see Hodgetts, Masters, & Robertson, 2004; 
McCreanor, 1993; Walker, 1996). Similarly treacherous is when the media 
(among others) engages in ‘dog whistle’ politics where things are said in ways 
where ‘everybody knows’ what is really being said, simply because it can be 
difficult to erect a challenge against language that otherwise appears benign. I 
contend that this is exactly what occurred in the case of ‘killer kids.’ Further 
interrogation of the conflation of the link made between criminality and the brown 
                                                
95 ‘PI’ is shorthand for ‘Pacific Islander’.  
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‘other’ at this particular period finds that it was also a time where South Auckland 
was understood as a place where this relationship was at its most extreme.   
 
In Chapter Four I discussed how the associations between South Auckland and 
poverty, dysfunction, and crime had lent a valid excuse to the neighbours (to the 
property where the crime took place) for refusing Michael Choy’s pleas for help. I 
then suggested that the contradiction inherent in the sentencing Judge’s handing 
down of severe custodial sentences in light of the offender’s failure to get help 
was because the offenders were of South Auckland, whereas the neighbours were 
merely in it. Here, I want to substantiate the understanding of South Auckland as 
a deteriorating and dangerous place. Media columnist Michael Laws (2008) 
writes:   
 
Of course, South Auckland is not Afghanistan. Not yet. But it has become a 
whirlpool of dysfunction over the past 25 years and no amount of national nor civic 
interventions has made any difference. It harbours more socially alienated 
individuals than anywhere else in New Zealand. Even the acting mayor of Manukau 
[Gary Troup] admits that it is evil. That is also an unfortunate fact for the tens of 
thousands of its inhabitants who do not kill, rape, sell drugs, join gangs or bludge off 
the welfare state. They have to live among those that do and have their home 
portrayed as a sprawling, antipodean ghetto … this social cesspit … Damn it, these 
are the badlands. Full of bad people. 
 
Historically, South Auckland was a working class suburb; thriving with textile 
factories and meat processing plants, and populated with young families in low 
cost state housing. However, as McIntosh (2004) argues, as it was just such 
industries and families that bore the brunt of the 1970s oil crisis and the reforms 
and restructuring of the 1980s, South Auckland suffered greatly. It has since 
become something of a social laboratory; a prime site for researchers to uncover 
the realities of poverty, vulnerability, and marginalisation. This scrutiny, it is 
argued, only contributes to the stigma attached to the area (see McIntosh, 2004).   
 
Significantly, as suggested above, the face of South Auckland is chiefly 
understood as a brown one. Moreover, as McIntosh (2004) argues, there is no 
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particular ethnicity assigned to this ‘brown face’; it is presented as a homogenised 
face so as to suggest that the only variable that is important when talking about 
minority ethnic groups from South Auckland is their ‘otherness’ (or more aptly: 
their brownness). At times, especially when adopted by ‘Southsiders’ themselves, 
this homogenisation points towards a positive and unified character: “an 
urbanised Pan-Pacific identity that is connected by location (Aotearoa, South 
Auckland); by experience (colonisation, immigration, prejudice); by socio-
economic status and situation and by friendships based on social and musical 
bonds” (Zemke-White, 2001: 237; see also Borell, 2005). However, for the most 
part, and for those living outside its parameters, this ‘Pan-Pacific identity’ is 
overshadowed by “shallow, negative and marginalising representations” 
(McIntosh, 2004: 144).   
 
One of the most notorious representations to emerge is the South Auckland youth 
gang member; the unsupervised and socially disengaged teenager who spends his 
time with other unsupervised and disengaged teens tagging, doing crime, and 
defending his territory or ‘colours’ against other gangs (see Borell, 2005; 
McIntosh, 2004; “Streets of Shame,” 2006). Indeed, so powerful is this 
stereotype, it was suggested to have aided in the defence of Bruce Emery, a 50 
year-old man who had stabbed to death South Auckland youth Pihema Cameron 
in January 2008. Emery had caught a group ‘tagging’ his fence, and this so 
angered him, he returned to his house to get a knife and subsequently stabbed 
Pihema to death. He was later convicted of manslaughter.96 Perhaps more 
disturbing, however, is that South Auckland children, those younger than what is 
traditionally ascribed for the adolescent or ‘youth’, are often reported about in 
terms that suggest that they are prospective ‘gang members’; wayward, out of 
control, and idolizing their older siblings and others already established in gangs 
(see Callinan, 2007; “Police Say Youth Gangs,” 2005; Purdy, 2001; “Officials 
Meet Over Gang,” 2005). It is further alarming how these bleak and misguided 
assumptions perpetuate something of a self-fulfilling cycle. Director Juliet Veber, 
                                                
96 Incidentally, the SST would offer a disclaiming comment on their offender database where 
Bruce Emery’s name appeared: “In this case it was felt by many that the victim’s conduct 
substantially mitigated the offender’s conduct” (Sensible Sentencing Trust, 2009).  
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whose film Trouble is My Business followed the lives of three South Auckland 13 
and 14 year-olds for a school term at Aorere College, comments upon the way in 
which the provocative headlines about South Auckland kids affects: 
 
The kids’ self esteem was shockingly low and their sense of disempowerment about 
their lives was appalling at such a young age. They genuinely believed people from 
outside the area looked down on them, and I had to agree with them, I knew a lot of 
people did (Veber, 2009). 
 
My point in this section is that by making clear that Bailey Kurariki was a child of 
South Auckland, the media drew upon some deep-rooted connotations – what 
‘everybody knew’ – about this area so as to suggest that the associations between 
criminality and the brown ‘other’ were due to nothing other than the fact that 
these were ‘bad people’. In this sense, while the use of the term ‘killer’ 
sensationalised and dramatised the acts of one child, the classification of this child 
as New Zealand’s was a suggestion – simply because the child it held as the 
exemplar was understood as brown and innately bad – that brown children living 
outside of South Auckland had the propensity to be problematic, especially if they 
were also poor, and/or socially alienated in any manner. I consider in more detail 
later how this suggestion was informed by, but also superseded by, the location of 
the imagery of Bailey within the spectacle of the ‘other’ child.  
 
In the next section I discuss that alongside this ‘dog whistling’ act of the media 
would be the intensification of a punitive turn in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This 
would offer the discourse of moral reprisal another discursive tool – the doctrine 
of ‘common sense.’ I examine how, with this punitive turn, the criminality and 
brown ‘other’ relationship would once again come into focus, together with the 
construction of Rita Croskery as the archetypical victim-hero.  
 
Penal Populism  
 
‘Penal populism’ refers to a political discourse that champions the voice of the 
‘common man’ in penal affairs. Aotearoa/New Zealand is often seen as a case in 
point to demonstrate the influence of the penal populism as it has enjoyed 
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something of a ‘full house’ with respects to factors that cause the phenomena 
(Pratt, 2008a). Though democratic in principle, in practice it consists of the 
pursuit of policies that have little to do with reducing crime and promoting justice, 
and more to do with gaining an electoral advantage (see Bottoms, 1995; Roberts, 
Stalans, Indemaur, & Hough, 2003). However, Pratt (2008a) argues it represents 
more than merely ‘tapping in’ to populist concerns at intermittent times. It is, 
rather, a product of a realignment of power which now extends across much of the 
modern social landscape. What characterises this new axis of power is a stronger 
resonance between governments and extra-establishment individuals, groups, and 
organisations who claim to represent ‘the people’. In effect, this has often meant 
that rational argument is put aside in favour of public sentiment where issues of 
crime and punishment are concerned. Indeed, the central paradox that 
characterises a world-wide (rather, western-wide) trend towards punitive penal 
reform is that it bears little relationship to actual crime rates. Pratt (2007, 2008a) 
identifies several forces at work in the penal populist turn. I will overview these 
forces in brief before considering how the phenomenon would come into play in 
the episode of ‘killer kids’.  
 
The first force at work is the decline of deference – a decline in the assumption 
and acceptance of the authority of elite figures and establishment bodies to speak 
on behalf of ordinary people. Related to this decline in deference is a decline in 
trust of politicians and the political process itself. Pratt (2007, 2008a) argues that 
this is due, in part, to a perceived inability of political processes to respond to the 
needs of the constituency of ‘ordinary folk’. Pratt (2007, 2008a) attributes a third 
cause to a sense of ontological insecurity, a familiar argument in many respects in 
that it refers to the late-modern condition of ‘breakdown’ in formerly stable 
structures and pillars of security; that is, full employment, the nuclear family unit, 
religious practice, and community and trade union group membership; ingredients 
deemed essential for the binding of an individual to wider society and the 
transmission of a civic culture, have all but fallen to the wayside.  
 
Pratt (2006, 2008a) argues further, that combined with the new awareness of 
instability is an ever accelerating crime rate that has plagued all Western nations 
 156 
from the 1960’s through to the early 1990’s. As a result, demands for more 
stringent laws and harsher penalties became paramount in terms of restoring both 
the lost sense of trust unto the political processes and forging a sense of security 
where there now appeared little. However, where moves to respond were slow, or 
in variation to demand, further public disenchantment and insecurity have 
followed. As Pratt (2008a: 36) argues, under such circumstances “many citizens 
will be more likely to put their trust and support in those populist organisations 
and political movements which claim to have the solutions to such problems – 
magical, commonsense solutions usually based on invocations of some golden 
period in the past when social stability and social order was unquestioned”.  
 
Adding to this vicious circle is a media who depends upon ‘emotional’, 
sensational stories which serves to further the idea that the crime problem is acute, 
out of control, and requires drastic action while simultaneously making it clear 
that the criminal justice system is ill-equipped to cope. Pratt (2007, 2008a) further 
claims that the democratisation of the media whereupon the average citizen is 
able to participate in the news making process via developments in information 
technology means that broadcasting elites are more subject to alternate voices in 
the construction of knowledge of crime and other matters. Thus, objective expert 
analysis is often left aside as the experiences of those in the know – particularly 
those who have been victims of crime – and the emotive opinions of lay citizens 
become the framework through which crime and punishment is understood (Pratt, 
2008a; Pratt & Clarke, 2005).  
 
Perhaps the first and most astute observation one can make is that penal populism 
is marked by the very same underlying assumption of the concept of moral panic; 
that is, that the constructed problem is disproportional to the objective reality. 
Indeed, many of the prerequisites for this phenomenon can be wedded to the 
‘stages’ required by moral panic; a concerned constituency (a decline in 
deference), a view that something must be done (a decline in the trust of 
politicians and the political process), and the manning of moral boundaries by 
‘right-thinking’ people (trust in populist organisations with common-sense 
solutions) to be particular. Certainly, in the case of ‘killer kids’ the phenomenon 
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of penal populism can be seen as especially significant for the authority it 
afforded to the role of Rita Croskery and the SST in the containment phase.  
 
Pratt and Clarke (2005) discuss how penal populism gained momentum in New 
Zealand beginning with a general shift towards longer sentences and stricter 
parole requirements in the 1990s. Then in 1999 a Citizens Initiated Referendum 
(CIR) endorsing greater emphasis upon the needs of victims alongside harsher 
penalties for violent offenders won a 91.75 per cent public vote. This would 
become, argue Pratt and Clarke (2005: 305), a “regular referent” against which 
the subsequent Sentencing, Parole, and Victims Rights Acts of 2002 could be 
judged. These Acts in unison increased penalties, restricted parole, and extended 
the rights of (and broadened the category of) victims. Though developed amidst a 
law and order theme of the general election of 2002, which was not an unusual 
theme (a similar one was prevalent in the election of 1987), two factors would 
guarantee the Acts’ materialisation.   
 
First, most major political parties had taken a stance to be ‘tough’ on crime, and 
so in effect there was a political consensus to address the law and order issue in 
such a manner.97 Second, the SST (in particular) was gaining authority as a lobby 
group for tougher sentences. Pratt and Clarke (2005: 306) contend that the law 
and order component of the 2002 general election campaign was effectively led 
by the SST with “politicians running to catch up with their demands”. Indeed, in 
an article that considered the role of Garth McVicar and the SST in a campaign 
for harsher penalties for violent offenders, which also made much of his 
outspoken opposition to visits made by two All Blacks to Bailey in November 
2002, it was observed that he and the trust had become “an almost automatic 
media destination” (Gamble, 2002). This can account for why the exploitative 
stage of the amplification cycle was dominated by Rita and the SST, and why 
then, the threads that made up the discourse of criminal risk unfolded as reponses 
to the anti-expert, common-sensical, and emotional dialogue of the discourse of 
moral reprisal. In fact, the SST’s submission to the Law and Order select 
committee on the Young Offenders (serious crimes) Bill in July, 2006 exhibits the 
                                                
97 The Green party was not part of this consensus (Pratt & Clarke, 2005).  
 158 
intimacy between the two discourses in a way that is inimitable, at the same time 
as it reveals its alliances to the underbelly of neo-racist thinking active in the 
community. Its first section, for example, which describes the causes of 
delinquency and urgency for action, clearly reflects the discourse of moral 
reprisal’s thread of godzone gone wrong: 
 
Current policies are failing dramatically … New Zealand is experiencing a forty-
year crime epidemic and children have been particularly hit – often literally – but 
regardless of other circumstances contributing to the offending it is time society 
took stronger measures to protect itself against these serious young offenders. It is 
hoped that this will be a wake up call for the liberal sector of society that has 
promoted the disastrous social experiment that has destroyed the family unit 
(Sensible Sentencing Trust, July 2006: paras. 1, 5, 6). 
 
Intertangled with this statement would be a reference to the Kahui twins, who 
were killed by an unknown assailant in June, 2006, when they were three months 
old. Through drawing on this most recent example of the thread of feral children, 
the underclass, and South Auckland (the Kahui family lived in South Auckland, 
and the case was constructed in the media as one demonstrating the ‘problem 
equation’ of the brown ‘other’ and crime), the SST would signify that it was this 
sector of the population that their submission was concerned with.98 The reference 
is as follows:  
 
The reality is if the Kahui twins had not been murdered they would have ended up 
inextricably entwined in our Criminal Justice System later in life (Sensible 
Sentencing Trust, July, 2006: para. 3). 
 
In a second section, the submission focused more directly upon New Zealand’s 
‘disastrous’ approaches to youth crime. Here, the family group conference (FGC) 
is a particular target: 
 
Family Group Conferences are another disaster, the idea may have been well-
meaning but in reality they have been hijacked by the criminal fraternity and are a 
complete and utter farce that is making a mockery of our justice system. The 
                                                
98 This also reflects what Pratt (2006: 542) identifies as an “ethnic toxicity” inherent in penal 
populism.  
 159 
conference is normally held as close as possible to the offender’s residence to cause 
as little disruption to their lives, the victims are often required to travel, even 
through the victims is supposed to be consulted this rarely happens (sic). A typical 
family group conference will have the offender or offenders and their support people 
normally between 6-10, lawyers for the offenders (one for each) the victim and their 
support person. The offender’s family treats it as a special occasion and often bring 
KFC or McDonalds and everything that goes with it … A dismal failure without any 
consequences or accountability shown by the offender (Sensible Sentencing Trust, 
July 2006: paras. 10, 11, 12, 14). 
 
This attack upon the FGC especially brings into focus that the SST were targeting 
brown ‘others’. FGC’s were an initiative of the Children, Young Persons and their 
Families Act (1989) which sought to implement restorative principles that were 
congruent with traditional Maori approaches to justice (see Quince, 2007). The 
definitive aim was to support and maintain the family unit as the ongoing support 
system in which young people could address their offending, and to be inclusive 
of different cultural notions of the ‘family’ (such as extended whanau).99 Another 
aim was to divert young people from formal criminal proceedings, while still 
holding offenders accountable for their actions (Quince, 2007). A number of 
Maori scholars have since criticised the model, particularly for its promotion as a 
‘Maori process’ when its authenticity as just that was questionable, but also for its 
minimal role in the legal system as a whole (see Jackson, 1995; Tauri, 1996). The 
SST’s attack upon the FGC was from quite a different position; one that sought to 
undermine the Maori worldview of balance, harmony, and reparation that 
underpinned the model.  Indeed, it can be argued that the climate of penal 
populism allowed the SST – via a pretence of common-sense justice initiatives – 
to launch a fervent critique towards a political initiative designed to negate the 
biases of the criminal justice system that had in the past contributed to a 
disproportionate number of Maori and Pasifika young people coming before the 
formal court (see Walters & Bradley, 2005).  
 
In quite a different (but ultimately comparable) vein, a variable lending weight to 
Rita Croskery’s voice was her role as a mother. Indeed, this is a role that appears 
                                                
99 Whanau is the Maori term for family. 
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to be the prerequisite in Aotearoa/New Zealand for the status of ‘victim-hero’. 
The precondition for the CIR of 1999 (which, as argued, provided the political 
fodder upon which the Sentencing, Parole and Victims Rights Acts were 
constructed) for example, was the 1997 attack on the mother of Christchurch 
shopkeeper Norm Withers. As Pratt and Clarke (1995: 314) argue, the attack “was 
able to provide the appropriate link between public anger over crime and the 
reforms to the democratic process: his mother seemed the archetypical victim – 
defenceless, innocent and randomly and brutally attacked”.100 In the next section I 
examine how the role of the mother is often employed in the construction of both 
the villain and the victim-hero and how indeed it was for both in the case of 
‘killer kids’. 
 
A tale of two mothers 
In Imagining Crime: Textual Outlaws and Criminal Conversations, Allison 
Young (1996: 147) traces the progression of governmental and criminological 
discourses that “pick out the figure of the single mother as the contemporary 
embodiment of responsibility for the criminal child” which follows the “figure of 
the mother [who is] made a scapegoat for the failure of investment in the link 
between community and child” and it is within this that she locates two of the 
dominant explanations for delinquent youth in responses to the Bulger murder; the 
absence of the father and the alleged inadequacy of maternal care. Similarly, in 
this case, aiding the distinctions between Bailey and his victim Michael Choy, 
much was made of their mothers who were depicted in opposite terms. Rita 
Croskery (Mr. Choy’s mother), for example, was shown not only to fulfil 
maternal expectations, but to go beyond them – beyond the grave – in her crusade 
to keep her son’s killers behind bars. This is best illustrated with her pledge to 
continue campaigning against parole after Bailey had been granted home 
detention in an article poignantly headlined “Mum’s marathon mission stretches 
on” (Binning, 2008):  
 
                                                
100 This trend would continue. In 2009 it was the mother of murder victim Sophie Elliot who 
commanded the spotlight.  
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I’m doing it for Michael, because that’s what I said to him [when he died] – that I 
would do what I could to keep these people behind bars for as long as possible … 
People think just because that little brat [Kurariki] is out now that is the end of it but 
it’s not (Rita Croskery cited in Binning, 2008).  
 
Bailey’s mother Lorraine West, on the other hand, was exposed for her less than 
adequate care of Bailey and his seven siblings. Described – by none other than 
Garth McVicar of the SST – as “a factory for producing out-of-control kids” 
(McVicar cited in Batchelor, 2003), she would defend her practices though 
recounting her parenting in material terms; “[making] sure they had a shower 
every day and changed their clothes” (West cited in Wellwood, 2002), and “I 
always make sure there’s food in the house, the rent’s paid and the place is clean” 
(West cited in Wall, 2002a). In hindsight, she wondered if she should have 
employed physical punishment (Wall, 2002a). Adding to this, the media would 
employ a series of particularly idiomatic utterances made by Mrs. West to confirm 
that this was a woman far removed from the likes of Rita Croskery. Indeed, 
attempting to explain his behaviour in the context of a violence free home, she 
argued “I think I never beated him or was cruel to him” (West cited in “Child 
Killer Smart,” 2002). Later, admitting that her son had been misbehaving in one 
of the youth justice centres in which he was held, she was quoted that he was just 
“answering back and that” (West cited in “Youngest Killer Will Not,” 2005).    
 
Operating as a backcloth to these class-maternal differences was a clear 
Pakeha/Other dichotomy. However, here the relation was by proxy, through each 
of the women’s marital partners. For both women, these intimate associations 
would locate them in terms of inclusiveness and exclusiveness within 
‘mainstream’ Aotearoa/New Zealand. Bailey’s mother, for example, was a Pakeha 
woman who had married Bailey Kurariki Senior with whom she had four 
children, but, as it was condescendingly put, she had also had four children “to 
another Rarotongan” (Wall, 2002a). She was thus a woman who would have 
appreciation for the complexities of being a brown ‘other’ in a Pakeha world; her 
worldview would not therefore be one necessarily related to by the 
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‘mainstream’.101 Michael Choy’s mother, by contrast, was an Asian woman 
married to Pakeha Ken Croskery. Why this is notable is because at the same time 
as the South Auckland stereotype was emerging as the ‘criminogenic other’, there 
was observed amongst the ‘mainstream’ an ill-ease with a growing Asian 
immigrant population. This was coined, colloquially, as the ‘inv-Asian’, and was 
propelled with a media depiction of the Asian as the ‘mysterious other’ (Butcher 
& Spoonley, 2009; Hannis, 2009). It is significant then, that Rita’s Asian heritage 
would not be mentioned; that seemingly – via her relationship – her ‘New 
Zealand-ness’ (and, incidentally, her qualification to speak on behalf of ‘New 
Zealanders’) would go unquestioned.  
 
It is additionally significant how the two women were constructed visually. 
Lorraine West, for example, was initially depicted as a ‘wild’ and unkempt 
woman with facial contortions of unbridled anger, suggesting a lack of self 
control (see Wellwood, 2002). In more recent imagery she appears physically ill 
(indeed she is) and emotionally defeated (“Bailey Kurariki’s Mum: ‘I’d,” 2010). 
Rita Croskery, on the other hand, was (and continues to be) routinely presented in 
demure poses with pensive expressions (see Binning, 2008), or with commanding, 
authoritative posture (see “Victim’s Mum Wants Criminals,” 2008). The lighting 
tends to be soft in these images; in stark contrast to the harsh illumination in 
Lorraine West’s pictures.       
 
This brings me back to the point of the initiation for this study. As argued, it was 
an encounter with the media presentation of the imagery of Bailey Kurariki and an 
observation, thereafter, of a marked social reaction resembling a moral panic that 
caught my attention and has sustained the impetus for a revised approach to moral 
panic. In Chapter Five I examined the construction of the imagery in relation to 
news values as it was subject to some extraordinary timing, a series of legal 
decisions and the accusative argument of the crown. I want to now engage with 
the imagery as a specific form of communication within a context of an image 
proliferated society, or society of spectacle; the third of the social phenomena in 
                                                
101 She could also be understood, morally, as a particular kind of woman, having had two sets of 
babies to two ‘Rarotongans’. That Rita Croskery was on her second marriage was not mentioned.  
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attendance in this episode. From the dichotomised interpretation of the imagery of 
Bailey, together with the notion that evil was present, I will propose that it (the 
imagery) occupied a space between the immediacy of vision, the ‘truth’ of 
photography, and the deception of appearance. Crucially, it will be seen in this 
space that the understanding that brown faces were problematic was informed by 
an entrenched and complex backdrop of a viewing the brown ‘other’. 
 
A Society of Spectacle  
 
It is not difficult to locate the significance of images and imagery in the 
construction of late-modern social life. Some scholars for example, argue that we 
are a ‘visual culture’ in which there are “particular and historically specific 
combinations of meanings and subjects” (Evans & Hall, 1999: 6) privileged by 
the technical unit of the image (Lister & Wells, 2001; Mirzoeff, 1999). Others 
assert that we have always been visual; what are new are the regimes in which we 
make and distribute images and the questions we ask of the visual object (see Bal, 
2003). Post-modern and post-structuralist thinkers take it further, identifying the 
aestheticisation of everyday life which refers, in part, to “the rapid flow of signs 
and images which saturate the fabric of everyday life in contemporary society” 
(Featherstone, 1991: 67) in which the traditional distinction between reality and 
the image is disrupted (see Baudrillard, 1983). Others suggest the late-modern era 
is one of a society of ‘spectacle’, which more concretely describes “a media and 
consumer society organised around the production and consumption of images, 
commodities, and staged events” (Kellner, 2003: 2; see also Debord, 1967).  
 
Whichever conjecture one accepts, it follows that as receivers, constituents – 
consumers, we place value upon the act of looking at the same time as we expect 
to see, for ourselves (McGregor, 2002b; Holland, 2002). This is substantiated and 
entrenched by the immediacy of images in relation to written text. Barthes (1973: 
110) argues:  
 
Pictures … are more imperative than writing, they impose meaning at one stroke, 
without analysing or diluting it. 
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This will become important in a moment. Aside, this immediacy can explain why, 
for the commercial media – television in particular – words are written to the 
pictures or ‘opening shots’; they (words) are secondary to what the eye has 
already witnessed. Yet, at the same time, the act of looking is said to be ‘impure’. 
As Bal (2003: 9) argues, ‘looking’ is “inherently framed, framing, interpreting, 
affect-laden, cognitive and intellectual” or the “look of the knowing subject” 
(Foucault, 1975: ix). In other words, there is always a level of understanding 
brought to what we ‘see’ and this is both for the unit of the imagery (a 
photograph, a painting, a sculpture) and for what that imagery depicts.  
 
The photograph presents as unique in this respect as it appears as a literal-
transcription of the real; a stand in for what is seen by the human eye (Hall, 1981; 
Holland, 2002; Lister & Wells, 2001). The photograph thus denies itself as a 
representation (Barthes, 1977). However, because photographs occupy multiple 
genres, the degree to which a photograph is read as reflection, as opposed to 
illustration, is dependent upon its immediate context (a newspaper, a billboard, a 
family album), an understanding of the photographer’s intention, and the 
aesthetic, emotional, and imaginative sensibilities of the viewer (see Barthes, 
1977; Hall, 1980; Holland, 2002; Rose, 2001). Such sensibilities, or the process of 
‘active viewing’, can often overpower the intended message. As Biber (2007: 6) 
observes:  
 
Photographs … they remind us of happy moments with our family, nostalgic 
reflections, memories of places we have been, disastrous images of places we never 
want to go, people we hope never to meet, our obsessions, our dark desires and our 
fears.  
 
The crimino-legal complex, however, endures nothing of photography’s manifold 
tenure nor allows for the rich scope of reception.102 The law, for example “looks 
at photographs as if there were nothing impeding its capacity to see” (Biber, 2007: 
5). Thus, though crime’s images have always been burdened with a sense of 
                                                
102 Young (1996) refers to the crimino-legal complex as the intersection between criminology, 
criminal law, criminal justice, the media, and everyday experience; that which makes up the 
collective cultural conception of crime.  
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‘staging’, partly as criminal acts tend to take place outside of public view (and 
thus, our witnessing of such events takes place after the fact and via mediated 
representations), and partly as the construction of ‘real’ crime is deeply entangled 
with constructions of fictional crime (see Ferrell & Websdale, 1999), they are the 
most analogous with ‘truth’; they are evidential.  
 
The same can be argued of news photographs. Just as written ‘news’, perhaps 
even more so by virtue of its ability to ‘see’, photojournalism is underwritten with 
neutrality and objectivity (Hall, 1981; Holland, 2002). This works to suppress 
both the construction at its site (setting, lighting, arrangement, author, subject) and 
dismiss the professional knowledge of the ‘decisive moment’ whereby the 
photographer seeks to ‘capture’ their subjects – often off-guard – at a moment that 
conveys the essence of the scene (Holland, 2002).  
 
Bailey’s imagery was feasibly read first and foremost as news imagery. It was 
therefore invested with assumptions regarding its authenticity, its objectivity, its 
truth. It is rare, however, that a news image will appear without linguistic 
supports which offer a preferred meaning on behalf of the encoder and serve to 
anchor the interpretation (Hall, 1980; Hall, 1981; Benjamin, 1980). Here the label 
‘New Zealand’s youngest killer’ performs such a task. While it was visually true 
that this was a child, who often smiles, who sometimes looks curiously up at the 
camera, who cries and bites his lips as he stands in the dock, via the attachment of 
the label it was also true that this was a killer. Indeed, through the anchorage of it 
as a crime image – it was evidence of a killer. In the next section I examine how 
this evidence would be fortified by a ‘regime of representation’ that depicts brown 
‘others’ in terms that maintain an ongoing colonial project.  
 
The spectacle of the other child 
Hall (1997) argues that representation – the first key ‘moment’ in the cultural 
circuit – is a complex practice both at the point of production (or encoding) and at 
the point of reception (or decoding). This is particular when it deals with aspects 
of ‘difference’; it engages emotions and mobilises anxieties at points and 
intensities that are not always easy to make sense of (see also Biber, 2007). The 
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face of Bailey Kurariki belongs both to the social space in which the image of the 
child is practised, and within which the representation of a brown ‘other’ is 
understood in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Hall (1997) identifies such spaces as 
regimes of representation.  
 
Earlier in this chapter I argued that the category of the child is permeated by 
notions of innocence, vulnerability, and dependence, and that we ‘work’, via 
various means of socialisation, to maintain this ideal. One of the ways in which 
we do this is through our images of children. Davies (1997) argues that in 
conjunction with the professional discourses of regulation and protection, images 
of the idealised child – from British royal princes and princesses to child stars of 
Hollywood to winners of local baby shows – proliferated popular culture and 
consumption as the 20th Century progressed. Holland (2004) contends that as a 
result childhood has become an elaborate drama in which real children perform 
roles, emulating the images of themselves around them, and of which adults seek 
to continually recreate in their making of family memories (with pictures). This 
authority of imagery in relation to the socialisation of children has, however, 
some negative aspects. Children are afforded very little agency, for instance, in 
terms of how they are depicted to others. Moreover, these depictions can move 
outside the terrain of idealised childhood, and indeed, outside ‘our’ conscious 
control.103  
 
Bailey’s imagery does not stray from how one should portray a child; his captured 
expressions and mannerisms the epitome of childlike responses. Indeed, he was 
actively viewed as a ‘face of an angel’; an expression that could only be reserved 
for the quintessential idealised child. The anchorage of him as a ‘killer’, however, 
inhibits the interpretation of such a child. It suggests that there is a profound 
deception inherent to the image, reminiscent of Satan’s ability to present himself 
as an ‘angel of light’ (2 Cor. 11:14, Revised Standard Version). What was 
evident, this implied, was the presence of evil.  
                                                
103 Greer and Jewkes (2005) suggest, for example, that part of the reason we ‘panic’ about the risk 
of paedophilia may be as we simutaneously tolerate, even enjoy, the overt sexualization of 
children in commercial endeavours.   
 167 
 
This is an important variable in the development of a moral panic. The notion of 
‘evil in one’s midst’ works to collapse the complexity of events to terms of a basic 
confrontation between ‘them’ and ‘us’, and necessitates that ‘they’ be expelled for 
the protection of the social order (de Young, 2004; Eldridge, Kitzinger, & 
Williams, 1997; Muncie, 1999). However, there is usually a laboured process of 
demonisation as part of that sequence. As Ingebretsen (2001: 52) argues, folk 
devils are typically “victims of metonymy and metaphor, prey to sloppy habits of 
public thinking, linguistic failure and a narrative rush to closure”. The ‘dog 
whistling’ act on behalf of the media as it identified ‘New Zealand’s youngest 
killer’ as a South Auckland child can be seen as an example of such inventory. 
However, this was almost unnecessary, as via the imagery there was immediacy to 
the interpretation of malevolence. Moreover, it was completed by the regime of 
representation in which the brown ‘other’ is understood. 
 
Literature concerned with the development of the ‘practices of exhibition’ of 
things Maori (McCarthy, 2007) and of things Pasifika (Suaalii, 2000) speak of the 
‘colonial gaze’. This ‘gaze’ refers to a historical practice whereby adult Maori and 
Pasifika peoples were exoticised and fragmented into the specific gender 
caricatures of the warlike ‘savage’ and the sexually appealing and accessible 
‘dusky maiden’ (see Mikaere, 1994; Paraha, 1993; Suaalii, 2000; Walker, 1990). 
Importantly, such caricatures were not limited to things ‘seen’; indeed, their 
symbolism permeated both fictional and scientific colonial discourses where they 
worked to justify colonialism by emphasizing the binary of civilised and barbaric 
(see Moorehead, 1987; Spoonley, 1988; Walker, 1990).  
 
Many commentators argue that this distortive gaze remains operative, permeating 
through contemporary representations and narratives of the brown ‘other’.104 It is 
also argued that brown children are not immune to its prescriptions. Hokowhitu 
(2004), for example, locates the notion that Maori and Pasifika men are naturally 
physical and athletic as a definitive ‘recasting’ of the savage. He then suggests 
                                                
104 The racialised notion that brown ‘others’ are more criminogenic than their white-faced brothers 
is arguably supported with, if not wholly composed by, the idea of the ‘savage’.  
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that the over-representation of Maori and Pasifika boys in high school sports 
academies, which in turn are said to ‘suit’ their ‘natural practicalities’, is evidence 
the understanding of the brown ‘other’ as inherently physical is not restricted to 
commentary about adult rugby stars (see also Te’evale, 2001). Others lament 
about the self-perpetuating cycle this understanding sets in motion; noting in 
particular the ‘hero’ status accorded to these rugby stars in the absence of 
alternate male role models for young brown boys. Misa (2005), for instance, 
argues: 
 
It bothers me that our kids’ horizons seem limited to either to gangsta rappers or 
football players … Not everyone can become Tana Umaga and it doesn’t get us far 
enough away from the image of the staunch, take-no-prisoners brown male … The 
problem for Maori and Pacific Island boys is that they’re not encouraged to define 
themselves in any other way … it’s not that [alternate role models] aren’t out there, 
it’s that our boys don’t seem to know they’re there. And neither, it would seem, does 
the rest of society.  
 
Conflating this notion that Maori and Pasifika children are more ‘physically 
inclined’ is an indicator that they are perpetual academic underachievers. Phillips 
and Mitchell (2010) argue that historically, these groups have not ‘fared well’ 
under Aotearoa/New Zealand’s mainstream school system, and are more likely to 
leave school earlier with fewer qualifications, than do Pakeha children. Despite 
extensive research that demonstrates that brown children do achieve when 
schooled in culturally appropriate environments, this notion effectively reduces 
teacher expectations of them, which, in turn, creates another cycle of self-
perpetuation (Phillips & Mitchell, 2010; Rubie-Davies, Hattie, & Hamilton, 
2006). Further, education scholar Linda Smith (1996) suggests that brown 
children are expected to behave differently to Pakeha children; they are the more 
wild and uncontrollable students. She attributes this to a range of complex factors, 
from historical assumptions about the native (and therefore untamed) subject, to 
the more tangible effects of poverty and disempowerment upon Maori (in 
particular) communities.  
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From another vein, the brown child is often cast as the tragic victim, at the hands 
of the savage. Jackson (see Judd, 2007), for example, claims that the media 
disproportionately places focus on instances of Maori and Pasifika child abuse 
and neglect, assigning negligible attention to cases where the victims and 
perpetrators are Pakeha (see also Hokowhitu, 2007). Indeed, in the wake of the 
death of the Kahui twins in 2006, columnists were quick to cite the cases of 
Decilia Witika, James Whakaruru, Hinewaoriki Karaitiana-Matiaha (Lillybing), 
and Tangaroa Matiu as they claimed a horrific trend of child killings in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, knowing it is these faces that the public have been 
witness to and will remember, and not those of Timothy Nelson, Natalie Wilson, 
or the Nelson twins of 2004 (Coddington, 2006; Laws, 2006; Woodham, 2006).105 
106 107  
 
These arguments would suggest that despite Bailey’s appearance as the 
quintessential ‘angelic’ child, he was never going to be understood in quite the 
same way that he would had he been a different child; say, a white-faced child. 
While brown children are subject, like all children, to the spectacle we create as 
part of our practices of constructing childhood, they are also vulnerable to a 
racialised regime of representation that draws upon and maintains the operation 
of the colonial gaze in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This regime intimates that there is 
an ‘other’ childhood where children are understood as inherently physical, as 
underachievers, as wild and uncontrollable, and as tragic victims of their violent 
carers. Each time a brown child is represented in terms of these understandings a 
spectacle of the ‘other child’ emerges, one that reinforces for the observer that 
these children do not quite fit the mould of the imagined idealised child.   
                                                
105 The first group of children I mention here are of Maori or Pasifika descent; the second group 
are Pakeha children. I explain the case of Kahui twins in the section on penal populism earlier in 
this chapter.  
106 One commentator, on the back of this apparent divergence, and referring specifically to Maori, 
went so far to suggest that it was time for the re-introduction of eugenics: “…many Maori parents 
do not possess the parenting skills to properly care and cater for their children. Letting these 
people have kids is an invitation to tragedy” (Laws, 2006).  
107 From here it is not hard to imagine how the stereotype of the South Auckland gang member 
takes hold: he is the tragic victim almost all grown up – emulating and ultimately becoming the 
savage himself (see Wall, 1995, 1997).  
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The point of the discussion here is that it is a ‘knowing subject’ that looks upon 
the body of the young brown male, presented in truth and offered as evidence. 
The imagery of Bailey was neither an expose of innocence corrupted, nor was it a 
vision of deception. Indeed, it was in spite of an angelic appearance; it was proof 
that brown children could be ‘savage’. It can be argued, therefore, that these 
images were far more formidable in locating the problem to some children than 
the identification of ‘New Zealand’s youngest killer’ as a child of South Auckland 
– which suggested that mini-monsters were likely to be brown-faced – could ever 
be.  
 
The Context of a Panic  
 
In this chapter I have focused upon exploring the social and cultural context of 
Aotearoa/New Zealand across the early to mid 2000s in an attempt to answer the 
first of the ‘bigger questions’ of this moral panic – why. My contention is that the 
presence of three intersecting social phenomena supported the materialisation of 
the real-type features facilitating the amplification cycle. These phenomena were 
the demonisation of children via race/space relations, a punitive turn characterised 
by a realignment of power, and a society of spectacle in which the other is 
exhibited through a racialised regime of representation. Embedded in such a 
context, it can be seen why the imagery of Bailey Kurariki was central to the 
episode of ‘killer kids’ as a whole. The capture of an image of a brown child 
appearing angelic as he sat in court for his part in a deplorable crime could only 
resonate where a regime of representation concerning brown children constructs 
anything but an angelic figure. The label then thrust upon this child would 
confirm the sharp end of an understanding of the other as the ‘criminal other’. 
Ultimately, together, the understandings constructed unto the image and the label 
would be adopted as verification that this society was facing inundation with 
‘mini-monsters’ propelled by an aggrieved mother and a lobby group that was 
gaining authority as the voice of ‘ordinary folk’ concerned with alleged 
deficiencies in the criminal justice system.  
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I want to now consider how the real-type episode, across the three tiers of the 
approach inspired by Fairclough’s (1995b) framework for Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), can be captured by Cohen’s (1972) opening paragraph, or 
whether there are significant departures signifying that the ideal-type concept of 
moral panic is challenged by this case. To aid memoire, Cohen’s (1972) 
paragraph is as follows:   
 
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by 
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or 
(more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates 
and becomes more visible (Cohen, 1972: 1). 
 
Viewing the case of ‘killer kids’ in these terms it can be seen that the trajectory 
was largely archetypical of a moral panic. Bailey Kurariki and his counterparts 
were defined as a threat to moral decency, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ‘godzone’ 
reputation, and the immediate safety of ordinary law-abiding folk. The nature of 
the threat was orchestrated via the presentation of a set of images in which the 
quintessential child was amalgamated with the culturally constructed criminal 
other. Newspaper editors, broadcasters, prison officials, and child-welfare experts 
called for immediate preventative action, while a media-savvy lobby group with a 
model victim-hero at its helm would denigrate Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ‘world-
leading’ youth justice system while calling for justice for Michael Choy. A private 
members Bill was put forth to parliament to criminalize children from twelve 
years of age. The episode comes to a close on the heels of Bailey’s release from 
jail and as the Bill to criminalise children is rejected. Thus, interestingly, it is not 
so much that the analysis of the real-type demonstrates that there was anything 
errant about it in ideal-type terms. What it suggests – perhaps confirms – is that 
the model is far more descriptive than it is formulaic.  
 
This can be seen in that outside of these terms, and by employing the three-part 
analysis of content, process, and context, a more complex picture emerges than 
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the ideal-type model allows for. First, this episode spanned three countable 
discourses and two conceptual phases. Second, the amplification cycle (the order 
of discourse in an internal sense) – that would lend itself to the development of 
the discourse of moral reprisal – was underpinned by a set of real-type features. 
Third, it was the relationship of those features with three intersecting social 
phenomena that afforded them their interpretative muscle. None of these nuances, 
however, offer any kind of formative challenge to Cohen’s (1972) description of 
moral panic in his opening paragraph of Folk Devils.   
 
This challenges my assumption that the ideal-type concept can be rethought in 
relation how real-type episodes materialise. At the same time it has some 
implications for how to conjecture what moral panics can be seen as extreme 
examples of; the first ‘big’ question in the project of rethinking moral panic. 
Recall that in Chapter Two (and in the opening paragraphs of this chapter) I 
argued that the intimacy between the ideal-type and real-types circumscribed that 
there was an intimacy between why panics happen (the contextual question of 
real-types) and what they might be seen as extreme examples of (the theoretical 
question of the ideal-type). In Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter for this 
dissertation, I explain how, despite the confirmation of Cohen’s (1972) model as 
heuristic, the contextual location of killer kids – why it occurred – is indeed 
important to the theoretical location of moral panics, and why then the real-
type/ideal-type approach, via a three tiered model of analysis, was significant 
nonetheless.  
 
Preceding this, I want to bend the rules for a moment and move outside of the 
sample to consider how Bailey Kurariki and his imagery would remain 
newsworthy long after the episode came to a close. As argued, the episode of 
‘killer kids’ concluded with the release of Bailey from jail in April 2008, which 
was closely followed by the rejection of the Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) 
Bill. Despite this, Bailey’s movements were still making news through to the time 
of writing (May, 2010). Just after his release, for example, the front page of the 
Herald on Sunday sported an image of a 19-year-old Bailey standing in a 
backyard paddling pool talking on a mobile phone, with the headline “Youngest 
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killer’s lavish new life” (Meng-Yee, 2008).108 The attending text was similarly 
condescending about Bailey’s changed conditions, and about whom it was that 
found these offensive:  
 
Kurariki might be on home detention, but he isn’t missing out on much. Since being 
released a fortnight ago the 19-year-old baby-faced killer has had KFC, Burger King 
and pizza delivered most nights to the secret Auckland address where he’s staying. 
At his birthday party on the day he was released, he was presented with gifts 
including a $180 pair of shoes, a stereo and a playstation console. For Rita Croskery, 
the mother of Kurariki’s victim, it’s a difficult pill to swallow. ‘What this boy needs 
is hard work and discipline, not to be handed things on a plate. How is that going to 
teach him anything?’ (Meng-Yee, 2008).  
 
Inherent in this article, particularly with the emphasis upon the ‘rewards’ Bailey 
appeared to be enjoying, is the discourse of criminal risk’s discursive thread of 
just deserts. This is perhaps not altogether unexpected given the media ‘story’ had 
for nearly six years (the containment phase of the episode) focused upon the 
paradoxes of punishment and the uncertain practices and outcomes of 
rehabilitation. Nevertheless, Mrs. Croskery was not off the mark in her implicit 
prediction that Bailey could again land himself in trouble. Indeed he has. 
However, just as Cohen (1972) observed that the response to the initial deviance 
creates a second order of deviance (the central paradox of moral panics), largely, 
this trouble has been provoked by the media. In the closing months of 2009 for 
example, Bailey was again facing a jail term; convicted of wilfully damaging the 
television camera of a reporter that had been following him. In February 2010, the 
Herald on Sunday ran the headline “Child killer becomes sex pest”. Precluding 
this latest incident was a visit by two female reporters to Bailey’s home intending 
to interview him about his time in jail. Thereupon they filed a complaint with the 
police claiming that Bailey had acted in an erratic and distressing manner, had 
exposed himself to them and attempted to ‘grope’ them as they left. At the time of 
writing this alleged incident is still before the courts. Nevertheless, its unfolding 
was somberly assessed soon after by one commentator as yet another chapter in 
the relentless pursuit of Bailey by the media throughout the episode: 
                                                
108 The Herald on Sunday is the Sunday edition of The New Zealand Herald. 
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If Bailey Junior Kuraiki becomes a hardened lifetime criminal, as now seems 
inevitable, then I’m afraid my fellow journalists will have to accept a large measure 
of responsibility … Of the six who were convicted [for the murder of Michael 
Choy], Kurariki was singled out for continued media attention solely because of his 
age. I would have thought this very factor was a compelling reason to leave him 
alone, so he might have had some chance of rehabilitation away from the public eye. 
In fact the exact reverse happened … I hope the two Herald on Sunday journalists 
feel pleased with themselves … This is not the New Zealand media’s proudest 
moment (Du Fresne, 2010).  
 
Putting aside that this assessment supports my claim of a misaligned focus upon 
Bailey, my point here is that the media continue to pursue the story beyond the 
boundaries of the observable moral panic. Inversely this suggests that panic 
processes are not soley dependent upon media whims and cycles of attention. 
However, it also suggests that the social and cultural conditions that have 
provided the backdrop for panic to flourish and take hold remain operative; that 
the salience of the ‘story’ beyond the stages of description continues simply 
because the demonisation of children via race/space relations, a punitive turn 
characterised by a realignment of power, and a society of spectacle in which the 
other is exhibited through a racialised regime of representation have not 
dissipated. Indeed, the episode – as an instance of social practice, affecting – has 
arguably contributed to their durability. Why then, is there not a permanent state 
of panic? How do conditions of panic submerge and become (as Cohen peculiarly 
puts it) more visible? In the next chapter I put forth an idea that suggests that why 
the conditions – in this case – were susceptible to moral panic can also account for 
why panics are manifestly acute or volatile.  
 
I want to end this chapter, and the empirical analysis of this case study, with a rare 
insight from Bailey himself in relation to the prolific press attention he remains 
subject to. Speaking to a noted campaigner against the populist punitive turn, Kim 
Workman, he argues:  
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Have you ever been to the rubbish tip? You know how the seagulls hover around 
picking at the choice bits? Well, it feels like I’m the rubbish and the media are the 
seagulls (Kurariki cited in Workman, 2008).109  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
109Across all sources, this is the only evidence of Bailey speaking. It is, perhaps, a bittersweet 
paradox that his parole conditions upon release from prison in 2008 included ‘no contact with the 
media’ (Vass, 2008). 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Killer Kids, Moral Panic, and the Economy of Excess 
 
  
This dissertation has been about moral panic. It has been about a case of moral 
panic and it has been about how the concept might regain authority as a 
sociological idea. Guiding the study have been two proposals. The first proposal 
was that the study of any real-type case of panic must be situated within its 
context; its socio-cultural-political environment. This is in order to understand 
why the episode in question occurred. The second proposal was that there needs to 
be more consideration of the relationship between real-type panics and their 
contexts with the concept of moral panic; the ideal-type. This is important as a 
more intricate understanding of why panics happen is crucial for imagining what 
moral panic may be an extreme example of, and thereupon how the concept might 
be employed for a more developed understanding of acute and volatile social 
reactions.   
 
In the first section of this concluding chapter I summarize the development of 
these proposals in relation to the discussions in Chapter One (Moral Panic), 
Chapter Two (Rethinking Moral Panic) and Chapter Three (Methodology). In the 
second section I look at what has been uncovered about the episode of ‘killer 
kids’ that erupted in the early 2000s and extended across the socio-political 
landscape in Aotearoa/New Zealand until the latter part of the decade. I consider 
how the answer to why this episode materialised can inform how moral panic 
might be explained. In the third section I reflect upon my approach to moral panic 
via a framework inspired by Fairclough’s (1995b) Critical Discourse Analysis as a 
methodology for ‘rethinking moral panic’. Last, I offer a suggestion for how to 
keep in check volatile and extreme social reactions such as moral panics and how, 
relatedly, we might negate the problem of ‘normativity’ that has long plagued 
panic research.  
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Building Proposals 
 
In Chapter One I argued that all three of the foundational works on moral panic 
(Cohen, 1972; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2004a, b; Hall et al., 1978) clearly 
demonstrated that there was an intimacy between the development of the concept 
and the real-life reactions it sought to describe. Nevertheless, a transferable 
sociological tool with which to trace similarities between real-type episodes 
remained valuable to more or less of a degree. This was reflected most in Cohen’s 
(1972) formulation of a ‘model’ and in Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (2004a, b) 
categorisation of ‘types’ determined by motivation and interest (grassroots, 
interest-group, and elite). I concluded that the preservation of a transferable ideal-
type concept was desirable. Indeed, it is this transferability that has lent the 
concept its extraordinary longevity as a sociological tool.  
 
This success, however, has also proved problematic for panic research. Indeed, 
the variable behaviours, conditions, persons, and groups of persons to what and to 
whom panic has been applied has – nearly forty years on – left its meaning 
somewhat diluted, generalised, and non-specific. Several substantial critiques 
have also weakened its authority. As discussed in Chapter One, it is argued that 
moral panic is a polemic idea rather than a neutral analytical concept. I argued 
that interpretations differ as to what part of the reaction is delineated by the 
analyst as ‘irrational’, and that my own reading was that it was the overall 
outcome of the amplicatory processes of panic that can be seen as ‘out of order’ 
and disproportional. It is also argued that the panic concept does not adequately 
capture the variety of reactions that can follow a moral assertion, and that a 
diversified media environment makes it more difficult to untangle the 
relationships between a commercial press, political strategies, and interest group 
campaigns. I saw that this would mean that the task of deconstruction was perhaps 
more imperative than for previous accounts, in previous eras. A further 
prerequisite that we are to be vigorous in our assessments was the appearance of 
‘risk’ problems as the boundaries between issues assessed as ‘risky’ and concerns 
about the ‘moral’ order are often blurred. Panic assessments also vary in how they 
account for the role of the public. Some argue that media attention equates to 
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public attention, while others contend that panic participants are invited through 
recruiting discourses. Yet because the public tend to be peripheral in policy 
making generally, a more convincing argument was that the public are an invoked 
party, present only in references made via other parties. Further, moral panics are 
often argued to be dependent upon some form of social ‘anxiety’. I argued that 
this is especially problematic as ‘anxiety’ is notoriously difficult to determine and 
to quantify, and in relying on it as a explanatory variable panic research then tends 
to place too much attention on what panics do instead of thoroughly investigating 
their cause.  
 
Despite my responses to these critiques I saw that a first step towards renewing 
the study of moral panic was a need to appraise the ideal-type in relation to real-
type panics as they materialise in present-day contexts that are different to that in 
which the original idea was formulated. Part of my impetus for this exercise was 
to engage with the debates emerging in a developing project of ‘rethinking moral 
panic’. In the Introduction I noted that this was the ‘age of moral panic’ 
(Thompson, 1998). In Chapter Two I identified that a group of contemporary 
scholars sought to revise the concept so that it could regain some authority as an 
analytical tool, to be used to assess the ever-increasing prevalance of extreme 
social reactions. Two questions could be seen to underpin this ‘project’. The first 
was concerned in the main with the ideal-type concept and how it might make 
connections with or be informed by developments within social theory. It asked, 
‘what are moral panics extreme examples of?’ The second question was directly 
concerned with the ‘age of moral panic’ and asked ‘why do panics occur in 
particular spaces and times?’ Both questions sought to situate moral panic, though 
in different ways. The first question aimed to connect the descriptive processes 
with theoretical ideas with a view to use the ideal-type as a general elucidation, 
whereas the second wanted a specific contextual explanation for each ‘real-type’. 
My concern that there was a need to assess the relationship between the ideal-type 
concept and real-type episodes demanded that the relationship between theoretical 
ideas and contextual evidence also required investigation. Indeed, at this point my 
proposals were extended from a case-based assessment of how a real-type 
challenged the ideal-type to how the answer to why this or that case occurred (the 
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contextual question) could inform what panics are extreme examples of (the 
theoretical question).  
 
A review of the work of the scholars involved in the project of ‘rethinking moral 
panic’ revealed that both relationships were already under scrutiny by way of the 
two questions. However, I found that each thinker would place his/her emphasis 
upon different aspects of the questions and have a different idea of how the 
relationships were configured. Moreover, each would assume a different position 
in relation to some of the critiques that I identified in Chapter One; most notably 
the issue of normativity. Ungar (1992, 2001) for example, argued that the move to 
a ‘risk society’ meant that societies now faced ‘real’ existential problems. This 
contextual shift meant that real-type social reactions could not be appropriately 
assessed from the constructionist ideal-type model of moral panic. Ungar (1992, 
2001) did not, therefore, offer a conjecture of how moral panic could be located 
theoretically. Critcher’s (2003, 2006, 2008, 2009a, b) focus was upon how the 
ideal-type concept could be renewed for application across many real-type cases. 
However, by placing emphasis upon the constancies across real-types his 
assessment removed the need to assess the contexts in which cases emerged, and 
fortified the boundaries of the ideal-type, leaving it impenetrable to reflections 
from theory. On the other hand, Hier’s (2002a, b, 2008) emphasis upon how shifts 
in the appearance of internal discourses in real-type panics would lead to an idea 
of moral panic as an extreme example of moral regulation. This conjecture, 
however, would negate the specificity of the ideal-type insofar as it would group 
reactions to relatively benign problems (such as those to overeating) alongside 
more explosive issues (such as paedophilia). This reflects Hier’s (2002b, 2008) 
interpretation of panic responses as rational, considered action and his 
concomitant reluctancy to employ the analytical concept as a form of social 
critique. Rohloff (2008, 2010) also adopts this interpretation and this is what 
attracts her to the figurational sociology of Elias with its ‘relative detachment 
principle’. This perspective then guides her notion of real-type reactions as short-
term decivilising episodes that result from long-term civilising processes. 
However, the preservation of the ideal-type concept of panic is not apparent in her 
work.  
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Keen to demonstrate why my systematic view of the relationships could be 
informative for rethinking moral panic, I turned to a line of thought developing in 
the sociology of punishment. Garland (1996, 2001) conceptualised real-type 
responses to the problem of crime in late-modern life as two currents; the 
instrumental criminology of everyday life, and the emotional criminology of the 
other. Drawing from the work of Bataille, Hallsworth (2000) located the latter 
conception within the abstract spaces of the ‘heterogeniac’. Loader (2009), on the 
other hand, argued that the punitive and emotional nature of the criminology of 
the other could be seen alongside other social/cultural/political phenomena which 
could be characterised by appetites for excess. In my view, the relationships 
developing in this line of thought between material matter (real-type phenomena) 
and contextual trends, and between conceptual notions and theoretical locations 
were more clear than those of the project of rethinking moral panic had thus far 
achieved. Moreover, this literature was less concerned with inflecting a judgment 
of sorts, as responses to crime tend to be routinely situated along a continuum 
which has at one end retributive principles and at the other end the ethics of due 
process and a concern for human rights. Because of the concern with crime 
(which ‘killer kids’ was centred around), it also offered a possible theoretical 
location in which I could situate my case of moral panic. This will become 
evident in a moment.  
 
My methodology would cement these proposals. Concerned to study the case of 
‘killer kids’ by the ways in which it was ‘talked about’ I turned to the literature on 
discourse analysis. I found in Fairclough’s (1995b) framework for Critical 
Discourse Analysis a means by which I could capture the relationship between the 
real-type and the ideal-type at the same time as I could locate the real-type within 
its context. Fairclough’s (1995b) position that how something is ‘talked about’ is 
both affected by and affects the organisational logic of the particular discursive 
field in which that something is usually constructed by and the social and cultural 
environment in which it appears. This confirmed my proposals that real-types 
could affect the ideal-type and that the study of the contexts in which they (real-
types) emerged was fundamental. It followed that the location of the real-type 
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(and its relation to the ideal-type) would then enable me to conjecture what this 
moral panic was an extreme example of.  
 
Reworking Fairclough’s (1995b) framework for panic analysis, I argued that I 
would study my real-type case via the relationships between its content, its 
process, and its context. I would study the relationship of this real-type with 
Cohen’s (1972) ideal-type model of moral panic at two intersections. The first 
intersection (which I determined as the internal assessment) would be at the level 
of process where I would examine the relationship of the real-type practices 
involved in constructing the episode of killer kids with the cycle of amplification. 
This cycle is fundamental to the construction of moral panics. The second 
intersection (identified as the external assessment) would be adjacent to my 
examination of the ‘communicative event’ across the three parts of content, 
process, and context. Here, I would look at if and how the episode as a whole 
could be captured by Cohen’s (1972) opening paragraph as it is this paragraph 
that is most employed as the criteria by which panics are assessed. My findings 
are summarized in the next section.  
 
 
Describing, Interpreting, and Explaining the Case of ‘Killer Kids’  
 
Using documentary data, in Chapter Four (a study of content) I identified three 
countable discourses that could be seen over two phases. The reactive phase (the 
acute period of social reaction) was dominated by the discourse of moral reprisal 
and the discourse of social rescue. Each of these discourses were made up from 
interconnecting discursive threads which could be seen to follow a particular 
order; from their accounts of the murder of Michael Choy, to the anticipation of 
an emerging ‘problem’, to their identification of a social crisis on a much wider 
scale. These discourses differed substantially, however, in their character. The 
discourse of moral reprisal was remarkably conservative in its identification of a 
course from one pathological child, to dysfunctional families, to a permissive 
society. The discourse of social rescue, by contrast, took a more liberal position 
insofar as the crime was seen as a ‘prank’ gone astray (with less of a focus on 
Bailey Kurariki as unique), that it happened because of a lack of community co-
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ordination, and that its remedy was in the provision of adequate welfare services. 
As the furore settled not long following the sentencing of the offenders for the 
murder of Michael Choy, the ‘problem’ changed course quite dramatically. At this 
time the discourse of criminal risk took centre stage. This third discourse 
questioned the notion of justice and the idea of rehabilitation while advocating 
community safety and offender accountability. Spanning the next six years, the 
discourse of criminal risk was overall less concerned with what was wrong and 
what to do about it, but how to contain the offenders now that the immediate issue 
– the murder of Michael Choy – had been dealt with. Thereupon I identified that 
the discourse of criminal risk commanded the field in a phase of containment.  
 
Significant for the identification of a moral panic are the ways by which the 
discourses would interact and the consequences they would deliver. At the level 
of content the discourses in the reactive phase were seen to have developed in 
relation to each other, with the discourse of social rescue disputing and negating 
the definitions and remedies proposed by the discourse of moral reprisal. True to 
panic conditions, however, the more punitive discourse of moral reprisal would 
emerge as triumphant as the reactive phase came to a close. I argued that this 
could be seen with the degree of severity imposed in the custodial sentences 
handed down to the offenders and as the discourse of criminal risk emerged with 
calls for ‘just deserts’. Indeed, the conservative and punitive tone of the discourse 
of moral reprisal would surface and inflect upon the pragmatism of the discourse 
of criminal risk throughout its course.  
 
In Chapter Five (a study of process) I examined the practices of production and 
consumption through which the countable discourses described in Chapter Four 
could develop. I first interrogated the practices of crime news-making in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand by conducting semi-structured interviews with 
professional journalists. I discovered that there were seven ‘news values’ (in three 
broad sets) by which crime events would be chosen for news that were particular 
to this social-cultural-political environment. These were bad news/violence, 
chance/irrationality, extraordinariness, personalisation, dramatic tension, 
visualness, and emotion. Once chosen according to these values a crime story 
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would be constructed. The respondents testified that a narrative would develop 
according to events relating to the crime as they would come to light and/or the 
crime response process as it moved through its stages. They would gain 
knowledge of these developments from sources such as the police and the 
judiciary, and by what part of the process of court proceedings the event was 
subject to. To meet the requirements of the hard-news format, and as a result of 
contemporary shift away from a journalistic ethic to contextualise complex 
events, the story would be constructed in its most simplified terms. However, 
bearing upon the development of crime stories from raw events would be an 
impetus to present a melodramatic narrative whereupon good would triumph over 
bad. Usually these stories worked with one-dimensional characters (heroes and 
villains) that were culturally apposite; that is, understood in terms of the ‘usual 
suspects’ and ‘suitable victims’.  
 
These findings would be compelling for understanding why the Choy case made 
news, and for why the unfolding narrative subsequently lent itself to the 
development of a moral panic. First, the events of the crime were violent, 
seemingly irrational, and extraordinary insofar as the perpetrators were 
uncommonly young. Intersecting with the potential story was a number of 
developments in relation to the crime itself. Due to the remarkable timing of the 
murder in relation to events unfolding on the world stage (the attacks on the 
World Trade Centre in New York) the events would be refigured from those 
relating specifically to the murder to those of the trial a year later. These events 
(those of the trial) would then be subject to a series of unusual legal decisions. 
First, name suppression was continued for the accused for the duration of the trial. 
Second, the media were prohibited to take photographs inside the courtroom. 
Last, the crown was permitted to employ character evidence against the youngest 
of the accused. As a result, now presenting itself as the event was the name, 
photograph, and character of the youngest accused; the as-yet-to-be-revealed 
Bailey Kurariki. Indeed, it was only after his imagery appeared in the Sunday Star 
Times on August 25, 2002 that the story took a formative shape. I argued that it 
was at this point that the news value of visualness was met, and via this (the 
visual) that the values of personalisation (one child out of a possible six), emotion 
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(an idealistic child-like depiction), and dramatic tension (the iconologically 
irreconcilable union of the child as he appeared and the killer as he was known to 
be) would come into play.  
 
The unveiling of Bailey Kurariki also marked the beginnings of the internal sense 
of a moral panic ‘discursive logic’ or ‘order of discourse’; the cycle of 
amplification. Taking care to capture this real-type episode, I examined how this 
case would erupt and augment itself beyond what I assumed would be a 
reasonable measure of retribution against the offenders involved in the murder of 
Michael Choy, and for a perceived ‘problem’ to materialise that I had measured 
would turn out to have little to do with an objective reality. I found that the middle 
stage of the cycle described by Cohen (1972) – dramatisation – was already under 
way via the visibility of the event. This was then propelled further by the lexical 
cementation of the illogical association between Bailey’s youth and his role in the 
crime with the media employment of the historically significant label ‘New 
Zealand’s youngest killer’. This, I argued, set in motion the spurious attribution 
by which the discourse of moral reprisal would demonise Bailey as a pathological 
child, at the same time as it would locate a perpetual danger about his character, 
constructing the platform from which a campaign for more punitive sentences 
could later commence. However, in a process of sensitisation, editorials and 
opinion pieces laboured to put forward the idea that something was indeed out of 
order, but that it could not yet be determined what exactly it was. Upon a prolific 
redisplay by the media of the imagery, this something came to be interpreted as 
the disturbance between semblance and substance; that is, between the 
appearance of a child and how it was known that this child had not acted 
accordingly. This would suggest a more far-reaching and uncontrollable threat; 
that the look of innocence could be deceptive. Touching upon a prophetic 
statement about an angelic looking child that would be on his way to prison made 
some sixteen months prior, the media, drawing on some ‘expert opinion’, 
prescribed that action must be taken urgently. This process of escalation would 
prompt a series of identities to come forward and propose a series of remedies. 
Often opposed to each other (marking the development of the two opposing 
discourses in the reactive stage) some of these identities (and remedies) would 
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achieve success in their campaign via their ability to align themselves with expert 
opinion and draw into the fold the notion of common sense and an angry public. 
These identities, in other words, dispersed their version of the problem (to which 
their remedies addressed) in a process of diffusion. With the sentencing of the 
offenders the reactive phase came to a close, and the amplification cycle could be 
seen as almost complete. However, a process of exploitation would mark the 
beginning of the containment stage, and in doing so, reinvigorate the preceding 
stages of the cycle.110 Largely, this was due to the identities afforded media space 
at this point; the Sensible Sentencing Trust (SST) and Michael Choy’s mother, 
Rita Croskery (who, incidentally, had recently taken a formative role in the SST). 
For Mrs. Croskery, particularly, the disturbance between semblance and substance 
was a principle feature of the offenders (notably Bailey) in the crime against her 
son, and it was this disturbance she argued the given length of sentence could not 
control, especially with its routine provision for parole. In turn, she and the SST 
would support Member of Parliament Ron Mark’s development of the Young 
Offenders (serious crimes) Bill, which sought to subvert the risk of violent 
children by criminalizing them from the age of twelve.  
 
Concluding this chapter, I argued that the practices at work in the episode of 
‘killer kids’ were underpinned by a label, an interpretation upon the reception of 
Bailey’s imagery, an invoked public, a doctrine of common sense, a lobby group 
and a victim and a proposal for the criminalization of children from the age of 
twelve. In other words, it was this compilation of features that facilitated and 
sustained the productive practices of the media and each stage of the amplification 
cycle (which, in turn, intersected with each other). These practices enabled the 
discourse of moral reprisal to be both victorious in the closure of the reactive 
phase and influential in the development of the discourse of criminal risk in the 
containment phase.  
 
In order to demonstrate why these features would play an important role in the 
episode of ‘killer kids’, in Chapter Six (a study of context) I argued that they were 
                                                
110 Cohen (1972) identifies this as the ‘feedback’ feature of the amplification cycle. 
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dependent upon three facets of social phenomena. The first of these phenomena 
was the demonisation of children via particular race/space relations. The second 
was a set of punitive penal practices characterised by a realignment of power. 
Third, I located a society of spectacle in which the exhibition of the ‘other’ 
pertains to a racialised regime of representation. Looking at each relationship in 
turn, it was my argument that the historically significant label ‘New Zealand’s 
youngest killer’ was more than an immediate artefact of the murder of Michael 
Choy. It was an affirmation of a cultural correlation between criminality and the 
brown ‘other’. By employing ‘dog whistle’ politics the variable of race would, 
however, be masked with references to a particular space – South Auckland. 
Indeed, South Auckland would operate as a ‘code’ of sorts insofar as it was 
understood that this space was inhabited by disaffected and idle brown youth; 
criminal youth, and by using this code in relation to the murder of Michael Choy, 
a discourse of ‘mini-monsters’ that had proliferated western societies from the 
early 1990s was identified to have a local manifestation. However, through the 
identification of Bailey as New Zealand’s youngest killer, it was also proposed 
that the problems of South Auckland were potentially non-specific and 
contagious.  
 
I then discussed how the notion of a proposed infestation of mini-monsters 
provided just the case in point for the idea that the criminal justice system was 
inherently flawed. Evidence of this notion was the punitive manner in which the 
moral boundaries were ‘manned’, particularly by editors who, in turn, would draw 
upon a perceived public anger to substantiate their diagnoses. Later, with the 
development of the discourse of criminal risk in shift to the containment phase, 
and the proposal for a new law, this phenomenon of ‘penal populism’ – the trend 
towards a stronger resonance between governments and extra-establishment 
individuals and groups speaking on behalf of ‘the people’ in penal affairs – would 
accord an almost exclusive authority to both the SST and to Rita Croskery and 
their interpretation of ‘the problem’. For Rita especially, this would be a very 
personalised sense of victimisation, which she would then lend to the SST in her 
role as their victims ambassador.  
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Last, I explored how the imagery and its interpretation could be understood 
through the immediacy of vision, the truth of photography, and a fabled notion of 
appearances as deceptive when evil is at play. I argued that the news story was 
inexorably structured to follow a particular angle simply because words are 
secondary to what the eye has already witnessed, and what had been witnessed 
was the juxtaposition between the child and the criminal inherent in the news 
imagery of Bailey. As argued, this imagery was already highly constructed; 
dependent on the timing of the event/s and a series of legal decisions made during 
the trial. However, as a photograph it denied this construction, presenting itself as 
objective, truthful. As an image of a criminal, it was more than truthful; it was 
evidential. Intersecting with this truth evidence nexus, however, was a primordial 
understanding that the ‘face of an angel’, which Bailey’s imagery was actively 
received as, could be reminiscent of the anti-Christ’s capacity to appear as an 
‘angel of light’. I argued that it was from this space that an understanding of ‘evil 
in our midst’ was cemented. Yet a further intersection would circumscribe that 
this evil was confinable. I argued that the face of Bailey Kurariki belonged within 
a regime of representation pertaining to a racialised conception of the ‘other’ 
child. Thus, the imagery was not deceptive, but operated as a confirmation of the 
other child as inherently bad.  
 
At the intersection of process I considered how the practices in the construction of 
the real-type case could be seen in relation to a cycle of amplification model. At 
the conclusion of the study of the case via the three-part framework of content, 
process, and context, I then considered how the episode could be captured by 
Cohen’s (1972) opening paragraph of Folk Devils. In both instances I argued there 
was little challenge to an ideal-type moral panic by the phenomenon of ‘killer 
kids’. Indeed, though the stages of the cycle of amplification were ‘out of order’ 
insofar as the cycle began with the dramatisation of Bailey Kurariki’s appearance 
and would end with the exploitation of the case by Rita Croskery and the SST, 
and by Ron Mark in his development of the Young Offenders (serious crimes) 
Bill, this impacted little if at all on the development of each stage nor on the 
augmentation of the ‘problem’ as a whole. Indeed, what it does is authenticate the 
circular nature of deviance amplification (see Cohen, 1972). On the other hand, 
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because the episode would be aptly captured by Cohen’s (1972) opening 
paragraph in spite of its real-type particularties, I inferred that the ideal-type is 
more abstract than perhaps is acknowledged, and definitively more descriptive 
than it is formulaic. This challenged my assumption that the ideal-type might be 
rethought in relation to how real-types unfold. My corresponding assumption that 
why a panic occurred could be informative for what moral panics are extreme 
examples of was, nevertheless, validated. In the next section I look at how the 
three social phenomena identified as the backcloth to the emergence of ‘killer 
kids’ can all be seen in terms of the appetites for excess that were discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
 
Moral Panic as an Extreme Example of the Expenditure of Excess Energy 
 
I suggest, tentatively, that the three phenomena that can explain why the case of 
killer kids emerged, can all be seen for their ‘festive’ features. Moreover, for each 
this festivity can be seen as the product of an appetite. The ‘holy war’ against 
dissident children, for example, labours to make spectacular its identification of 
the ‘other child’ as it evicts this child from the category of the quintessential child. 
At the heart of this eviction is a desire to maintain the innocence and naivity of 
the ‘child’ as it has been constructed in modern life. Yet, this ‘war’ has no time or 
the will to invest in the welfare of this ‘other child’, nor address the conditions 
and ideologies that sustain its segregation. Similarly, as seen, the punitiveness of 
late-modern penal order thrives upon the magical and commonsensical notions of 
populist organisations and power-savvy politicians. It has little patience for 
research based, long-term solutions to the problem of crime. Last, the society of 
spectacle is marked by a demand for immediacy. Where crime is concerned, this 
spectacle is obliged to give evidence, and this evidence is accepted as truth 
regardless of how ‘staged’ the visuality of a criminal event might be. Indeed, what 
marks these appetites is the very same shortsighted drive for instant self-
gratification that Loader (2009) speaks of in relation to features of late-modern 
living.  
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Intersecting with the festivity apparent in each of these phenomena is the appetite 
of the modern media. This is a feature emphasised by those concerned to 
demonstrate that developments in media practices have implications for moral 
panic construction (see McRobbie, 1994b; Watney, 1987). My own research 
revealed that guiding what is selected for crime news are the festivities inherent in 
violence, irrationality, drama and emotion. My respondents declared that media 
professionals will ‘wring the emotion’ and ‘maximise the drama’ in order to 
‘appeal to’ a constituency they understand to have become numb to the problem 
of crime. They then argued that their craft draws upon and reinforces stereotypes 
along the primary stratifications of race, gender, class, age, and sexuality as a 
melodrama of good versus evil is inflected upon crime news stories. Further, it 
was seen that the modern media regularly employ and exploit the connotative 
qualities of images to shape their narratives. In the case of ‘killer kids’ the media 
drew upon the stereotype of the criminal brown youth and fortified it with the 
truth of a news image, and the evidence of a crime image. Indeed, so powerful 
was this nexus that it over-rode Bailey’s immediate appearance as the 
quintessential child, and firmly placed him in the childhood of the ‘other’.  
 
If, as I have proposed, the why of ‘killer kids’ is intimate to an understanding of 
what the ideal-type concept might be an extreme example of, it would follow that 
the notion of appetites for excess might also be what each process of moral panic 
describes. In turn, it might be argued that moral panic can be explained as an 
processual expenditure of energy where, in any particular instance, appetites are 
charged and discharged. Indeed, each independent stage of Cohen’s (1972) 
opening paragraph can be seen to describe the routine and regular discharge of 
excess energy (for instance, a deviant minor is portrayed in a stereotypical way by 
the media). It is energy that is discharged into nothing productive should this 
stage remain unconnected to any other appetite. A moral panic can be said to 
occur when appetites meet and are discharged at the same time (the deviant minor 
is portrayed in a stereotypical way at the same moment as ‘right-thinking’ people 
call for retributive justice). In this way, the energy discharged by each stage 
charges another and becomes productive as a cycle of amplification gets to work. 
However, ultimately the process is still an expenditure, or the discharge of surplus 
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energy. This can be seen in – and would explain – its volatile, temporal nature, 
and the ways by which the measures that are put in place as solutions are often 
only symbolic. Indeed, it is my proposal that a moral panic can be understood as 
an extreme example of the expenditure of surplus energy.  
 
Content, Process, Context: An Approach to Moral Panic  
 
I stated in the Introduction that my contribution to the scholarship of moral panic 
would be my approach – a real-type/ideal-type assessment via the three-part 
framework of content, process, and context. This remains so, despite the above 
conjecture. For moral panic to regain some authority as a sociological concept, it 
is imperative that assessments demonstrate the complexity of individual cases at 
the same time as they identify the commonalities or constancies between panics 
as these shift or remain the same (see Critcher, 2003, 2006). Thus I contend there 
must be a first commitment to the relationship between the analytical concept and 
its real-life manifestations (the real-type/ideal-type equation). Second, because a 
real-type is always dependent upon its social/cultural/political environment, there 
needs to be a commitment to examining the relationship between real-type 
contexts and ideal-type speculations. This is especially so if we are to continue to 
‘rethink’ moral panic as an ‘extreme example’ of something.  
 
My approach through the three tiers of content, process, and context has offered 
one way by which to assess the real-type/ideal-type relationship and to understand 
why a said reaction occurred. Through identifying how the content of ‘killer kids’ 
was constructed via a set of practices and processes, and by then locating the 
substance of these practices and processes within wider social ‘goings-on’, my 
understanding of what this episode uncovered established a firm foundation for 
explaining moral panic. Of course, whether a moral panic is indeed an extreme 
example of the expenditure of excess energy can only be suggestive at this stage, 
with the assessment of only one case. I look forward to what further studies will 
offer; if the concept will be understood in relation to real-type manifestations, 
whether the study of context will be important, how these contexts are employed 
toward locating moral panic theoretically, and what those locations entail. 
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Some Closing Thoughts  
 
To close I want to consider how my approach and the conjecture it has facilitated 
can address two related things; how to subvert reactions that we deem 
disproportional, and how to negate the charge of normativity that has become 
something of an Archilles heel for moral panic research.  
 
Loader (2009) poses the question of how to get off the infinite treadmill of 
insecurity that politicians in many western societies appear to have jumped upon. 
As I was nearing the end of my writing for this thesis I attended a symposium on 
punishment at Victoria University of Wellington, where I am a student. The 
discussion turned, after much despair had gone back and forth about the direction 
in which punishment in Aotearoa/New Zealand was heading, to the question of 
how to abort the punitive turn; to diffuse the emotion and disconnect the varied 
practices that have come together in its development. Answers were not 
forthcoming. Perhaps I have one here. By understanding extreme social reactions 
(like moral panics) as processual discharges of excess energy, we could diffuse 
the fever and disconnect the practices that propel them by anticipating that surplus 
energy will be present, accepting that it needs to be discharged, and by directing 
or channelling that energy in ways that differ to how it materialises presently. 
Hallsworth (2000) warns of a return to a premodern spectacle of justice, however. 
He argues that the modern principles of rationality (inherent in the restricted 
economy of limits) have (perhaps inadvertently) facilitated the humanistic goals 
of the enlightenment and that these should be retained. One can not but agree, but 
the question is, thereupon, how to avoid such a return. Bataille (1988) argues that 
only when loss has been experienced can the true value of something be known. 
This loss – or the profitless expenditure of excess energy – ensures an equilibrium 
is coded into the exchanges of social relations. Bataille (1988) determines that any 
such expenditure will be either glorious or catastrophic in nature. But perhaps it 
need not be so dramatic, and involve only some form of non-constructive or 
inconvenient activity on behalf of the practitioner. Perhaps, for example, the state 
could direct its energies not into the making of retributive laws, but into the 
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unprofitable (unprofitable in terms that the state’s sovereignty is not strengthened) 
redress (say, financially) to victims of crime. Perhaps the media could also pay a 
financial dividend to those whom it stalks outside courtrooms and from behind 
private fences, given that it sells papers with stories forged from such actions. 
This would arguably change some decision making about what is newsworthy and 
what is not. Perhaps, alternatively, children could be allowed to make mistakes, to 
be forgiven for their premature impulses and not categorised into a binary of 
ideals and infractions. I suggest that it is ironic that the ultimate moral expression: 
the act of punishment, is tempered – eventually – by cost. It is also wholly ironic 
that underpinning Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ‘world-leading’ approach to youth 
justice – in particular the FGC (family group conference) that was under attack in 
the episode of ‘killer kids’ – are equalizing principles (see Becroft, 2003).  
 
Relatedly, the notion that panics are where surplus energy is expended may 
diffuse the problem of normativity. The first step, of course, is to contextualise the 
reaction; the panic. In this way an understanding of why it erupted is gained. If the 
episode can then be understood as dependent upon phenomena which in turn can 
be seen as appetites, its appropriateness as a discharge of the energy those 
appetites have mustered may be appraised. This is because the appraisal relies 
upon locating the panic research within the ‘restricted economy of limits’ (where 
thought is accepted as ‘rational’) and the panic in question as a manifestation of 
the alternate but equally valid ‘economy of excess’ (where all hell breaks loose). 
It proposes that if the principles of the Enlightenment are to be retained, it is the 
direction of that energy that is astray rather than its presence per se. Indeed, by 
thinking, as students and scholars of these extreme social reactions, not in terms 
of irrational ‘panic’ but in terms of ‘energy in this or that direction’, or ‘energy in 
the service of’, the way by which our ‘judgment’ is received may shift. Perhaps, 
with that, our concept will once again prove quite delicious.  
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Appendix 
 
Interview Questions 
 
1. Could you describe for me a perfect crime story (either one you have 
covered, or one you can imagine). What about it makes it ideal? 
2. Where do you source your information for crime stories? Why?  
3. What narrative structures would you follow in developing a crime story 
for news? Are these structures particular to crime stories?  
4. Who are you most likely to call upon to give your story ‘balance’, or to 
emphasize a particular angle? Why?  
5. If you are reporting on a story that is already ‘in the news’, how important 
is it for you, professionally, to follow the existing angle? 
6. Who do you imagine your audience is? How does this impact upon the 
way you write the story? 
7. What level of responsibility do you accord the media for how a crime or 
social issue is understood by the public? 
8. What are your thoughts on the statement “in recent years there has been an 
increasing emphasis on entertainment in New Zealand [television] news, 
with a higher priority being given to conflict, drama, and emotion”? (Abel, 
1997: 10).   
9. In relation to question 8, what impact might this have on how you 
construct a story?  
10. It has been argued by one media commentator that “there is little evidence 
of biculturalism in news agendas, but rather a focus – consistent over time 
– on Maori as problems, criminal, radical, dangerous” (Matheson, 2007: 
93). As a professional in the field, what are your thoughts on this 
observation? 
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